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PREFACE 
Austrians tend to be preoccupied with the idiosyncrasies of their own mentality. The 
Austrian soul (die österreichische Seele) and its various crises of identity have been 
the objects of all kinds of analyses, ranging from Erwin Ringel’s psychological 
inquiries to Helmut Qualtinger’s satirical caricatures, whose black humour is typical 
of the entertainment seen in the Austrian cabaret. The reasons for this self-
questioning obsession are manifold and partially roorted in the multiculturalism of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Vienna of the fin de siècle was not only the capital 
but also the cultural meeting place for intellectuals from all corners of the Empire. 
This creative atmosphere was characterized by the exchange of ideas among various 
schools, circles, groups, and individuals, and nourished by Vienna’s thriving 
coffeehouse culture. The decline and eventual dissolution, in 1918, of the Habsburg 
Monarchy, reactivated once again the problematic issue of Austrian identity, an 
identity defined mainly in contrast to Germany, its neighbour to the north.  
Numerous scholars have tried both to define and to account for the existence of 
Austrian traditions in various cultural fields. The extensive work of philosophers 
such as Rudolf Haller and Barry Smith has substantiated the claim, expressed earlier 
by Otto Neurath in the manifesto of the Vienna Circle, that there are distinct 
Austrian traditions in philosophy. Literary critics such as Claudio Magris, Ulrich 
Greiner, and Robert Menasse investigated similar claims about typically Austrian 
features in literature. 
We invited leading experts on these topics to participate in an international 
conference, Writing the Austrian Traditions (May 12-14, 2000 at Woodsworth 
College, University of Toronto), in order to discuss some of the significant 
connections between Austrian literary and philosophical traditions. The articles 
collected in the present volume emerged from this conference. 
In the opening article “The Austrian Plato,” Wendelin Schmidt-Dengler gives 
an overview of Austrian responses to Plato and Platonism by drawing on 
overlapping philosophical, literary, and philological discourses. He includes 
examples from such writers as Franz Grillparzer, Heinrich Gomperz, Hermann 
Broch, and Karl Popper, all of whom are representative of Austrian literary and 
intellectual history. The mainly anti-idealistic responses pertained to artistic and 
philosophical questions rather than to systematic philosophical issues. Against the 
background of the enduring seductiveness of Plato’s thought, Schmidt-Dengler 
argues, the Austrian responses apparently strive to avoid a thorough discussion of 
Plato’s metaphysics. 
Fred Wilson argues for a more careful assessment of Freud’s work, given recent 
criticism of the unscientific aspects of Freud’s psychoanalytic method, in his article 
“The Vienna Circle and Freud.” He discusses the examination of psychoanalysis in 
the works of Gustav Bergmann, who was one of the younger members of the Vienna 
Circle, and of Egon Brunswik, who was closely associated with this group. On the 
whole, both accepted the scientific claims of Freud despite some negative tendencies 
in psychoanalysis such as the teleological thinking so characteristic of German 
Romantic philosophy. After commenting on Adolf Grünbaum’s work on the 
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methodological status of psychoanalysis, Wilson suggests that Freud provided 
reasonable grounds to consider his theory scientific even according to the criteria 
proposed by the Vienna Circle. The relationships between the Freudians in Vienna 
and the Vienna Circle were not merely personal; similar cultural and ethical aims on 
both sides situated them in broader philosophical contexts. Wilson concludes by 
looking at their shared background, which includes Nietzsche, neo-Kantian 
philosophy, and the traditions of Enlightenment and humanism. 
In his article “Wittgenstein – Poetry and Literature,” Rudolf Haller explores the 
philosopher’s attitudes toward literature and art. According to Haller, Wittgenstein 
remained critical of cultural modernity; neither his writings nor his reading list 
renders examples of modern(ist) literature. Economic and social modernization as 
well as cultural and intellectual modernity from the turn of the century to the 1930s 
provide the background for his anti-modernistic responses. Haller emphasizes that 
Wittgenstein’s conservative taste in poetry and music should not be mistaken for 
political neo-conservativism. Wittgenstein’s exposure to the journals Die Fackel and 
Der Brenner, and his interest in Trakl, Anzengruber, Dostoevskii, and Tolstoi prove 
that to split Wittgenstein into the analytic philosopher, on the one hand, and the 
artist striving for perfection of form, on the other, is misleading. Haller states that 
unification of such a split character is a precondition for interpreting Wittgenstein’s 
views of culture. His concerns for language and, specifically, for form and style, are 
consistent with his views on life and life-form which, in turn, are bound up with 
questions of morality, faith, religious experience, and mysticism. 
John Gibson shows in his article “Reality & The Language of Fiction,” how we 
can use Wittgenstein’s theory of language in the context of the theory of literature. 
The prevalent trend in many contemporary theories of literature, Gibson argues, is to 
conceive of literary language as a self-referential use of language, one which does 
not and cannot reach beyond the “world of the text” to touch the nature and reality 
of the world of the reader of literary texts. The late Wittgenstein demonstrates that 
since language provides our point of contact with reality, it is by examining the 
structure of language, of linguistic convention and practice, that we investigate our 
linguistic connection to reality. Literature, Gibson argues, is capable of providing 
this sort of Wittgensteinian investigation. Accordingly, the popular idea that we can 
segregate a literary text from reality is theoretically flawed, since literature’s use of 
a common social language reveals a way of understanding how it can weave our 
world into the very words it uses to construct its fictional worlds. 
Newton Garver argues in his article “The ‘Silence’ of Wittgenstein and Kraus” 
that Wittgenstein’s famous slogan to keep silent whereof one cannot speak is more 
than the climactic expression of his philosophical program in his early book, the 
Tractatus. Wittgenstein’s silence is instead a life-long practice, an activity rather 
than a mere absence of speaking, related to Goethe’s phrase “In the beginning was 
the deed.” Garver points out that this understanding of silence as an activity rather 
than an absence could also account for Wittgenstein’s admiration of the Quakers, a 
religious group whose practices have various parallels to Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical program. His views on silence as well as his life-long silence about 
political matters, Garver argues, were strongly influenced by Karl Kraus, an 
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extremely productive writer who, nevertheless, found silence the most effective 
reaction to some of the political developments in his lifetime, notably in his 
comment “I cannot think of anything to say about Hitler.” 
Barry Smith discusses three interrelated topics at the heart of the thinking of 
Karl Kraus in his contribution “Kraus on Weininger, Kraus on Women, Kraus on 
Serbia.” In the first part of his paper Smith gives a concise outline of Otto 
Weininger’s position on sex, value, and morality. Smith shows that Weininger’s 
ethics is strongly influenced by Kant, and that Weininger formulates an extreme 
version of Kantian ethics, which he then applies to the distinction between male and 
female. In the second part of his paper, Smith argues that Kraus turns Weininger’s 
work on its head: Kraus, like Weininger, accepts the basic distinction between male 
and female aspects, but whereas Weininger detests female aspects and believes 
every person has a moral obligation to try to become more man and less woman, 
Kraus loves women precisely for their female aspects and criticises the attempts of 
some women to become man, as in the case of Alice Schalek, an Austrian war 
correspondent he disparages as a “male-female perversion.” 
Concentrating on the theory of fiction, Dale Jacquette, in his article on “David 
Lewis on Meinongian Logic of Fiction,” defends Meinong’s position against 
objections raised by David Lewis. Meinongian semantic domains admit existent and 
nonexistent objects, including objects ostensibly referred to in works of fiction, and 
permit reference and true predication of constitutive properties to existent and 
nonexistent objects alike. Lewis proposes an alternative to Meinong’s object theory 
that considers the truth of a sentence in a work of fiction only within an explicit 
story-context. Jacquette argues that Lewis-style modal story-contexting is not 
incompatible with a Meinongian logic of fiction and suggests that it needs to be 
combined with a Meinongian semantics of fiction in order to avoid both Lewis’s 
objections to Meinongian object theory and Meinongian objections to Lewis’s story-
context-prefixing. 
A particular form of the relation between philosophy and literature, namely the 
actual meeting of a writer and a philosopher, is the topic of Wolfgang Huemer’s 
contribution to this volume. Huemer discusses a letter Edmund Husserl wrote Hugo 
von Hofmannsthal shortly after Hofmannsthal had visited him. In this letter, Husserl 
compares the phenomenological reduction to Hofmannsthal’s theory of aesthetic 
experience. The letter was written at a time when Husserl was just beginning to 
develop the phenomenological reduction and was still struggling with a way to 
introduce this new method. Huemer analyses why Husserl does not continue to use 
this comparison to introduce his new ideas. He shows that while the comparison had 
clear limitations for Husserl’s early version of the phenomenological reduction, a 
comparison with Hofmannsthal’s later aesthetic theory, especially his Lord Chandos 
Letter, could have provided Husserl with a strong tool to introduce his later version 
of the phenomenological method. 
In his article “The ‘Soft Law’ of Austrian Historical Logic since the 
Enlightenment in the Arts and Sciences,” Mark E. Blum approaches the distinctive 
features of Austrian historical reasoning as in contrast to German traditions. 
National historical logics respond to political-social experience and are interpretive 
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norms that structure the understanding of how events of public and private life are 
ordered causally over time. Blum characterizes Austrian historical logic, which 
arose with the Habsburg authority in Europe, as a morphological logic that functions 
like a family dynasty. With its sense of an evolving form bridging times and places, 
this type of logic privileges the non-dramatic, non-dialectical, or the Gestalt. 
Examples from writers, philosophers, and political scientists support his claim that 
Austrian historical logic favors models of the “one in the many,” of interdependence 
and empathy. 
In his article on “Mathematics in Musil,” Randall R. Dipert focuses on 
mathematics as an important leitmotif in Robert Musil’s work. He points out that 
Musil’s view of mathematical metaphysics lies close to his “secular mysticism,” but 
is notably different from the views of his contemporaries, such as Thomas Mann or 
Hermann Broch. Musil’s views are even further removed from the outright hostility 
toward scientific and excessively rational thinking, a hostility that flourished in the 
shadow of Heidegger and that came to be regarded as informing Nazism. Dipert 
argues that the traditional interpretation of Musil, according to which Musil is seen 
as a kind of literary exponent of logical positivism, is profoundly mistaken.  
Jill Scott argues in her contribution “Oedipus Endangered: Atrean Incest and 
Ethical Relations in Musil’s Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften” that Musil’s 
masterpiece threatens the psychoanalytical master narrative of Freud’s Oedipus. 
Without staging a direct polemic, Mann ohne Eigenschaften has the Atrean myth of 
Electra usurp the singular, masculine-gendered subject position of the Oedipal 
model. In addition, the Electra myth serves as a platform for a critically engaged 
dialog with Ernst Mach’s theories of the provisional ego and sensation body. Tacitly 
referring, among others, to Johann Jacob Bachofen and Friedrich Nietzsche, the 
novel gives rise to a new ideal of femininity and an alternative relational ethics. 
The state of morality in an epochal “Zerfall der Werte” is a core topic of 
Hermann Broch’s cultural-philosophical Schlafwandler Trilogie, which is a fine 
example of the late modernist novel in German-language literature. In his article “A 
Symposium as Ornament? Hermann Broch’s Schlafwandler Trilogie and the 
Discourse of Art and Philosophy in the Modern Novel,” Mark Grzeskowiak 
considers how Broch’s conception of a new type of novel based on unity is achieved 
in Die Schlafwandler and how it relates to modernist architectural debates around 
the fin de siècle. The passage “Symposion oder Gespräch über die Erlösung” from 
the trilogy’s third part “Huguenau oder die Sachlichkeit” is singled out for the 
distinction between the ornament (which has contextual function) and decoration 
(which is purely aesthetic). If the whole trilogy, like this passage, is decorative, then 
the question about the novel’s status as (late) modernist might have to be reviewed 
in light of postmodernism.  
We are extremely pleased that we can conclude this collection of studies with 
recent examples from the poetic work of Franz Josef Czernin. The contemporary 
Austrian writer is known for his diverse literary interests and techniques ranging 
from the traditional to the experimental. With publication beginning in 1978, his 
extensive work includes theoretical-critical texts and is informed by a highly self-
reflective position. Austrian language criticism and Wittgensteinian philosophy are 
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just two of the contexts that Czernin competently and creatively engages with 
philosophical questions about language, poetics, and realism. Czernin both 
thematizes and applies such questions to his literary work without reducing poetic 
speech to a mere vehicle of theoretical claims. 
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I. 
It is not my intention to give Austrian philosophy or literature any credit for special 
achievements as far as the discussion of Platonism is concerned. On the contrary, 
Austrian writers and thinkers have tended to steer clear of Plato and thus more or 
less ignore a thinker and artist whom one cannot avoid if one is to deal with thought 
and art at all. The responses of Austrian authors to Plato’s works seem to me, on the 
whole, interesting, particularly as strategies of avoidance that are, in turn, revealing 
in the sense that they determine one’s own position. In the discussion on Plato, the 
philosophical, the aesthetic, the literary, and even the philological discourses would 
seem to overlap, and therefore the following paper should also be regarded as a 
minor contribution to the history of these four disciplines and thus as shedding light 
on a context which is by no means insignificant for Austrian literary and intellectual 
history. I hasten to add that the point is not to discuss individual aspects of 
Platonism, but instead to present an overall picture, and to focus on those points that 
have aroused the interest of a variety of writers. 
II. 
Plato’s place is marked also by controversy in the history of German philosophy and 
literature. Hölderlin, for example, praised him in a hymn as a person who created 
paradise, and then condemned him in Hyperion as an enemy of poets. In his novel 
Aristipp, Wieland portrays him as a liar who has betrayed the legacy of Socrates 
through his reports. And we are familiar with the negative views that Nietzsche 
expressed on the creator of a theory of ideas and his mentor Socrates. The contours 
of this dispute cannot be dealt with here even generally. Suffice it to say that 
German literature and philosophy tended to regard Plato as an incontrovertible fact 
involving the creation of a self-sufficient system and theory of ideas that has left us 
with the unavoidable point of departure for any discussion of metaphysics. Similar 
coherence will hardly be found among the views expressed by Austrian writers, 
although his name and his achievements – even if there is no express mention of 
them – play a key role for many of them, although it is a role that is scarcely 
discernible on the surface. 
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III. 
As is evident from his diaries, Franz Grillparzer read Plato throughout his life. There 
are entries on Plato from 1820 all the way up to the year of his death in 1862. He 
read Plato primarily in the original; later in life, due to his failing eyesight, he turned 
to German translations.1 The point of departure for Grillparzer’s scepticism toward 
philosophy and German philosophy in particular arises due to the neglect of 
psychology in German thinking, on the one hand, and Grillparzer’s admiration of 
the physicist and perspicacious psychologist Lichtenberg on the other: “O 
Lichtenberg Lichtenberg, why were you snatched so early from your fatherland!” he 
laments in 1809.2 And in 1816, he jots down the following from the Spectator: “Our 
disputants put me in mind of the scuttle-fish, that when he is unable to extricate 
himself, blackens all the water about him until he becomes invisible” and concludes 
the entry with the question: “Philosophers?”3 In his notes on Plato and Aristotle his 
chief aim is to find the basis among the Greek philosophers for the works of Kant 
and Hegel, and with respect to the latter, he writes: “In the final analysis, this 
Hegelian system is, indeed, based on Platonic ideas.”4 It is worth noting that this is 
the only place where Grillparzer makes any reference at all to the theory of ideas. 
The purpose of his notes is apparently not so much to emphasize the general, but 
instead the particular. Thus, in Phaedrus he does not perceive much more than the 
sublime criticism of a speech by Lysias rather than a treatise on rhetoric and beauty 
or – as Schleiermacher assumed – dialectics. There is only one lesson to be drawn 
from Grillparzer’s selective perception: rhetoric without dialectics is a futile 
undertaking. Naturally, Plato did, in Grillparzer’s view, advance far beyond the 
topic under discussion – as in the case of every major writer the actual reason for 
writing is taken up only to go to a point beyond.5 Grillparzer never tries to pin Plato 
down to a system; he appears only to have taken note of the aporias, which 
concerned him most. In a note he made in 1862 we read:  
The main task of Socrates, one which Plato continued in his dialogs, was 
obviously the following: to get the Athenians – such a wonderful people, 
the likes of which have never again been known in history, who, 
however, because of their sanguine temperament had a flaw, which was 
to undertake the most important things only in response to a whim, to 
some kind of feeling or passion – used to thinking, used to the 
investigation he calls dialectics. For that reason, the inquiry is always 
carried out with painstaking precision, the result, however, is lacking, 
although in philosophy the result ought indeed to be the main issue.6 
On repeated occasions, Grillparzer mentions the “hogwash” which he compares to 
the verbose speech in tragedies; his explanation for this, and he is likely right, is the 
tendency of the Athenians toward “Räsonnement.”7 The form of these dialogs is, in 
his eyes, superior to their philosophical validity. Philosophy appears to be less a 
matter of teaching or theory that is capable of being transformed into a state of the 
highest abstraction, than an activity, a working with and on words. The achievement 
of Plato is precisely the work on language: “Plato [is] entirely modern in the 
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emotional dissection of the original notions.”8 It is not the definition that is 
fascinating, but the dissection; not the result, but the process of analysis. 
It is safe to say that for Grillparzer Plato was the only recognized authority 
among the philosophers. Everything that philosophy has otherwise to show for itself 
is preformed in him and his work.9 Grillparzer is more interested in the procedure. 
Thus, it is not without reason that he takes note of the “stationary” element that 
distinguishes the tragedies of Aeschylus and transforms itself into garrulousness in 
the works of Sophocles and Euripides.10 Grillparzer’s interest is focused neither on 
epistemology nor on the ethical or political maxims. What concerns him is the 
formal quality of this thinking which seems to be self-sufficient in its aimlessness. 
Philosophy appears to have been a therapy for the Athenians, and it is precisely the 
inconclusiveness of the dialogs which leads Grillparzer to esteem the “divine 
Plato.”11 It is as if he wanted to overlook the consequences of Plato’s train of 
thought simply in order to better appreciate the rhetorical and psychological 
dimension. And because these dialogs present themselves as works of art, they have 
validity and permanence for Grillparzer, who also claims to see life in the Age of 
Antiquity mirrored there in a highly concrete fashion. What Plato’s philosophy loses 
in validity from a theoretical standpoint tends to become more binding from a 
practical point of view. 
IV. 
In nineteenth-century Austrian philosophy Plato obviously plays a less significant 
role than does Aristotle. When Theodor Gomperz wrote his Greek Thinkers he 
appears to have approached Plato with major reservations. Accordingly, the Greek 
Thinkers deserve attention solely by virtue of their influence on a wide range of 
personalities. For Karl Popper, for instance, they became an important authority. 
Benito Mussolini, for his part, gave them careful study,12 and Sigmund Freud ranked 
them among the ten most important books in his life.13 
Theodor Gomperz’s son Heinrich wrote extensively about the reservations his 
father had about Plato. His father spent more than three years working on the 
sections on Plato, but it seems that during the course of this work he clearly changed 
his mind about the Greek philosopher. According to the son, the material simply 
became too much for his father, whose difficulties were also increased by a certain 
inability to relate to the key points of Platonic thought (theory of ideas, immortality, 
religious-conservative attitude).14 Theodor Gomperz had certainly given credit to 
Plato, Heinrich Gomperz said, but he had given a condescending smile to the theory 
of ideas and had argued that the idea of immortality and the uplifting power of 
virtue was not supported by good arguments and that the ideal state was scarcely 
within the realm of human capabilities. But his father had, Heinrich Gomperz went 
on, identified Plato as the discoverer of association of ideas, regarding him as a 
precursor of the emancipation of women and praising him as the originator of an 
electoral process for the representation of minorities. All in all, his father had not 
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succeeded in presenting the unity of Plato’s thought, but, at the same time, had 
never tried to press the wide range of thoughts into the Procrustean bed of a system.  
Theodor Gomperz saw himself forced to expose the fallacies of Platonism, and 
this was not to be without consequence. On the other hand, the Platonic dialogs 
seemed to him to be the place for “free, unconditional dialog, inquiry, and 
research.”15 The fact that he supported the philosophy of experience of someone like 
Democritus and condemned the theory of ideas is typical of philologists at the end 
of the nineteenth century. But the fact that he succumbed to the “spell of Plato” is 
equally understandable – as is the fact that he changed his mind about Plato while he 
was working on the book. Grillparzer, for his part, simply ignored the theory of 
ideas; it appeared to him to be relatively uninteresting, and he did not concern 
himself with the unity of Platonic thought either. Theodor Gomperz distanced 
himself from the theory of ideas, and he also lost sight of this unity of thought. 
Instead, he became more and more interested in the formal qualities of the 
individual dialogs, especially in the procedure Plato used to present his arguments.  
Crucial to the intellectual development of Theodor Gomperz was his close 
association with British philology, philosophy, and social sciences. He dealt very 
intensively with the works of George Grote and John Stuart Mill. Mill’s review of 
Grote’s book on Plato found its way into the German edition of Mill’s writings, for 
which Gomperz was responsible. The review appeared in the twelfth and final 
volume, and it had been translated by none other than the young doctor of medicine 
Siegmund [sic!] Freud.16 Freud had been given the job of translation at the 
recommendation of Brentano.17 The bias against the metaphysicist Plato is clearly 
evident in Mill’s writings; however, this rejection of the philosopher goes hand in 
hand with a re-evaluation of the dialectician:  
The real merits, however, of the Platonic dialectics are not dependent on 
this religious and metaphysical superstructure; and before we follow 
Plato farther on that slippery ground, we must dwell a little on the debt 
mankind owe to him for this, incomparably his greatest gift.18 
On repeated occasions Mill attempts – in concordance with Grote – to emphasize 
Plato’s importance as a dialectician rather than as a moralist, although he is aware 
that Plato was, first and foremost, definitely a moralist.19 At the same time both 
scholars are conscious of the inconsistencies of Platonic thought, especially in 
respect of the definition of virtue.20 The previously admired theory of ideas thus met 
its death “in a fog of mystical Pythagoreanism.”21  
Anglo-Saxon criticism of Plato tends to focus on the dialog Theaetetus because 
it concerns the essential question as to what “knowledge” is. I will not here go into 
Plato’s complex line of argumentation against the celebrated epigram of Protagoras 
“homo-mensura” and George Grote’s defense of it, but what is important in this 
context is that, while Grote and Mill indeed recognize that the course of the dialog is 
inconclusive, at the same time they consider the questions it raises as essential to 
philosophy itself. Grote concludes – and in so doing wins approval from Mill – that 
the following is the key to Gomperz’s approach: All of Plato’s critics are 
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preoccupied with the notion that they are dealing with a body of ideas and a ready-
made system, 
even when professedly modifying it. Their admiration for Plato is not 
satisfied unless they conceive him in the professorial chair as a teacher, 
surrounded by a crowd of learners, all under the obligation (incumbent 
on learners generally) to believe what they hear. Reasoning upon such a 
basis, the Platonic dialogues present themselves to me as a mystery. They 
exhibit neither identity of the teacher, nor identity of the matter taught: 
the composer (to use various Platonic comparisons) is Many, and not 
One – he is more complex than Typhôs.22  
Gomperz tries to provide a precise analysis of the various attempts to define what 
constitutes knowledge: The fact that the source of our knowledge is sensual 
perception makes this dialog in particular important and interesting for philosophical 
debate even in the twentieth century.23 Here, again, it is not so much the right 
answer or the result that is significant, it is the procedure that Socrates uses. First of 
all, in the Theaetetus there is repeated reference to the fact that no positive results in 
any shape or form can be expected from this dialog. Furthermore, Socrates presents 
himself as a helpful intermediary:  
It is not as critic that Socrates is introduced, but as accoucheur, for the 
son of the “esteemed and portly” midwife Phaenarete assists into the 
world the thoughts of the youthful Theaetetus, whose portrait is painted 
in the most sympathetic colours. It is only because at these intellectual 
births some discrimination is required between mere phantoms and 
genuine offspring, that it becomes incumbent on Socrates to test the 
thoughts of which Theaetetus is delivered, and decide whether they can 
live or no.24 
It is significant that the disputant is given a degree of freedom, which must not be 
mistaken for arbitrariness, although it definitely does considerably limit the position 
of authority held by Socrates. The dialog Theaetetus was especially important to 
Austrian philosophers in many other cases, and for that reason will be mentioned 
again in the following. 
Theodor Gomperz also devoted a good deal of attention to the dialog Phaedrus. 
As Grillparzer already observed, its issue is that of overcoming the pure rhetoric of 
Lysias; Socrates can counter with a language far superior to the flowery speech of 
Lysias and others like him. However, there is more substance to this dialog, for 
Plato also wanted to overcome what poetic writing otherwise consists of; he would 
turn his back on it here, even if it was supported by 
the two pillars of dialectic and psychology. Himself one of the greatest 
among authors, if not the greatest of all, he mounts here to a height from 
which he looks down upon all authorship and all rhetoric, recognizes and 
sets forth all their weaknesses and drawbacks with incomparable depth of 
insight.25 
This dialog allows Gomperz to pay tribute to Plato’s procedure, one which rejects 
every dogmatic commitment and makes writing itself debatable. Schleiermacher 
described the necessity for the reader to become actively involved in the text in 
6 WENDELIN  SCHMIDT-DENGLER 
 
 
order to open its secrets.26 Of course, we are talking here about the philologist’s 
Plato and not the philosopher’s Plato. Heinrich Gomperz repeatedly appears to 
censure his father for not investigating thoroughly the philosophical aspects of 
Plato’s dialogs. Nevertheless, the father’s attempts are indeed impressive at every 
phase of the work because he succeeds in defending in discursive fashion the variety 
of Platonic thought against any attempt at a one-sided approach. He views Plato’s 
works as a process and makes no attempt to overlook the fallacies. In his eyes, Plato 
is the “great original thinker” who, when “he has trodden the path of error to the 
end, […] is nearer to the truth than if he had halted half-way.”27 Had he not read 
Grote and Mill, who both had drawn attention to those qualities in Plato’s work that 
were worthy of praise and beyond all metaphysical concern, Theodor Gomperz 
probably would never have reached this far in his judgment on Plato.  
V. 
A special variation in the reception of Plato in Austria is worth mentioning. In 1897 
the young Heinrich Gomperz published a work entitled Grundlegung der 
Neusokratischen Philosophie, in which he characterized Plato as “the most noble, 
the richest, and the most reliable source” for understanding Socrates.28 In it he tells 
of a strange group, which took seriously the Socratic maxim that a good person 
could suffer no evil. Accordingly, the members of this group thought bad marks in 
school were not to be taken seriously. The group’s motto was: “Paidias charin” – 
“for the love of the game.” Adherents to this neo-Socratic teaching held the view 
that everything is merely a game and that all human activity has no serious purpose, 
but is instead part of a game. For Gomperz, the Paidia offers a way to transform the 
world altogether. All activity will be merely for the sake of the game:  
It will happen […] that the simplest farmer will no longer respond to the 
question “Why do you till the soil?” by saying, “In order to make a 
living!” Instead, he will reply: “paidias charin.” And the wisest scholar 
will no longer respond to the question “Why do you ponder?” by saying, 
“In order to benefit mankind.” He, too, will reply: “paidias charin.” Thus 
man will become similar to God, who, when asked “Why did you create 
the world?” could only respond by saying, “For the sake of the game, 
paidias charin.”29 
A rather simple solution to social and theological problems by a man from a family 
of good standing! Socratic irony here undergoes transformation into Viennese 
decadence. Socrates, the Platonic Socrates, becomes the advocate of a new code of 
conduct, which can deliver humanity from evil by avoiding all worldly interests.  
Of course, this pronouncement is not to be taken completely seriously, and the 
jocular tone, paradoxically, clearly offers an opportunity to do justice to Platonism 
in all its complexity. What appears here to be a joke is a clear indication of the 
degree to which the Socratic teachings were internalized. What, on the one hand, 
could be regarded as a game or paidia could, on the other hand, be interpreted as an 
inclination toward experimentation, something which is revocable, something which 
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opens up possibilities and then again can be revoked. There is, however, a deeper 
significance to the fact that the décadents in Vienna chose Socrates of all people as 
their patron saint. This becomes especially apparent when one looks to Nietzsche 
who regarded Socrates as the buffo, the harlequin, the epitome of the décadent. 
Plato, on the other hand, is considered the artist par excellence, but this is only the 
case if the ethical and political substance, which constitutes Platonism, is 
disregarded. If the only thing that is important is paidia, the game, then one can 
either have a good laugh with this adaptation of Socrates on the part of Jung Wien or 
else even dismiss it as being irrelevant. However, this perspective is revealing in 
terms of the mentality that lies behind it: once again, philosophy no longer appears 
as a system or even as a reliable science, but instead as an activity with no strings 
attached. In the case of Heinrich Gomperz, philosophy is not brought down from the 
heavens to the people as it were. It is, instead, freed from the shackles of dogmatism 
and academia and transformed into a concept of art.  
I must confess that when one looks at these things with the strict tradition of 
thought in mind then the approaches of the young Heinrich Gomperz do seem 
somewhat outrageous and juvenile. It is a naïve utopia devised by a young man from 
a well-to-do home for whom it is possible to solve all social and ethical problems by 
taking a detour through a very subjectively adapted Socratic philosophy. Of course 
it is difficult to distinguish between irony and seriousness (of intent). However, this 
ambiguity is what gives the text its particular appeal as a departure from accepted 
academic practice. At the same time, it demonstrates that henceforth philosophizing 
can be possible not only in the hallowed halls of academia, but that it can also find 
its way back onto the street and into day-to-day life. It shows that the problems of 
the workday in particular would be easier to master if people were capable of 
philosophical observation. Having said that, it is conceivable that someone who 
heard all this talk about everything being for the sake of a game could interpret it as 
downright dangerous cynicism.  
VI. 
The “spell of Plato” exerted a lasting influence especially around the turn of the 
century. There was scarcely a thinker whose attention was not drawn to him. 
Wittgenstein frequently mentions the Theaetetus – something which comes as no 
real surprise. And he always cites the same passage concerning the object of “to 
imagine”; Wittgenstein does not reproduce the text verbatim, but instead appears to 
paraphrase it,30 thus making it difficult to trace precisely the link to Plato. Typically, 
it is a matter of semantics: for example, the word “vorstellen” (to imagine) has 
entirely different aspects of contextual meaning than the word “to kill.” 
For Ernst Mach, Plato’s allegory of the cave is a successful example of how 
effective the popular notion of an antithesis between appearance and reality can be. 
He considers the allegory to be “a pregnant and poetical fiction” that was, however, 
“not thought out to its final consequences” and therefore exerted “an unfortunate 
influence on our world-view”: “The universe, of which nevertheless we are a part, 
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became completely separated from us, and was removed an infinite distance 
away.”31 This is where the criticism of metaphysics sets in. Plato seems to have the 
right approach, but the consequences of his failure to carry through with the allegory 
are fatal.  
The most radical criticism of Plato comes from Karl Popper, whose reception of 
Plato merits special mention not so much because of its philosophical substance but 
because of the tenacity with which the demystification takes place. Popper cites 
R.H.S. Crossman’s Plato To-Day from the year 1937 but also makes reference to 
George Grote and Theodor Gomperz: “This interesting book [i.e., Crossman’s Plato 
To-Day] (like the works of Grote and Th. Gomperz) has greatly encouraged me to 
develop my rather unorthodox views on Plato, and to follow them up to their rather 
unpleasant conclusions.”32 With amazing over-meticulousness Popper gathers 
together every small detail he can find to use against Plato. Even Gomperz is taken 
to task for succumbing to the spell of Plato. In this manner, the book becomes, in a 
very impressive way, a commitment to the importance that the author attaches to 
Plato, while, at the same time, the book is a settling of accounts on Plato’s political 
attitude and his thinking generally. And Popper readily admits to this – albeit at the 
end of an appendix that includes his response to Levinson’s critique:  
Yet I do not wish to end this long discussion without reaffirming my 
conviction of Plato’s overwhelming intellectual achievement. My 
opinion that he was the greatest of all philosophers has not changed. 
Even his moral and political philosophy is, as an intellectual 
achievement, without parallel, though I find it morally repulsive, and 
indeed horrifying.33  
Popper’s commitment to the spell of Plato could hardly be more succinct. The 
philosopher Plato is blamed for forming the theory, which paved the way for 
fascism, National Socialism, and Stalinism. Popper is, like Gomperz, no longer 
concerned about determining the possibilities of error or erroneous actions 
themselves and then committing himself to them. For him Plato becomes the most 
consistent dogmatist of an anti-enlightenment and mystifying attitude. 
Unfortunately, it is not apparent from this book – in which polemics has such a 
dominant place – where precisely the overwhelming achievement of the Greek 
thinker could, indeed, lie; this aspect very obviously distinguishes Popper from 
Gomperz. He simply continues, as far as I can see, Plato’s train of thought. The 
more idealistic Plato’s portrayal of his ruler, the more negative it becomes 
politically, Popper claims:  
The great importance which Plato attaches to a philosophical education 
of the rulers must be explained by other reasons – by reasons which must 
be purely political. The main reason I can see is the need for increasing to 
the utmost the authority of the rulers. If the education of the auxiliaries 
functions properly, there will be plenty of good soldiers […]. Thus 
Plato’s philosophical education has a definite political function. It puts a 
mark on the rulers, and it establishes a barrier between the rulers and 
the ruled.34 
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Popper is the last of a line of Austrian thinkers who have typically regarded Plato in 
an anti-idealistic light. Even the attempt to make the best people into rulers is 
contrary, as Popper sees it, to Plato’s claim that he is seeking an ideal state. The 
empirical method is mobilized against the Utopia, which is not regarded by Popper 
as a principle that gives us grounds for hope and keeps us alive and well. Instead, it 
is depicted as a constraint that leads to destruction. 
VII. 
Contrary to Popper’s own intention, I, for my part, cannot read his text as a 
fundamental refutation of Plato. I see it as more of an attempt at liberation. With an 
enthusiasm that demands respect and a persistence that is irritating, these people go 
after Plato as if that were the way to clean up the house of European thought. It is 
entirely legitimate to ask whether this effort could not have been directed also 
toward making the complexity of Platonic thought somewhat more vivid. This is 
especially true in the case of Theodor Gomperz, whose critical discussion did, after 
all, lead to a far more varied result. Popper’s autobiography does, indeed, clearly 
reveal how important Plato was to him as a thinker in cases where the focus was not 
on political issues.35 
Hermann Broch took a gentler, almost nostalgic approach to the farewell to 
Plato. One of his essays, from 1932, is entitled “Leben ohne Platonische Idee” 
(“Life without the Platonic Idea”). In it, however, he scarcely makes reference to 
any one of Plato’s individual works. But he does argue that Platonism must be 
regarded as a decisive point in the development of the human race. It appears as the 
product of the disintegration of religion and, accordingly, the intellectual becomes 
the guardian of the Platonic idea. At this point, according to Broch, the Platonic is 
no longer universally binding: “The rule of the intellect passes over to the rule of the 
worldly, and this marks the beginning of that strange process through which the 
universally binding character of reasoning, too, is handed over to worldly matters.”36 
The end of Platonism apparently coincides with the end of large fields of 
philosophy; philosophy itself, insofar as it is identical with ethics and metaphysics, 
is no longer valid.37 The intellectual and the hero – this too is a product of the 
decline of religious (or Platonic) thought – concur, according to Broch, in their 
rejection of Platonism.38 Philosophy, and here in particular Platonism itself, has 
been replaced by a new manner of thinking, “since that which can be scientifically 
proven takes places exclusively within the tautology of the logical and 
mathematical.”39 It is highly likely that Broch had the Vienna Circle in mind when 
he wrote this passage. He assumed that this philosophy was also determined by the 
desire for a savior, a bringer of salvation, and that “the new Platonic freedom would 
one day arise out of the darkest constraint of rational reason: the ‘irrational ratio’: 
the present state of the world.”40 Whatever Broch may have meant by this, the 
important point is that the Platonic idea has had its day and that this is utterly 
deplorable. The end of the Platonic era can be likened to the period of Advent, 
which is waiting for a new religion, one for which “philosophy is not only a post- 
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but also a pre-religion.”41 The present is regarded as a transitional period, and it is 
by no means certain whether “the philosophical striving will find its new shape in 
the bare mathematical formulas or else whether it will be restricted for the time 
being to poetic expression.”42 Broch, whose text is to be found at the end of a long 
farewell to Plato, leaves us with this perspective. The farewell is by no means easy 
and has caused most of those mentioned here sorrow and difficulty. Theodor 
Gomperz, Popper, and Broch are all looking for an escape from Plato’s cave and, at 
the same, have the feeling they are losing the protection they need.  
But do Austrian writers try to escape the cave to which they seem to be 
confined by the Platonic allegory? Hans Blumenberg provided us with good 
evidence of the mutations of the cave allegory in the works of Wittgenstein.43 But as 
compelling as the allegory may be, it is just as disturbing as the concept of the 
totalitarian state. It is not because Plato wanted to see all the writers banned from his 
state that many thinkers have tried to free themselves from this concept. It is 
because the suggestive power of Plato’s thought is so attractive. The kind of 
literature, which sees itself as committed to such idealistic views and would like to 
slave away on concrete objects, will not find any hospitality in Plato’s works. 
Heimito von Doderer, writing on his theory of the novel in 1959, decreed that, 
for him, idealism was useless. The novelist was, he added, “least of all an idealist, 
and, for him, Plato’s cave allegory is as useless as Kant’s Ding an sich.”44 This is a 
brief, but succinct rejection of Plato and his allegory. It well illustrates the dividing 
line between the complex of Platonic thought and Platonic imagery on the one hand 
and literary writing on the other. It is precisely at the site of such seismic faults that 
powerful movements and tremors become noticeable, and that is where Philosophy 
and Literature have to set up shop – even if it happens to be dangerous.  
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THE  VIENNA  CIRCLE  AND  FREUD 
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Gustav Bergmann was one of the last of the Vienna Circle to flee. In 1938 Otto 
Neurath had already been in Amsterdam for several years, and there he arranged for 
funds to enable his younger colleague to obtain passage to New York. He asked in 
return only that Bergmann write a memoir of his time as a member of the circle. 
These recollections have recently been published.1 Bergmann mentions how in the 
young left culture of Vienna there was a coming together of sympathizers with the 
program of the Circle and a number of young Freudians (p. 199). Bergmann was a 
member of both these groups. Arne Naess, in his somewhat later memoir,2 
describing the meetings of the Circle from the viewpoint of an invited Ausländer, 
also notes how there was cooperation between some of the Freudians and members 
of the Circle (p. 14ff).3 So there were personal connections. But the regard in which 
members of the Vienna Circle held Freud can best be gauged by an anecdote that 
Bergmann once told,4 though it does not occur in the memoir. While in Amsterdam 
waiting for his passage to the United States, Bergmann was despairing of what was 
happening in Europe. Neurath attempted to reassure him, somewhat at least. “Don’t 
worry,” Neurath said, “in 200 years Hitler will be just another mad dictator who 
lived at the time of Freud.” Neurath had no doubt underestimated the evil that had 
been descending upon Europe and the world. But that is not the point, which is 
rather that when Neurath, the Marxist and positivist, had to choose a figure as 
representing not the evil but the greatness of our century, he chose Freud. 
Given the criticisms that have more recently been made of Freud’s work, and 
given that the Vienna Circle was a champion of scientific method and of the 
methodological unity of science,5 it would seem an odd choice: it would seem that 
in fact Freud had succeeded in pulling the wool as it were over the eyes of the 
positivists, misleading them into believing that what he was doing was in fact 
scientific. I do not, however, think that it is so easy. Gustav Bergmann, who was one 
of the younger members of the Vienna Circle, had himself undergone analysis in the 
1920s – though he never met Freud himself, he did know Anna Freud – and he was 
later to write a detailed critique and evaluation of psychoanalysis. Furthermore, 
Egon Brunswik, not a member of the circle, but close to it, wrote the monograph on 
psychology for Neurath’s International Encyclopedia of Unified Science;6 in the 
latter he provided a critical account of psychoanalysis.  
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What I propose to do is first to look at psychoanalysis and the psychoanalytic 
method, to see whether these stand up to the sort of scrutiny upon which the 
Vienna Circle rightly insisted. In this examination, I will begin with the work of 
Bergmann and Brunswik, but then go on to comment on some of the recent work of 
Adolf Grünbaum.7 I shall suggest that Freud has in fact provided good grounds for 
accepting his theories, in broad outline at least, and that they pass any sort of 
reasonable test that the Vienna Circle might have proposed. I shall then go on to 
look at the broader context, at the shared background in Nietzsche and neo-Kantian 
philosophy, and at the cultural aims of the Vienna Circle and how Freud’s views fit 
into that framework. 
– A –
I. Bergmann and Brunswik
Freud himself acknowledged the impact of Darwinism on his thought and on his 
approach to the mind. In speaking of Darwinism, I am thinking not so specifically of 
Darwin’s own theories, but rather that broader stream of thought that became a 
characteristic frame of reference for so much in the nineteenth century. In particular, 
there came with this frame of reference an emphasis upon functions.8 In psychology 
the group that most directly took up this theme were the American functionalists. 
These psychologists were inspired by John Dewey’s study in “The Reflex Arc 
Concept in Psychology.”9 Dewey’s emphasis on functions derived as much from his 
background in Hegelianism and German Romantic philosophy as it did from 
Darwin. But those who took up Dewey’s themes soon dropped the metaphysical 
trappings and simply looked at the person as an animal whose organs performed 
certain functions enabling it to survive and reproduce. The mind was one of those 
organs, and by turning to functions they began to think of psychology as dealing 
with behavior and not just what could be grasped by our inner consciousness. 
The functionalists were not yet behaviorist, but they did make behavior a 
central part of psychology, and it was not long before the next generation of 
psychologists became simply behaviorists. They were led by John B. Watson,10 who 
was many things besides a behaviorist. He favored classical conditioning over re-
inforcement – the latter seemed too close to teleology and all the bad metaphysical 
theories of mind such as that which one could find, for example, in Dewey. He 
favored peripheral theories for bodily localization rather than central theories – it 
seemed easier to get rid of minds if the central nervous system played but a minor 
role in explaining behavior. But no one is now troubled by re-inforcement theories 
of learning: metaphysical teleology no longer is a worry for psychologists. As for 
the issue of peripheral vs. central theories, it too is no longer an issue: with cognitive 
science the balance has shifted to the central nervous system, but in general 
psychologists simply take it to be a matter of fact that functions have their bodily 
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locations. Above all, Watson was a metaphysical behaviorist – he simply denied that 
there are any conscious states. The latter theory is just silly, to use the felicitous 
expression of C.D. Broad.11 Watson himself recognized the point when he argued on 
the one hand that there are no conscious states and on the other that they are to be 
identified with certain bodily states.12 
Psychologists now for the most part do not deny conscious states; they simply 
ignore them, proceeding to study behavior and to explain it in the same sort of 
causal terms that are used to explain the behavior of stones or trees. Psychologists 
are now simply methodological behaviorists: psychology has become an objective 
science, methodologically the same as any other science.13 To be sure, there is 
nothing particularly non-scientific about introspection. In principle the data obtained 
by introspection could be treated in straightforward scientific fashion.14 What was 
non-scientific was the insistence that somehow by their nature conscious products 
escaped the same sort of causal analysis that applied to stones and trees. Scientific 
psychology had by the end of the century abandoned these mystical ideas. The point 
is not that behaviorism made psychology into a science but that it made it into an 
objective science. Psychology was already most of the way there; the parallelistic 
hypothesis had become common among late nineteenth-century introspectionists, 
and according to this there was always a physical state of the system parallel to any 
conscious state. Once this was granted, then there was no need to try to explain 
behavior in terms of mental states: the parallel physical state sufficed. In that sense, 
psychology was already prepared for methodological behaviorism.15 We can 
therefore see that Watson, however important he was historically, made only a small 
step when he transformed psychology into an objective science of human behavior. 
Bergmann16 and Brunswik17 both emphasize the close connection of Freud’s 
work in psychology with that of the American functionalists.18 Both also emphasize 
that methodologically there is a close fit, in principle at least, between the 
psychoanalytic approach to human behavior and that of the methodological 
behaviorists. It is clear that with its emphasis on the unconscious, psychoanalysis 
can hardly adopt the introspective methods of the older psychology. At the same 
time, however, psychoanalysis by the nature of what it is trying to do carries on 
some of the spirit of the older views, insofar as it must rely for much of its data upon 
verbal reports of dreams and of purposely uninhibited streams of ideas (“free 
association”). 
Brunswik notes how psychology had previously concentrated on sensation, or, 
what is the same, on peripheral processes. It was only with psychoanalysis that a 
determined attempt was made to investigate central processes (p. 714). At the same 
time, however, he criticizes psychoanalysis for its narrow view of functions. In 
particular, it focuses its attention on proximate effects, tending to ignore the 
importance of distal effects (p. 678, p. 715). The latter are for the most part social 
factors. Brunswik is thus criticizing Freud for not taking sufficiently into account 
social variables. Brunswik therein finds himself strangely allied with what 
Bergmann called the “nicifiers” such as Karen Horney, who wanted to de-emphasize 
the sexual in favor of the social. It is a strange criticism, however. As Ernest Jones 
once remarked, “It would not be a gross exaggeration to say that psycho-analysis is 
16 FRED  WILSON 
 
 
 
 
essentially a detailed study of the relations between a child and his parents.”19 The 
social is thus hardly ignored by psychoanalysis. The point becomes even more 
evident when one realizes that the socialization of the child, the making of the child 
fit for society, takes place in the context of the family: it is through the parents that 
social values and social skills are passed on to future generations. 
Bergmann makes a different point. He does not downplay the importance of 
functions. But functions are merely effects, and, in the case of minds, acquired 
effects.20 What science aims at is causal explanation, where to speak of causes is to 
speak, as Ernest Jones had made clear, in Humean fashion, of regularities. Jones 
contrasts the older concept of causality with that of correlation or regularity. 
“Psychological science,” he states, “any more than any other, cannot do without the 
latter concept, and in its postulate of orderly relationship subsisting between 
phenomena must therefore be as deterministic as the rest of science.”21 The ideal is 
to understand functions as originating within a causal context. Focusing on functions 
establishes the temptation to teleological thinking, and to the idea that to understand 
is to grasp the function. As Bergmann puts it, “The disadvantage inherited from the 
Darwinian outlook I see in the propensity to teleological thinking and in the 
tendency to take teleological patterns for scientific explanation.”22 This is a 
temptation to which Freud and the psychoanalysts too often succumbed, Bergmann 
argues. He cites in particular the so-called death wish or death instinct.23 The end-
point becomes a goal or terminus which in turn becomes explanatory. There is the 
same temptation in the Deweyan side of American functionalism. What is important 
from the viewpoint of explanation is not functions but rather the causes of those 
functions. This led the American functionalists almost directly, by way of Watson, 
into learning theory. This of course is the point of the slogan that psychology seeks 
“stimulus-response” relations.  
It was Bergmann’s argument that if one looked carefully at psychoanalytic 
theory, then there was nothing incompatible with that and learning theory in 
experimental psychology (p. 365ff). The first training of libidinal hungers occurs at 
an early stage of infancy, long before there is any significant development of 
language. But the process is complicated by the development of language, that is, by 
the development of the human symbolic apparatus (p. 367). The point is that 
symbols can in the case of humans start the same train of events as the thing 
symbolized: ideas are potent. The complexities of the human personality cannot be 
understood apart from the many roles language plays in learning. These are 
complexities far beyond the skills of the experimental psychologist to grasp – 
though in principle at least there is no reason to suppose that these complexities are 
not the cumulative result of rather simple learning processes. 
At the same time, however, if one does want to come to grips with such 
complexities, if one does want to put them into some sort of causal story, then one 
must perforce work in ways that take for granted the complexities of the symbolic 
apparatus of language. This means, on the one hand, that the methods will hardly be 
those of the controlled experiment. Other means must be found to explore the 
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complexities. It means, on the other hand, that the theorizing will in fact and 
inevitably be relatively loose. In terms of theory, one could reasonably expect 
nothing much better than what Freud and the psychoanalysts have provided. 
The verdict of the Vienna Circle, then, as represented by Bergmann and 
Brunswik, was that on the whole one should be prepared to accept the scientific 
claims of Freud. There were to be sure negative tendencies. In particular there was 
the tendency to lapse into the sort of teleological thinking that was characteristic of 
German Romantic philosophy. But those awkward details aside, they were prepared 
to accept the claim of psychoanalytic theory that it passed the verifiability test: one 
could take it for granted that it was reasonable to claim that it was scientific.24 
II. Grünbaum
The great British psychologist Henry Maudsley25 recognized the limits of 
introspectionist psychology.26 As a psychiatrist he was clear that there are often 
unconscious forces at work in or on the human mind. He therefore proposed that one 
use the method Cuvier had developed in anatomy, the comparative method.27 What 
he proposed comparing were the sane and the insane.28 But in order to do this, one 
already has to have some method for exploring the mind of the non-normal person. 
The best that Maudsley could suggest was some retreat to physiology. But exactly 
how physiology was to do the job remained unclear indeed. It was a program, not a 
practical method for undertaking practical research.29 In the end, he failed to provide 
a serious method of research for the non-normal.30 
It was Freud’s genius to have discovered a method for dealing with, if not the 
insane, then at least the non-normal.31 It built on the fact that even the insane have a 
set of symbols: their language. Their symbols may not be normal; their language 
may be confused and confusing in many ways. But it is for all that language. As we 
look back on the history, the method is not all that surprising. Psychologists had 
used the method of association to investigate sensory phenomena. This method 
involved the mind attending to associations connected to a stimulus and inferring 
from these the genetic antecedents of conscious events. The theory goes back to 
practices recorded by Aristotle.32 Orators had learned about association and had 
used the technique to help them in remembering the topics they wished to present in 
their speeches. Aristotle recorded this knowledge in his three laws of association. 
With Hobbes and Locke these laws were recalled in the seventeenth century, and 
they became a central part of psychological theory, of learning theory specifically, a 
place which they retain to this day.33 
Like King John, we all have our little ways.34 Often enough, more often than we 
perhaps like, there are thoughts and impulses that force their way into our 
consciousness; often enough, more often than we perhaps like, there are actions and 
behavior that impose themselves upon us. This is true of all of us. Most of these 
little ways can safely be ignored, passed off as simply slips or accidents. But at 
times and for some people they become crippling. These are our psychoneuroses. 
Philosophers have recognized that if we are to talk of free will then we must 
acknowledge that there are what can be called second order desires, desires about 
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our own desires. The point about our psychoneurotic thoughts and impulses is that 
these are for the most part things that we do not desire. We do not want them yet 
they impose themselves upon us. It is my thought, my impulse, my action, yet it is 
not mine and not wanted.35 
Because these thoughts are not wanted, we ignore them: they are not ours, we 
say. Psychology in particular ignored them. This was not merely because it had 
difficulty dealing with the higher or central processes. They were not even included 
in the “in principle” sketches of psychological theory. Slips were slips, and did not 
need to be accounted for. Even Maudsley, for all his success in treating the mentally 
ill, simply ignores these little ways. But they are in fact part of our mental life, part 
of human behavior. They too, on the very principles traditional psychologists were 
using, ought to be thought of as having causes. But when slips become 
incapacitating, they need to be recognized. His training as a physician sensitized 
Freud to these cases. His training as a scientist made him search for causes. His 
humanity led him to seek a way to free people from these slips, these little ways that 
impose themselves upon us. 
It is not possible simply to forbid these thoughts, impulses, and actions. Freud 
in fact tried this route. Following Breuer he tried using hypnosis. The patient was 
put under hypnosis and the physician directed the patient to in effect remember 
earlier experiences that seemed to lie behind the symptoms. Upon remembering 
them the patient would cathartically re-experience them. The symptom would 
disappear. In effect, the use of hypnotic suggestion amounted to the physician 
instructing the patient to stop having those little ways. The little ways did indeed stop. 
Unfortunately, it was only for a while, or only to be replaced by another little way. 
The aim is to make the patient free, that is, free in the sense of being in charge 
of his or her own thoughts and impulses. The method of forbidding does not work. 
And Freud came to understand why it does not work: it fails to uncover the causes. 
We all smile when we hear tales of William Ewart Gladstone, while he was Queen 
Victoria’s Prime Minister, taking prostitutes from the East End of London to 
Downing Street and giving them scripture-based lessons in the expectation of 
reforming them. He had little effect. Forbidding prostitution is not effective, and 
neither is making suggestions or giving instructions. One must get to the causes, and 
only if one seizes control of them will one eliminate the problem. It is the same with 
our little ways: it is necessary to seize control of the causes, and only then will one 
be able to free oneself of the problem. 
It was with this aim in view that Freud went from hypnosis to the method of 
free association and dream analysis.36 The method of free association proceeds as 
psychologists had traditionally proceeded, by recording the associations that 
occurred when a certain stimulus was produced. Traditionally, however, the 
stimulus was controlled – the primary concern was sensory processes. Moreover, the 
response was also controlled. Details are not important: the point is that the method 
involved constrained associations.37 Freud used the same method but with no 
constraints.38 The patient was purposely instructed simply to report the ideas that 
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came to mind, and by looking at these ideas one could come to an understanding of 
the associations that had become established in the patient’s mind.39 
The injunction of the Delphic Oracle was to “Know Thyself.” This was the aim 
of Freud’s method. It was to discover the patterns of causation that were at work in 
the patient. And it was not simply a matter of the physician coming to know these 
patterns. It was rather the patient, him- or herself, coming to know these patterns. 
Nor was the aim simply intellectual. The aim rather was to give the patient the 
knowledge that he or she needed to become a person who is free, in control of him- 
or herself. If you know yourself, that is, know yourself in a practical way, then it is 
you who will be in charge. 
Freud’s basic argument was that his method did put the person in control of 
him- or herself. In Freud’s later terminology, it is the ego that is the center of 
consciousness, the surveyor of reality that provides the knowledge of how best the 
instinctual urges might be satisfied. The instinctual urges themselves he refers to as 
the id. It is here that one finds the mental energy that moves us to act. Much of the 
id is beyond consciousness, and some of the urges of the id lie unsatisfied, repressed 
by the ego at an early stage of life because they are found by the ego to be 
unacceptable: so dangerous are they that they must be repressed. But they will have 
their way, one way or another. It is these repressed instinctual urges that are the 
roots of psychoneurotic ideas and impulses. The ego strenuously attempts to deny 
the existence of these urges, but in vain: if they cannot be satisfied directly, then 
they will be satisfied indirectly. These dangerous impulses have to do with the 
child’s relations with his or her parents. In therapy, the patient-therapist relationship 
mimics in many respects the parent-child relationship. This is the phenomenon 
known as transference.40 The similarities enable the associative mechanisms to 
work, and the patient begins to recall the experiences and the impulses that he or she 
has been forbidding him- or herself to remember. The patient begins to recognize 
the causes of those ideas and impulses that are found to come quite involuntarily 
into one’s consciousness: one begins to understand the real causes, deep in the past, 
of one’s little ways. He or she also becomes aware of the forces that are leading him 
or her to resist acknowledging these events even as events let alone causes. The 
analyst may make suggestions as to the relationships that are present – his or her 
experience will provide many plausible hypotheses. But there is only one test as to 
which are the correct hypotheses. It is not simply that the patient finds them 
acceptable. It is that in coming to know them the patient acquires self-
understanding, the knowledge of him- or herself that is required to put him or her in 
control, that is, in control of him- or herself, that is, in conscious control of him- or 
herself. The most frequent outcome is one in which “Repression is replaced by a 
condemning judgement carried out along the best lines.” A second sort of outcome is 
sublimation, the re-direction of the impulse to some culturally approved end. On this 
outcome, it becomes possible for “the unconscious instincts revealed by [analysis] to 
be employed for the useful purposes which they would have found earlier if 
development had not been interrupted.” Then there is the third possible outcome, the 
actual satisfaction of the libidinal impulse. As Freud noted, “A certain portion of the 
repressed libidinal impulses has a claim to direct satisfaction and ought to find it in 
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life.”41 Whichever outcome the ego allows, the libidinal energy receives a release 
which the ego approves. No longer must there be a release which intrudes in 
unwelcome fashion on the territory of the ego: the ego is now in control. As Freud 
put it, “Psycho-analysis is an instrument to enable the ego to achieve a progressive 
conquest of the id.”42 Where id was, there ego shall be. 
It is in this sense that one must understand Freud’s remark that the test of truth 
for any hypothesis about the causes of the patient’s psychoneurotic behavior must be 
that it “tallies” with his or her thoughts and behavior. Freud puts it this way: “[the 
patient’s] conflicts will only be successfully solved and his [or her] resistances 
overcome if the anticipatory ideas he [or she] is given tally with what is real in him 
[or her].”43  
Adolf Grünbaum, in his work on The Foundations of Psychoanalysis,44 has 
argued carefully the thesis of Bergmann and Brunswik that psychoanalytic theory 
fits the notion of science defended by the Vienna Circle. He defends the scientific 
nature of the theory on the one hand against those such as Habermas and Ricoeur 
who want to place Freud’s thought in the anti-scientific stream deriving from 
German Romantic philosophy which insists upon the idea that the study of human 
behavior requires a method radically different in kind from the method that science 
uses to study stones and trees. And then, on the other hand, he also defends the 
scientific status of psychoanalysis against the claims of Popper and others that it 
cannot be scientific because it is not falsifiable. On Grünbaum’s reading, Freudian 
theory is falsifiable and the method that Freud attempts to use to justify his claims is 
of a piece with the methods of physics and biology. 
At the same time, however, Grünbaum also argues that the specific 
psychoanalytic method provides no foundation for the theoretical claims. It is 
science but not good science: it is science without foundations. Indeed, his 
suggestion is that not only does the theory lack foundations but that there are 
counterexamples to its claims. It may be falsifiable, but it is also falsified. The 
theory is in this respect like astrology. Since Freud bases his claims for the theory on 
the fact that it has had success in the therapeutic context, Grünbaum concentrates on 
this argument. This is the claim that the theory is supported because the hypotheses 
located by the theory in fact “tally,” to use Freud’s term, with what the patient 
discovers within him- or herself. Grünbaum (p. 138) quotes Freud on this point, 
about how hypotheses must tally with the experience of the analysand, but argues 
that Freud provides no grounds for accepting the claim that the hypotheses do so 
tally. On the contrary, since there are many cases in which psychoneurotic 
symptoms undergo spontaneous remission (p. 160), there are no grounds to think 
that the hypotheses finally accepted by the analysand are anything more than mere 
suggestions of the analyst. 
But, does this really touch the claim made in Freud’s “tally argument”? This 
argument is to the effect that the psychoanalytic hypotheses are necessary to effect a 
cure. What, however, is a cure? A cure, as we have seen, is not the mere absence of 
the symptom. It is rather a matter of the patient coming to be in control over his or 
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her ideas and impulses, becoming free from the imposition of unwanted things on 
his or her consciousness or behavior. A “cure” in this sense could never be anymore 
than partial, a fact that Freud recognized. But in the context of Grünbaum’s 
argument, the point is that spontaneous remission by itself does not count as a cure. 
Breuer’s use of hypnosis could free the patient of a symptom. It aimed at helping the 
person recall the event or events that had caused the symptom, and cathartically re-
live the experience to eliminate the forces that were otherwise finding their outlet as 
it were in the symptom. But this method by-passed the forces that normally 
prevented the recalling of the crucial event or events. It bypassed, in other words, 
the resistances, the forces that were blocking the recall. But these forces, too, are 
part of the problem. Since the method of hypnosis did not deal with these factors, it 
could not effect a cure, it could not free the patient, and put him or her in control. 
Nor does the fact that other therapeutic methods also have success in eliminating 
psychoneurotic symptoms (p. 161) tell against Freud’s claim. On the one hand, it is 
to be expected on psychoanalytic principles that such will occur: just as a 
sympathetic listener will do a world of wonders, so can aversion therapy. However, 
this does not mean that the patient is cured in the sense of being genuinely free; it 
does not mean that the ego is now in control. On the other hand, if these therapies 
really do uncover the causes of the psychoneurotic thoughts, impulses and behavior, 
then why ought that to tell against the psychoanalytic theories? It tells against those 
theories only if there is disagreement in the assigning of causes. That different 
therapies are equally successful does not by itself imply that those therapies disagree 
as to the nature of the causes, the knowledge of which will enable the ego – the 
person – to take full, or at least fuller, control of his or her own life. 
I conclude that Grünbaum’s argument that Freud has not vindicated his theories 
is not successful. To be sure, not all aspects of psychoanalytic theorizing are 
reasonable; Bergmann and Brunswik had already made this point. But much of the 
psychoanalytic theorizing is scientific in terms acceptable to the Vienna Circle, at 
least within the limits imposed by the difficulty of the material: human beings after 
all, and to repeat, are very complex creatures. The point here is that not only does it 
pass the test of being an empirical or testable theory but that it is well founded in the 
facts. There are data that support the theory. These data come from the cures that 
have been effected by the methods that emerged from Freud’s struggle to help 
people free themselves from aspects of themselves that they did not want. These 
data are not merely the remission or disappearance of psychoneurotic symptoms; the 
data consist in the fact that as a result of psychoanalytic therapy patients do come to 
be in control of themselves, do, in other words, become free – not, to be sure, fully 
free, but freer, much freer, than they were. Ask them. 
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Freud’s theories are, I think we can safely say, both empirical and soundly based. In 
his insistence that our little ways, our slips of the tongue, our dreams, all have 
causes that need explaining, his work was of a piece with that of Maudsley, though 
deeper and more comprehensive. Where he went beyond others such as Maudsley 
was in discovering a tool to explore the causal structure of those little ways. But 
Freud also went beyond people like Maudsley in his humanity. Unlike Maudsley, he 
did not attribute the ills of the son to the fact that the father had masturbated.45 We 
have seen the three ways in which repressed impulses might express themselves 
once they are brought under the conscious control of the patient. They might be 
consciously repressed, they might be allowed to sublimate into wants with more 
culturally acceptable objects, or they might simply be satisfied. Freud showed that 
indeed many of the prohibitions that late nineteenth century society imposed on 
people were in fact pointless, that there were no problems to be found in allowing 
many of these impulses to be satisfied, and, even more importantly, that repressing 
them could in fact be dangerous, both to the individual and to society. In this 
respect, Freud represented in another way the freeing of human beings from 
unreasonable shackles.  
What Freud was arguing is that, in itself, there is nothing wrong with pleasure, 
and if it can be obtained without harm to oneself and others then there is no reason 
not to accept it. The idealists had denied the importance of pleasure. “What Act of 
Legislature was there that thou shouldst be Happy?” Carlyle asked,46 and rejected 
utilitarianism, or, more generally, Epicureanism. This he did in the name of the 
higher self, which was held to impose a variety of higher obligations which might 
well conflict with utility and require the denial of pleasure. Kant could think of few 
sins more troubling than masturbation. We can smile at that, and use it to provide 
our undergraduates with something else at which to smirk. But people at one time 
did in fact take that sort of thing seriously: witness Maudsley. If we are now free 
from those shackles, then it is due in part to Freud, but not Freud alone. Freud as a 
humanist was part of the tradition deriving from the Enlightenment, aiming to free 
humankind from the chains of superstition and to provide through science rather 
than metaphysics and theology the tools that could be used to improve the human 
lot. The Vienna Circle was part of that same tradition.  
Moritz Schlick, who, while he lived, was the center of the Circle, wrote on 
ethics. His little book on The Problems of Ethics is exemplary.47 He argued that the 
primary motivators were the pleasantness and unpleasantness of our feelings.48 Otto 
Neurath, too, was another major figure in the Circle who also looked to Epicurus to 
provide the basic framework for ethics.49 Like Neurath, Schlick rejected the whole 
idea that ethical principles somehow find their basis in a self that is outside the 
world of ordinary experience. Like Neurath, he accepted the basic premise of 
Epicureanism, that human beings aim at pleasure, and he rejected the romantic ideal 
expressed by Carlyle that there are duties which demand that we forgo pleasure, 
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duties which demand that we live up to standards in a way that denies us the 
pleasures of this world. 
John Stuart Mill had argued,50 no doubt with the example of Carlyle in mind, 
that pleasure or happiness was the test of morality because pleasure was not only 
one of the ends that people seek but the only end.51 This, he emphasized, was not to 
say that people did not seek things other than pleasure. On the contrary, there are 
many ends that humans have, and to aim simply at pleasure almost certainly ensures 
that it will not be attained. But those things at which humans do aim are 
pleasurable; as Mill put it, they are sought as “parts” of pleasure. Such things are 
first sought as means to pleasure, and then they come through association to be in 
themselves pleasant. And so Mill argues on the basis of these psychological 
principles that people not only do but must seek pleasure: that is just the way they 
are.52 However, since they must seek pleasure, it is unreasonable to propose duties 
of the sort that Carlyle clearly had in mind that would require them to seek some end 
contrary to that of pleasure. There may be no Act of the Legislature that makes it 
obligatory that people seek pleasure, but for all that it is true that they must seek 
pleasure.53 This fact delimits the range of things that could be our duties. Since 
people are going to seek to maximize their pleasure, what one is going to count as 
worthy of pursuit, what one is going to count as one’s duty, has to be something that 
will produce that effect. We need an ethics, then, which is an ethics without 
renunciation.54 
This was Mill’s argument. It in fact goes back as far as Epicurus himself. 
Schlick does not quite understand Mill on this point; he takes more seriously than 
one should G.E. Moore’s criticism of the inference from “desired” to “desirable.” 
But in his own argument, Schlick adopts the Epicurean position, that what is sought 
is sought because it is pleasant, that nothing is sought that is not pleasant, and that 
the task of ethics is to find those things that can as a matter of fact bring about a 
maximization of pleasure. Schlick’s view was that a liberal state, with a minimum of 
government, would best serve these interests. Neurath thought it better to wed Marx 
and Epicurus: he argued that one could best achieve the greatest happiness in a 
society with a planned economy and that Marxist theory pointed the way to such an 
economic order.55 These differences are, from the philosophical point of view, 
differences in detail, mere matters of fact – though of course from the perspective of 
political action they make a world of difference. 
But what of the heroes of whom Carlyle made so much? John Stuart Mill 
pointed out the problem with reference to St. Simon Stylites.56 It was a case that 
showed what people can do, but, surely, he argued, it was not a case that showed 
what they ought to do. St. Simon could do what he did atop his pillar because in fact 
he took joy in the idea that he would, by virtue of his being high up there in the air 
of Asia Minor, be the first to see the Lord upon his second coming. It was Mill’s 
argument that through a process of association, Simon came to feel pleasure in that 
thought. Schlick makes much the same point: the hero who sacrifices him- or herself 
for the cause, Carlyle’s hero, who forsakes pleasure for duty, does in fact take joy in 
knowing that he or she is doing what is required.57  
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The problem is that all this just does not ring true. Carlyle is a better 
psychologist than Mill or Schlick. There is an important sense in which the hero, 
whether it is Simon or a member of the Hitler SS killing squads, does not take joy in 
what he or she is doing: it is duty, not pleasure. Duty is the forsaking of pleasure. 
Whatever Schlick says, it does involve renunciation. Neither Mill nor Schlick make 
plausible how it is that human beings can find joy in renunciation.  
It is Freud’s contribution to psychology to reveal the mechanisms by which this 
happens. It is also his contribution to the enlightenment project. Hume and Mill both 
knew Calvinism. Both knew the sorts of self-flagellation that Calvinism could 
produce when one did not live up to the impossible standards that Christian faith 
required of one. But the psychological theories, which they developed, simply did 
not provide any plausible explanatory sketch of how the joyless pursuit of duty is 
possible, or how it is that one can punish oneself for taking pleasure in simple and 
harmless things like masturbation. Freud provided us with a theory that makes 
understandable how people can be this way, how they can cripple themselves with 
guilt, on the one hand, and how they can become intolerant and vicious political and 
religious fanatics on the other. 
None of this challenges the Epicurean argument that pleasure is the standard of 
duty since we all, of necessity, seek pleasure. But it does enable us to understand 
how for some people their little ways can include self-mutilation or the burning of 
others at the stake. We can now understand how it is that being human includes 
being nasty. If we read Hume or Mill, what we find is a portrait of human beings all 
of whom are basically decent, good members of the club. They, and thinkers like 
them, knew that there were counter-examples, from Calvinists to Inquisitors, or, in 
our own day, to Nazis. But their psychology lacked the resources to account for the 
deep and evil side of human beings. For better or for worse, but mostly for better, 
Freud provided the psychological theory that was required. It was a liberating 
theory. As Thomas Mann put it in his lecture celebrating Freud’s eightieth birthday, 
“on every page he [i.e., Freud] seems to instruct us that there is no deeper 
knowledge without experience of disease, and that all heightened healthiness must 
be achieved by the route of illness”; it is through the route of illness that “we have 
succeeded in penetrating most deeply into the darkness of human nature.”58 
We have so penetrated into the dark side: that is what the methods of 
psychoanalysis for the first time permitted. In that respect Freud helped further the 
enlightenment project that he shared with Schlick and the Vienna Circle. Indeed, it 
was the project of the Delphic Oracle, “Know thyself.” But it provided not only 
understanding but also relief. Freud showed the way out of self imposed human 
suffering, whether it be the suffering imposed on oneself by the Calvinist or the 
suffering imposed on others by the religious or political enthusiast. Psychoanalysis 
provided the tools through which human beings could become masters of 
themselves and could locate within themselves a way of taking joy in things without 
having to suffer or without having to make others suffer. 
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Carnap was confident. When he wrote in 1928 his book on The Logical Structure of 
the World,59 what he was attempting was a picture of reality as it is and as it presents 
itself to us, without the illusions of metaphysics. The “Preface” is important. “This 
requirement,” he tells us in reference to the requirement enjoined upon science by 
the Vienna Circle “for justification and conclusive foundation of each thesis will 
eliminate all speculative and poetic work from philosophy” (p. xvii). This project, 
the elimination of metaphysics and poetry from philosophy, was the enlightenment 
project. This is not to say that there is no role for the emotions: of course there is. 
Carnap puts it this way: “The practical handling of philosophical problems and the 
discovery of their solutions does not have to be purely intellectual, but will always 
contain emotional elements and intuitive methods.” However, as he then adds: “The 
justification [...] has to take place before the forum of the understanding; here we 
must not refer to our intuition of emotional needs.” The work of the Vienna Circle is 
part of a broader movement. While the irrational forces of religion and metaphysics 
are both present and, alas, active, nonetheless, Carnap tells his readers,  
We feel that there is an inner kinship between the attitude on which our 
philosophical work is founded and the intellectual attitude which 
presently [i.e., 1928] manifests itself in entirely different walks of life; 
we feel this orientation in artistic movements, especially in architecture, 
and in movements which strive for meaningful forms of personal and 
collective life, of education, and of external organization in general. We 
feel all around us the same basic orientation, the same style of thinking 
and doing.   (p. xviii) 
Carnap goes on: 
It is an orientation which demands clarity everywhere, but which realizes 
that the fabric of life can never quite be comprehended.   (p. xviii) 
We all have our little ways. But there is no reason to think that in the broad outlines 
at least we are doomed to failure in our attempts to use science not only for self-
understanding but for relief from our suffering. The orientation of the Vienna Circle 
makes us pay careful attention to detail and at the same time recognizes 
the great lines which run through the whole. It is an orientation which 
acknowledges the bonds that tie men together, but at the same time 
strives for free development of the individual.   (p. xviii) 
The aims of the Vienna Circle are those of Freud: the freedom of the individual 
from the bondage of illusion and of the constraints that we impose on ourselves and 
others through those illusions of religion and metaphysics. Carnap is hopeful: “Our 
work is carried by the faith that this attitude will win the future” (p. xviii). It was 
more hope than history would justify.60 
The issues, however, are not just social, they are also personal. As Carnap 
explains about the philosophers in the Vienna Circle: 
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We too have “emotional needs “ in philosophy, but they are filled by 
clarity of concepts, precision of methods, responsible theses, 
achievement through cooperation in which each individual plays his part. 
(p. xvii) 
We are moved by our cognitive interests. These interests are ends in themselves. But 
the satisfaction of these interests is also a means. The criticisms of traditional 
metaphysics and religion that come through clarity are a means to social justice and 
harmony.61 
Hume expressed this important point in his own way: “Reason is and ought 
only to be the slave of the passions.”62 It is the slave of the passions in the sense that 
the love of truth, which reason attempts to satisfy, is itself a passion. It ought to be 
the slave of the passions for the reason that when it makes pretense of coming to 
know things and more specifically duties that come from beyond the world of 
ordinary experience, then the result is dangerous. 
Nietzsche63 ridiculed the love of truth as a motive for philosophers.64 They were 
in fact moved by such things as the need to secure a university chair. But mostly his 
argument was, on the one hand, the positivist idea that transcendental metaphysics is 
illusion and, on the other, the idea that these illusions were disguised wishes, the 
aim of which was to enchain humankind with ostensibly objective duties.65 These 
duties were not, when it came down to justification, rules that enabled people to live 
together, though they are that. The will to power is the will to command others. One 
commands others in the enterprise of satisfying one’s own instinctual urges. One 
commands them not personally but through the illusion of objective duties. German 
Romantic metaphysics provided the rationale once the illusions of religion had lost 
their force. Somehow, these metaphysicians said, there is beyond the world of 
ordinary experience an objective self or being that commands us. 
Nietzsche’s program was of a piece with that of the British empiricists. He 
found his basic ideas in Friedrich Lange’s History of Materialism.66 Lange restated 
the Humean position that what we know we know by sense and that there is nothing 
in things that is beyond that way of knowing.67 Nietzsche accepts by way of Lange 
Hume’s argument that there is no self beyond the empirical self, that there is no 
reality beyond sensible reality, and that this world including humankind as a part of 
it can be explored under the guidance of the principle that whatever happens has a 
natural cause, a cause that can be found in the world of ordinary experience. 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals68 echoes Hume’s Natural History of Religion:69 
both are part of the enlightenment enterprise of freeing humankind from illusion. To 
be sure, there are differences. For both, religion is an illusion. But Hume locates the 
roots of the religious illusion in fears raised by the terrors that confront us from the 
natural world: God is the means to help us psychologically confront the dread raised 
by the unknown forces of nature. Nietzsche, in contrast, begins with a natural 
history of morals. He contrasts the ethics of self-fulfilment of the ancient world and 
the ethics of renunciation of the modern world;70 it is the ressentiment of the persons 
who are not successful under the former that leads to development of the latter.71 It 
THE  VIENNA  CIRCLE  AND  FREUD 27 
is in ressentiment that one finds the psychological origin of our ordinary concept of 
justice.72 With this concept goes the concept of punishment,73 and with that in turn 
comes the phenomenon of conscience and guilt – self-punishment74: “thus began the 
gravest and uncanniest illness, from which humanity has not yet recovered, man’s 
suffering of man, of himself …”75 Out of this illness of bad conscience comes the 
concept of supernatural forces that will enforce the rules of justice, first the 
ancestors, and these as transmuted into gods: “in the end the ancestor must 
necessarily be transfigured into a god. Perhaps this is even the origin of gods, an 
origin therefore out of fear!”76 And the gods come, again through fear, to be 
magnified into the one God.77 Where Hume has the origins of the gods in a fear of 
nature, Nietzsche locates the origins in the fear of oneself: God is the dispenser and 
enforcer of the rules of justice, the self-imposed rules of justice. It is these sorts of 
psychological forces that Freud was to explore. In Nietzsche, as in Hume, the causal 
story is speculative. Freud provides a causal account of this sort of illusion that is 
rooted in the scientific picture of humankind provided by psychoanalysis. Hume, 
Nietzsche, and Freud are all part of the developing enlightenment project of freeing 
humankind from illusion and from the unreasonable self-imposed constraints 
demanded by such illusions.78 We have to see the program of the Vienna Circle, so 
well expressed by Carnap, in just this same context of the enlightenment program of 
making humankind free. 
It has become a commonplace to locate the Vienna Circle, Carnap at least, 
within a neo-Kantian framework.79 After all, had not Carnap studied with them as 
well as with Frege? This means that one locates the Vienna Circle in the framework 
that includes Lange and also Nietzsche: all defend and pursue the enlightenment 
project. Where Nietzsche goes beyond the Vienna Circle is in going back to Hume 
and offering not only a critique of religion and morality but also a causal story about 
how these illusions arise and about the interests they serve.  
But for Nietzsche, as for Hume, it is only a story: there is no background 
method beyond the literary to support the claims about the psychological origins of 
the power that these illusions have over humankind. The requirement of the Vienna 
Circle for the clarity that comes from the demand for empirical truth goes only so 
far. One wants also to control oneself, to so control oneself that no longer is it these 
illusions that are in charge. In order to seize control one needs more than a story, 
one needs to “know thyself” in the sense that one has the causal knowledge about 
one’s own self that puts one in control of how one thinks and feels and behaves. The 
positivist critique will not by itself do that. Neither will the insights of literary 
critics, not even if they are Nietzsche. What one needs is a real method that enables 
one to gain control of oneself. It was Freud who gave us this method. This was the 
central human achievement of the twentieth century: for the first time genuine self-
understanding really was possible. It was only with this that the enlightenment 
project of the Vienna Circle could be realized. 
There were not only personal relationships between the Freudians in Vienna and 
the Circle that Schlick gathered about himself. Deeper than that there was the shared 
project of furthering the enlightenment. Neurath recognized the significance of Freud 
in this project. Nothing, however, not even Freud’s insights into the dark side of 
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human nature, not even the insights of the Nietzsche and the Vienna Circle into the 
irrationality of religion and German Romantic philosophy – nothing had prepared 
anybody for the horrors that were to come. Maybe in the end the human condition is 
beyond comprehension. That is not something that Freud would have said. Neither 
would Neurath have said that. It might just the same be true … unfortunately. 
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New York: Random House, 1967. 
69  David Hume, The Natural History of Religion, ed. H. Root, Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1956. 
70 Genealogy of Morals, First Essay, § 10 [see endnote 68]: “While every noble morality 
develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to 
what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself’; and this No is its creative deed” 
(p. 36). Schlick makes the same point, though of course in his more sober way: “It is 
characteristic,” he says, of our modern morality that “all of its most important demands end 
in the repression of personal desires in favor of the desires of fellow men” (Problems of 
Ethics, p. 79 [see endnote 47]). To this he contrasts the ancients’ ethics: “The ancient 
classical ethics is not an ethics of self-limitation, but of self-realization, not of renunciation, 
but of affirmation” (ibid., p. 80). 
71 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, First Essay, § 11. 
72 Ibid., Second Essay, § 11. 
73 John Stuart Mill made this point in “Utilitarianism,” Ch. 5. [see endnote 50]. 
74 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Second Essay, § 15. 
75 Ibid., Second Essay, § 16, p. 85. 
76 Ibid., Second Essay, § 19, p. 89. 
77 Ibid., Second Essay, § 20.
78 Nietzsche’s “will to power” is simply the demand to be free of unreasonable constraints. 
Thus, he speaks of “the instinct for freedom (in my language: the will to power)” (Genealogy 
of Morals, Second Essay, § 17, p. 87). The will to power is simply what has come to be 
known as the desire for negative liberty. Nietzsche unfortunately too often clothes his notion 
of the will to power in rhetoric redolent of the German Romantic philosophy that he 
despised. He allows his despising of the reason of the German Romantics – the reason that 
claimed, wrongly, to be able to transcend this world for another – to become a despising of 
all reason, and an over-valuing of the instincts (cf. Mann, “Nietzsche’s Philosophy in the 
Light of Recent History,” p. 161 [see endnote 63]). This leads him at times to falsely contrast 
all morality, all restraint, with life, with the will to power (see ibid., p. 162). But, of course, 
even negative liberty, if it to be enjoyed to the fullest possible extent, requires some restraint. 
Otherwise it is simply the war of all against all. The errors are connected. Reason, in its 
reasonable sense, will tell you what restraints are necessary for the fullest possible self-
realization of all. It is these combined errors that lead Nietzsche to the rhetoric of the blond 
beast who tramples others underfoot that so endeared him to the Nazis. When we read these 
parts of Nietzsche’s writing, then, as Thomas Mann puts it, “the clinical picture of infantile 
sadism is complete, and our souls writhe in embarrassment” (ibid., p. 165).
79  See Michael Friedman, “The Re-Evaluation of Logical Positivism,” Journal of 
Philosophy 88 (1991), pp. 505-519; “Epistemology in the Aufbau,” Synthese 93 (1992), 
pp. 15-57; “Carnap’s Aufbau Reconsidered,” Noûs 21 (1987), pp. 521-545; and “Geometry, 
Convention and the Relativized A Priori: Reichenbach, Schlick, and Carnap,” in W. Salmon 
and G. Wolters, eds., Logic, Language, and the Status of Scientific Theories, Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994, pp. 21-34; and A. Richardson, Carnap’s Construction 
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 The general thrust of these works is to argue that Carnap’s project is neo-Kantian rather 
than empiricist. “The aim of the Aufbau,” we are told, “is not to use logic together with sense 
data to provide empirical knowledge with an otherwise missing epistemological foundation 
of justification. Its aim, rather, is to use recent advances in the science of logic [...] together 
with advances in empirical science (Gestalt psychology, in particular) to fashion a 
scientifically respectable replacement for traditional epistemology” (Friedman, “The Re-
Evaluation of Logical Positivism,” p. 509). The point is that the replacement could well be 
one that aims to meet the spirit of empiricist epistemology while rejecting some of the 
shortcomings that had become evident, e.g., the failure to take account of the relational 
structures present in the world as we ordinarily experience it – this was a real defect in 
traditional empiricism, and for this the tradition had been criticized by the idealists; on this 
point, see F. Wilson, “Bradley’s Impact on Empiricism,” in J. Bradley, ed., Philosophy after 
F.H. Bradley, Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996, pp. 251-282.  
 A second point is that the positivists, Carnap in particular, rejected the traditional 
empiricist account of geometry and opted instead for a neo-Kantian position (Friedman, “The 
Re-Evaluation of Logical Positivism,” p. 510ff, and also “Geometry, Convention, and the 
Relativized A Priori: Reichenbach, Schlick, and Carnap”). Where the empiricist tradition 
made geometry straight-forwardly empirical, the neo-Kantians, following Lange, located it in 
the necessary structure of how as a matter of fact we think about the world. The positivists 
maintained that an adequate account of geometry required that there be a conventional 
component. This component is a priori, but a relativized a priori, a convention adopted pro 
tem because it facilitates providing a factually adequate account of the geometry of the world. 
This introduction of an a priori element into geometry, it is claimed, makes the positivists 
more neo-Kantian than empiricist. But would empiricists such as Mill have disagreed? It is 
more that they would have welcomed such a view, as a more adequate re-statement of the 
position that they were trying to defend. Carnap, in his own way, may have been inspired by 
the neo-Kantian tradition, but his allowing a conventional element into geometry is much less 
neo-Kantian than it is an improved statement of the empiricist position. 
 Finally, it is claimed that the positivists took the special sciences as foundationalist for 
their philosophy, rather than their philosophy providing a foundation for the special sciences. 
“There is no privileged vantage point from which philosophy can pass epistemic judgment on 
the special sciences: philosophy is conceived as rather following the special sciences so as to 
reorient itself in response to their established results” (Friedman, “The Re-Evaluation of 
Logical Positivism,” p. 515). But the positivists did conceive of their task as involving the 
critique of the special sciences. Thus, rather than simply being accepted, what biologists said 
in their scientific writings was to be scrutinized carefully for metaphysical error so that their 
views could be placed on a secure philosophical and epistemological footing; see, for 
example, Schlick’s essay “On the Concept of Wholeness” (in Philosophical Papers, vol. II). 
Schlick and the other positivists were following good empiricist tradition in taking solid parts 
of natural science for granted and defending the body of science from the incursions of 
metaphysics. Hobbes and Locke saw it as part of their task to provide a foundation for the 
new science and to defend it against the Aristotelianism that was still deeply entrenched in 
the universities; on this latter point, see F. Wilson, The Logic and Methodology of Science in 
Early Modern Thought, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.  
 If there is neo-Kantianism in the background of the positivists, then it is also true that 
they mostly overcame it. As Nietzsche could accept the empiricist side of Lange and reject 
the Kantian dross, so the positivists such as Schlick and Carnap could accept from neo-
Kantianism what suited their empiricist program and thus reject the Kantian refuse. 
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WITTGENSTEIN  –  POETRY  AND  LITERATURE 
Rudolf Haller 
University of Graz 
I. 
In this paper I intend to present Wittgenstein from two perspectives, which in a 
certain sense are not in harmony. We may think of the two selected models or types 
which constitute the same character thus: one is the analytic philosopher partly 
formed by a strange mixture of Frege and Russell with Schopenhauer, Tolstoi, and 
Dostoevskii. The other is the artist, whose aim is the perfection of forms, be they of 
construction, furniture, poetry, or philosophical texts. The unity of these artificially 
distinguished characters is a precondition for an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
general attitudes and prejudices in regard to art, music and literature, and, in general, 
form and style. Wittgenstein finds the first application of the analytic method or 
style in logic, in the language of signs which he had studied with Frege and Russell. 
We know about these early steps by way of Wittgenstein’s notes written in 1913, 
dictated to George E. Moore during his stay in Norway in April 1914, and especially 
from his diaries of the First World War dating from August 1914 to January 1917. 
II. 
In taking up this topic I am well aware that other philosophers have long wrestled 
with the very same difficult and problematic questions for a long time and have 
achieved remarkable results. I am especially thinking of Georg Henrik von Wright’s 
essay “Wittgenstein and His Time” and his talk at the symposium in honor of 
Jaakko Hintikka in Helsinki in 1989, “Wittgenstein and the Twentieth Century.”1 
The first part of Wright’s study provides an overview of the general background of 
modernity from the turn of the century to the 1930s: modernity viewed as the legacy 
of the Age of Enlightenment, the achievement of the French Revolution, the rise of 
science and industry, and the desire to liberate humankind, whatever this means. 
One outcome of this process was the modernisation of our ways of life: mobility, 
urbanisation, and the total change from an agricultural to an industrial society along 
with democratisation. We can observe these developments in many countries, 
especially in the USA and in many  parts  of  Europe,  and  in  a  few  other 
countries,  
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like Japan, who are now in competition with old Europe and the USA. As might be 
expected, and as Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other authors had predicted and 
demonstrated in their works, these changes were paralleled by other social, political, 
and economic revolutions. Wright rightly underlines that “in origin it was an 
optimistic mood,” which impregnated the leading ideas and the hope for steady 
progress in the liberation of humanity. And these general expectations reflected also 
one of the main ideas of the nineteenth century: the idea of evolution not only in 
nature, as we find it in Darwin and Mach, but also if we think of Hegel, Comte, or 
Spencer in the history of ideas and societies – as, for instance, von Hayek has 
pointed out in his masterpiece The Counterrevolution of Science.2 
While the optimistic idea of steady progress was boosted for some time by the 
rapid growth of science and industry, it cannot be ignored that during the very same 
period an equally strong counter-movement arose. Against the rationalistic system 
of Hegel there was Kierkegaard’s religious critique, and later the much more 
forceful attack on the leading ideologies of the nineteenth century advanced by 
Nietzsche. All of the metaphysical comfort of great philosophy had to be destroyed, 
relieved from the search and need for metaphysical substitutes. Not only Christian 
morality was questioned: the entire ethos of the modern time was something to be 
overturned. But Nietzsche’s work was not merely destructive; he was not simply the 
Alles-Zermalmer, he was not playing with incitement, but was concerned much 
more basically with a new kind of honest morality. 
Another movement countering the superficial optimism of the “progressists” 
came from Russia with the writings of Dostoevskii and Tolstoi. Like Nietzsche, who 
placed Dostoevskii on the same level as Schopenhauer, de Vigny, Leopardi, and 
Pascal,3 Wittgenstein had an enthusiasm for Dostoevskii’s “romantic pessimism.” 
Although the writing as well as the life of Tolstoi had a deep impact on 
Wittgenstein, this did not diminish the high esteem in which he held Dostoevskii 
and especially the Karamasov.4 But, even if it were true that Wittgenstein preferred 
Dostoevskii, and I think it is, his own way of life and his decision at the end of the 
war to free himself of his inheritance and wealth were deeply influenced and 
motivated by Tolstoian ideas. Biographical publications and documents produced by 
Wittgenstein’s friends and pupils have provided a wealth of data and interpretation 
both in respect of his life and his philosophical remarks. We may think of the 
biographies by McGuinness and Monk, the recollections of his friends and students, 
and the prodigious literature based on these accounts. 
If we direct our interest to Wittgenstein’s relation to and understanding of 
literature, we have to distinguish between different kinds of literature (poetic, 
philosophical, scientific, or religious texts, etc.). What I intend to do is to try to 
understand a little better the fact that Wittgenstein was not only a philosopher – one 
of the two or three most important philosophers of the twentieth century – but that 
he was many-sided in a deep sense. Even in philosophy he was not merely a creative 
logician: he was also a revolutionary defender of ordinary language and its use in 
philosophy; he was the first of a long line able to escape the enduring scholastic 
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school as well as the habit of compiling compendia; but he also nevertheless 
accepted the power and value of tradition. What I am interested in is not so much 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical texts and their interpretation, but his understanding of 
literary works of the past and especially of his own time. 
After the period of the Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung, which after all was 
neither a “Abhandlung” nor a “Tractatus” in the usual style, he decided to write 
remarks. Some of them are so concentrated and perfect in form and content that they 
could be mistaken for aphorisms. Actually he himself was aware of this danger, 
which is similar to that of unintentionally turning a straightforward sentence into a 
rhyme. For Wittgenstein, style was not only an aesthetic category; it was first and 
foremost a moral one. “Writing in the right style,” he says, “is setting the carriage 
straight on the rails.”5 Unsurprisingly, from time to time he criticises his own style, 
e.g.: “My style is like bad musical composition.”6 Style has to do with one’s self; it 
is a way of reacting to the world and to ourselves. And this, very often, has to do 
with religion. I personally think that one of the marks of Wittgenstein’s character 
was undeniably his strong religiosity (which he separated from his philosophy as far 
as possible) and steady search for God’s protection. If we read the so-called Secret 
Diaries, we find again and again the cry to God for help, even in the form of a 
prayer, as on April 7, 1916: “Gott helfe mir. Ich bin ein armer unglücklicher 
Mensch. Gott erhöre mich und schenke mir den Frieden! Amen.”7 (“Help me God. I 
am a miserable, wretched human being. Hear me, God, and grant me peace! 
Amen.”) 
We, who have read and studied the Tractatus (completed at the end of the First 
World War in 1918) and the Philosophical Investigations (the first part of which 
was finished at the end of the Second World War in 1945, which is also the date of 
his preface to his second book), normally see his work as the most important 
contribution, first, to the philosophy of Logical Empiricism in the 1920s and 1930s, 
and then to the broader wave of analytic philosophy arising after World War II. 
It is well known that for a time after the First World War Wittgenstein 
contemplated becoming a monk. However, Russell was right: it was “an idea, not an 
intention.”8 But even an idea may point to an important fact, namely that 
Wittgenstein’s genuine perspective was beyond modernity also in regard to religious 
beliefs. In 1919 Russell states that “[I] was astonished when I found that he has 
become a complete mystic,” and he refers to Wittgenstein’s interest in Kierkegaard, 
Angelus Silesius, and Tolstoi’s writing on the Gospels. Many of the later remarks in 
his diaries written in the thirties signify Wittgenstein’s steady concern with religion. 
Since he does not understand the real Christian belief (“Den eigentlichen 
Christenglauben – nicht den Glauben – verstehe ich noch gar nicht”),9 he is 
struggling constantly with his inescapable desire to reach certainty: “Die Leiden des 
Geistes loswerden, das heißt die Religion los werden.”10 (“To get rid of the pain of 
mind means to get rid of religion.”) 
Almost all remarks are in one way or another connected to the problem of 
language and the problem of our life – and both problems relate to the question of 
faith: “Gott laß mich fromm sein aber nicht überspannt”11 (“God, let me be devout, 
but not overstrained”), asks Wittgenstein in his private notes. He is warning himself 
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again and again, knowing the snares of language: “Aber was ist am Gebrauch der 
Zeichen Tiefes? Da erinnere ich mich, erstens [...], daran, daß die Probleme, die 
durch ein Mißdeuten der Formen unserer Sprache entstehen immer den Charakter 
des Profunden haben”12 (“But what profundity is there in the use of signs? I 
remember, first, […] that the problems arising from a misinterpretation of the forms 
of our language always have the character of profundity.”) Repeatedly we are 
reminded that all of our conduct is linked with language or, better: language games. 
A good example is found in Wittgenstein’s remark of February 4, 1937:  
I can well deny the Christian solution of the problem of life (redemption, 
resurrection, judgement, heaven, hell), but by this the problem of our life 
is not at all solved, for I am not good and not happy… And how can I 
know, what picture of the order of the world I would have in mind as the 
only acceptable one if I lived in a different way, in a completely different 
way. I cannot judge... If one lives in another way, one speaks in another 
way. With a new life one learns new language games.13 
Thus we can learn new uses of language if we change our life and the principles of 
life, and this is also proof that we have changed the ways we think and feel. In the 
same year Wittgenstein offers another remark concerning the dogmas of our 
thinking and the power of literature – in this case religious literature – to influence 
people:  
The effect of making men think in accordance with dogmas, perhaps in 
the form of certain graphic propositions will be very peculiar: I am not 
thinking of these dogmas as determining men’s opinions but rather as 
completely controlling the expression of all opinions. People will live 
under an absolute, palpable tyranny, though without being able to say 
they are not free. I think the Catholic Church does something rather like 
this. For dogma is expressed in the form of an assertion, and is 
unshakable, but at the same time any practical opinion can be made to 
harmonize with it.14 
III. 
After his death, nearly fifty years ago, there is an almost general view (especially in 
publications in English) that Wittgenstein – who had, apart from one article, not 
published anything but the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – was perhaps the most 
important philosopher of the twentieth century. That he belonged to the history of 
English philosophy seemed obvious. Started with his philosophical studies before 
the First World War in England with Russell, his training as a philosopher was 
English. And with a few exceptions – perhaps with several soldiers during the war 
(Ludwig Hänsel, Michael Drobil) and the members of his family – he did not belong 
to any circle in Vienna. I do not think he had much contact with artists and writers in 
Vienna. When he met Loos, whom he already knew personally in 1914, together 
with von Ficker, during the early 1920s, he was disgusted: he found him “versmokt.” 
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But this did not alter his high regard for Loos’s revolutionary decision to liberate 
modern architecture from unnecessary decoration. The house that Wittgenstein 
designed for his sister, Gretl Stonborough, in Kundmanngasse in Vienna, originally 
designed by Paul Engelmann, was a task which in some way should have helped to 
overcome the fact and catastrophe that he had to quit his job as a teacher. On the 
other hand, it did give Wittgenstein the chance to practice and to prove his aesthetic 
sense and his abilities as an engineer. Together with Engelmann, whom he won as a 
friend during his time in Olmütz, he put all of his talent into the construction and 
details of this house, which reflects the ideas and constructions of Adolf Loos. That, 
on the other hand, he both did not at all like Loos’s engagement in an almost 
political movement for new architecture and found him somewhat strange was, I 
think, not an obstacle to the inclusion of Loos’s name in the list of people who had a 
decisive influence on his own thinking. At certain moments Wittgenstein was 
convinced that there was truth in his idea that he “really only think[s] 
reproductively.” It is worthwhile quoting this confession from 1931:  
I don’t believe I have ever invented a line of thinking, I have always 
taken one over from someone else. I have simply straightaway seized on 
it with enthusiasm for my work of clarification. That is how     
Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos,      
Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa have influenced me [...] What I invent are 
new similes.15  
Although I do not want to dwell on this list, I think that we have to take it seriously 
and that it in fact comprises the most important figures in Wittgenstein’s intellectual 
life. It is noteworthy that this list, written almost three years after his return to 
England in 1931, includes only one Englishman – Russell – but four Germans: 
Heinrich Hertz, Arthur Schopenhauer, Gottlob Frege, and Oswald Spengler. 
Evidently not all philosophers, these Germans were, at different times, of central 
importance to the evolution of Wittgenstein’s work. The list also reflects the 
temporal order of these influences, since of the five Austrians, he mentions 
Boltzmann first, followed by Kraus, Loos, and Weininger (whom he met before the 
twenties), and finally Sraffa (whom he met immediately after his return to England; 
actually Sraffa’s name is emphasised especially in Wittgenstein’s preface to his 
second main work, the Philosophical Investigations).  
Unfortunately there does not exist a similar list of poets and writers who may 
have contributed to his understanding, even if they did possibly have a special role 
in his “work of classification” – his Klärungswerk as he has called it. But on the 
basis of different sources, I think he could have made similar lists for literature. 
Most of the following names would no doubt have been mentioned: of the writers 
and poets from Germany, first and foremost, is Goethe, who has a special place in 
Wittgenstein’s life, and then Friedrich Schiller, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Heinrich 
von Kleist, Matthias Claudius, Eduard Mörike, Ludwig Uhland, Albert von 
Chamisso, Wilhelm Busch, and certainly Georg Christoph Lichtenberg; from 
Switzerland, Gottfried Keller, and from Austria, Franz Grillparzer, Johann Nestroy, 
Nikolaus Lenau, and Rainer Maria Rilke. But others should also be mentioned, for 
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instance, Ferdinand Kürnberger and Ludwig Anzengruber, Russian writers 
(especially Dostoevskii and Tolstoi), and the famous Indian Rabindranath Tagore. 
Wittgenstein was for some time a regular reader of Der Brenner, edited by 
Ludwig von Ficker, and even before the First World War a temporary subscriber to 
the journal Die Fackel, edited by Karl Kraus. The first journal was indeed a more or 
less Catholic literary journal. Nevertheless, or perhaps just because of this fact, one 
could find there poems by Georg Trakl and Rainer Maria Rilke. That even Karl 
Kraus praised this journal as “the only honest periodical in Austria,” and hence the 
only honest periodical in Germany,16 persuaded Wittgenstein to donate to this journal 
100,000 Kronen (at that time quite an enormous amount of money), of which Trakl 
and Rilke were to receive 20,000 Kronen each; 10,000 Kronen went to the journal 
Der Brenner, and the balance was distributed among fourteen other people. 
It was through these transactions that Wittgenstein received Georg Trakl’s 
poems, which he evaluated as brilliant, in spite of the fact that he could not 
understand them.17 Actually, in November 1914, Wittgenstein wanted to visit Trakl, 
who was at the time ill and in a Krakow hospital. But Trakl, who had previously 
attempted suicide, died after a final attempt two days before Wittgenstein’s ship 
“Goplana” arrived in Krakow. In his diary Wittgenstein notes: “Ich bin gespannt, ob 
ich Trakl treffen werde. Ich hoffe sehr.” (“I am curious whether I shall meet Trakl. I 
very much hope so.”) Receiving the sad news in the hospital, he writes: “Dies traf 
mich sehr stark. Wie traurig, wie traurig.” (“This affected me very strongly. How 
sad, how sad.”) In a letter to Ludwig von Ficker he repeats what he thought of 
Trakl’s poems: “Ich verstehe sie nicht; aber ihr Ton beglückt mich. Es ist der Ton 
der wahrhaft genialen Menschen.”18 (“I do not understand them; but their tone 
makes me happy. It is the tone of truly ingenious people.”)  
We know for a fact that Wittgenstein was well acquainted with at least these 
two journals, Die Fackel and Der Brenner, which means that at a certain time he 
had a general picture of the kinds of lyric and prose writings available and an idea of 
what modern literature, at least German modern literature, was about. If, however, 
we turn our attention to the oft-mentioned examples of the kinds of literature 
Wittgenstein actually liked and read, we will mainly have to look the past; most of 
his citations and remarks point in that direction. There is no doubt Wittgenstein had 
quite a good and perhaps even excellent knowledge of classical literature. Whenever 
possible he read a text in its original language; he even worked on his Latin in order 
to read the Vulgata in the appropriate language. 
IV. 
Wright, in his aforementioned papers, calls our attention to three authors, all of 
whom have dedicated their work to the question: what kind of relation or 
correspondence is there – or can there be found – between Wittgenstein and his 
philosophy on the one hand and modernity on the other. The three authors are Allan 
Janik,19 co-author with Stephen Toulmin of Wittgenstein’s Vienna; Janos Christof 
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Nyíri, the Hungarian philosopher who ascribes to Wittgenstein not only a 
conservative style but also a conservative anthropology;20 and S. Stephan Hilmy, 
with his studies on the later Wittgenstein.21 I will not discuss any of these except for 
a very brief observation on Nyíri’s view of Wittgenstein’s conservatism and a 
remark on Hilmy’s attempt to stress – or overestimate – the difference between the 
early and the later Wittgenstein. 
No one reading Wittgenstein’s writings, and especially the remarks to be found 
in his notes and letters concerning his relation to his time, can fail to observe that a 
number of these remarks can be read and understood as expressions of a 
traditionalist or, in Nyíri’s view, conservative way of thinking. Nyíri claims that 
neo-conservative thinkers directly influenced these remarks and, especially, 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.22 Perhaps the best examples cited by Nyíri are the 
writings of Paul Ernst; Wittgenstein admired this writer and poet, and even wanted 
to mention Ernst in the preface of a book. “The book” Wittgenstein was alluding to 
is probably the one he hoped to finish and for which he wrote the preface in 
November 1930. Nevertheless it seems to me completely wrong to mix up, on the 
one side, the change of one’s life and lifestyle (as motivated by religious and ethical 
reasons), and, on the other, Wittgenstein’s conservative taste and interest in music 
and poetry with a general neo-conservative political movement. A few characteristic 
traits of some kind do not make up an ideal; we have to take into account the overall 
circumstances from which these traits arise. For instance, Mahler’s symphonies 
exemplify a remarkably different type compared to classical symphonies. 
Wittgenstein believed that Mahler’s music was “worthless,” but despite this 
negative judgment, he recognized that “if conditions nowadays are really so 
different from what they once were that one cannot even compare the genre one’s 
work belongs to with that of earlier works, then one can not compare them in respect 
to the value of either.”23 And Wittgenstein adds that he, too, makes this mistake now 
and then. 
It is in this sense that Wright justly criticizes Nyíri’s identification of 
Wittgenstein’s criticism of modern civilisation with conservatism; Wright is also 
justified in correcting Janik’s proposal to discern in Wittgenstein’s life a strict 
separation between his philosophy and his personal beliefs. After all, what would it 
mean to separate philosophizing from personal beliefs? Can we even think of this as 
anything other than a form of insincerity? No, what Wittgenstein does not say, we, 
on our part, should not imagine that he had said or thought it, except when there is 
sufficient evidence. In any case, I do not think that Janik actually suggested what 
Wright rightly does criticize. What Janik might have found in the later writings of 
Wittgenstein – and perhaps this is the point he wanted to stress – was the remarkable 
advice Wittgenstein had for himself and his readers, to be unbiased and not take sides 
in philosophy: philosophy leaves everything as it is. I shall return to this point later. 
With regard to Hilmy’s thesis that the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein is in 
essence a strong departure from his earlier philosophy, I share Wright’s doubts; he 
correctly emphasizes the unity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his lifelong battle 
for the proper understanding of philosophy and its task. However, my criticism of 
Hilmy is not limited to disagreeing with his perception of two different 
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Wittgensteins, which one may call Wittgenstein I and Wittgenstein II. I am 
contesting Hilmy’s picture of the later Wittgenstein as such. This does not mean that 
I am not in agreement with many or most of the results of Hilmy’s research 
concerning the earlier sources of Wittgenstein’s Investigations, which, to a 
remarkable degree, can be found in the unpublished so-called Big Typescript (TS 
213). I think, for instance, that Hilmy provided good evidence that this typescript 
has a “far stronger claim to the title ‘Preliminary Study for the Philosophical 
Investigations’ than The Brown Books has.”24 
With his general tendency to exaggerate the difference between the          
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and his later philosophy, Hilmy does not merely 
repeat a mistake that marked the early reception of Wittgenstein’s work. The trouble 
is that Hilmy’s analysis rests on the erroneous belief that the later Wittgenstein was 
in total disagreement with his writings of the earlier Tractatus period, and equally in 
total conflict with the logical empiricists. One remembers one of the preface-
versions of the “book” Wittgenstein wrote and wanted to publish in the early 
thirties. In the early version from 1930, he emphasized the huge difference in spirit 
between the main current of European and American civilisation, “whose expression 
is the industry, architecture, music, fascism and socialism of our time” and his own 
anti-modernistic attitude. During the period in which he wrote these versions of the 
preface, he was deeply influenced by Spengler. While Spengler saw the decline of 
the West as the fate of Europe, Wittgenstein, unlike Spengler, included also the 
United States in the decline, although, in agreement with Spengler, he excluded 
Russia. This general aversion to the political, social, and cultural situation in Europe 
was not at all unique and was particularly common in Austria. Robert Musil, for 
instance, notes in his diary that “Europe has never been at such a low ebb as now.”25 
And, reflecting on why this is the case, Musil attempts initially to think of man as an 
“Ungestalt,” something that accommodates to a given form, but does not shape or 
construct it. In the same context Musil says: “The human being does not fix the 
shape of his own life [...]. The causal chains of human development and those of the 
particular life-form are different.”26   
Wittgenstein may have had similar thoughts about Lebensform as early as Musil 
did – namely at the time of the publication of the Tractatus, although I have not find 
any trace of them. In the 1920s Wittgenstein assessed the mood of the people around 
him as he had during the final years of the First World War: “We are asleep... Our 
life is like a dream.”27 And disgusted by his impression of some Austrians in Lower 
Austria, he said that the people were not human at all but loathsome worms. Thus, 
already in 1922, he mentions “the idea of a possible flight to Russia,” to, as we 
might guess, the Russia of Tolstoi and Dostoevskii, the Russia beyond Western 
civilisation.28 Even when in 1935 Wittgenstein actually went to Russia it was – 
besides other aims and considerations – in the hope of escaping the strange demands 
life, namely normal life, makes. And he knew that if “your life does not fit into life’s 
mould,” you have to change it so that “it does fit into the mould” – the German word 
Wittgenstein used was Form. To fit into a mould, or life-form, seems to be an image 
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for a complicated process, and we do not know general criteria for fitting into a life-
form because there always remain more options and possibilities beyond the ones 
which have actually come true or been realized. One might think that the difference 
between the happy man and the unhappy man does reflect the fitting or non-fitting. 
But this is not something we can achieve by our will. Wittgenstein never gave up the 
thought that the world is independent of the will: “Even if everything we wished 
were to happen, this would only be, so to speak, a favour of fate,” he says in the 
Tractatus (6.374). Since there are only logical necessities, no other connection of 
this kind can be made. The rules we follow in our life are in an essential sense 
arbitrary. They “are arbitrary in the sense that they are not responsible to some sort 
of reality – they are not similar to natural laws; nor are they responsible to some 
meaning the word already has.”29 
V. 
Concerning the unity of his work – if this claim has any justification – I assume and 
take it as a fact that Austrian literature and Austrian philosophy have taken on a 
shape of their own. But I am aware it would be an exaggeration to state that its 
literature should be as rigorously distinguished from German literature as Austrian 
philosophy is from philosophy in Germany. And that has nothing to do with the fact 
that Kant’s and the German idealists’ philosophy did not have the same effect in 
Austria as in Germany. On the contrary, the philosophies of Bolzano and Brentano 
represent the two lines of the Austrian tradition responsible for the fact that Austrian 
philosophy has been taken seriously in the last 150 years. 
I want to emphasize that: there is, as far as I can see, no indication that     
Wittgenstein was prejudiced against German literature, but he must have seen a 
general difference, which in 1929 he formulated as follows: “I think good Austrian 
work (Grillparzer, Lenau, Bruckner, Labor) is particularly hard to understand. There 
is a sense in which it is subtler than anything else and the truth it expresses never 
leans towards plausibility.”30  
The problem at the center of Wittgenstein’s work was not so much the mind but 
language: language, he stated, is a labyrinth. You come from one side, and you 
know where you are (“und du kennst dich aus”); you come from another side to the 
same spot, and you are lost (“und kennst dich nicht mehr aus”). This is why he 
directed his interests towards Austrian writers and critics, to Ferdinand Kürnberger 
and Johann Nestroy: from these two writers he borrowed his mottoes for the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as well as for the Philosophical Investigations. 
Wittgenstein was also deeply impressed by a play of another Austrian poet and 
playwright, Ludwig Anzengruber, which engendered in him a religious feeling he 
never could forget. He later told his friends that this experience occurred when he 
was twenty-one; he saw the play Der Kreuzelschreiber (published 1873), in which 
“one of the characters expressed the thought that no matter what happened in the 
world, nothing bad could happen to him – he was independent of fate and 
circumstances.”31 “Es kann Dir nix g‘schehn! – Du g’hörst zu dem all’n und dös 
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alles g’hört zu Dir! Es kann Dir nix g’schehn!”32 (“Nothing can happen to you! – 
You are part of all this, and all this is part of you! Nothing can happen to you!”): 
this passage in the play impressed Wittgenstein immensely, and he referred to it 
repeatedly when explaining his religious feelings. 
In spite of the fact that in some respects Wittgenstein was a leading modern 
philosopher and writer, he still remained, from another perspective, critical of 
modernity: his favorite period in the history of culture ended, as he himself 
confessed, with the time of Schumann. Thus we may ask ourselves: Why 
Wittgenstein failed to notice or actually ignored even those artists and writers who, 
during his lifetime, shared his general background and some of his ethical and moral 
points of view? Why did he think that “his house,” although he had been asked to 
cooperate in its design by the architect Paul Engelmann, did not meet his 
requirements? Was the house not an example of modern architecture? 
We do not find anything in his writings that we could compare to modern 
literature, nor do we find examples of modern literature in his reading list. Even in 
the case of Trakl, with whom he had some emotional relationship, does not point to 
a case of literature which could have served Wittgenstein as a true sample and which 
he himself did accept. The simplicity he could and did admire in the poems of 
Mörike was one of the examples of finding the simplest answer in the muddle of 
philosophical questions. Whereas Wittgenstein had always been interested in 
contemporary music, and in Gustav Mahler in particular, the works of the poets of 
that time did not seem to interest him as strongly. But as it is rather unlikely that he 
did not at least try to feel the spirit of poetry of his time, that is early twentieth 
century poetry, one can only assume that it must have remained strange to 
Wittgenstein. 
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And as imagination bodies forth 
The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen 
Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing 
A local habitation and a name. 
 
Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream 
 
 
I. 
In this paper I will suggest that one can use Wittgenstein to shed light on a puzzle 
literary language raises for the philosophy of language. Specifically, I will show that 
his notion of linguistic criteria allows us to understand how literature, speaking as it 
does about fictions and fictions alone, might nevertheless be able to say something 
of profound cognitive consequence about reality. Explaining how talk about fictions 
can be revelatory of reality is, of course, not interesting merely as a puzzle for the 
philosophy of language. It is upon the belief that it is possible to hang our faith in 
the humanistic value of the narrative arts, and so much is at stake when we find 
ourselves called on to address this puzzle. Now most of us do believe, in some sense 
at least, that the language of literary fiction can offer us genuine insights into how 
things stand in our world. But explaining this with any degree of philosophical 
respectability has proven to be a tremendously troubling task, and this is where 
Wittgenstein can help us. With the exception of two authors, Bernard Harrison and 
David Schalkwyk,1 I am unaware of any philosopher who has even touched on the 
possibilities Wittgenstein’s notion of criteria opens up for those of us interested in 
the puzzle of literary language, and in this paper I will map out a precise strategy for 
importing it into the current debate. 
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II. 
The precise form of the problem that Wittgenstein allows us to solve is well-known 
and requires very little setting up. It concerns a tension that exists between two basic 
intuitions we have about the nature of works of literary fiction. One intuition 
concerns the social and cognitive value of literature, and it tells us that literature 
offers us a window on our world. We might call this the “humanist intuition” and 
characterize it as the thought that literature presents the reader with an intimate and 
intellectually significant engagement with social and cultural reality. It is the idea, 
one familiar to all of us in some respect, that literature is the textual form to which 
we turn when we want to read the story of our shared form of life, our moral and 
emotional, social and sexual – and so on for whatever corners of our culture we 
think literature brings to view – ways of being human. The other intuition concerns 
how we understand the fiction that goes into a work of literary fiction. For it strikes 
us as equally intuitive to say that the imaginative basis of literary creation presents 
to the reader not his world but other worlds, what we commonly call fictional 
worlds. If we think that literature tells us about our world, we have to make this 
square with the obvious fact that we understand, and certainly read, literature as if it 
is exempt from the task of worldly exegesis. Literary fiction trades in aesthetic 
creation rather than factual representation. It speaks about people created on paper, 
who inhabit worlds made only of words. And from this it seems quite natural to 
conclude that literature is therefore essentially and intentionally silent about the way 
our world is, choosing instead to speak about worlds none of which are quite our 
own. The tension, then, is a matter of how we might reconcile these two intuitions, 
these basic visions we have of literature as somehow at once both thoroughly our-
worldly and other-worldly. 
Of these two intuitions, the humanist’s has lost out in current philosophy of 
fiction. The reason for this, of course, is not that anyone believes that we have come 
to realize that literary fiction is after all irrelevant to life. It is because in many 
minds humanism is associated with a crude and antiquated tendency in the history of 
aesthetics. In attempting this reconciliation, humanists have often been guilty of two 
sins, namely that of forging the connection to our world by taking literature to be a 
mimetic rendering of reality – and thus relying on the now much disfavored 
representational view of literary fiction – and then going on to treat as the ultimate 
object of literary appreciation not the literary work of art itself but this world of 
which the text is thought to be just a mirror. There is an odd expression Derrida has 
popularized, “il n’y a pas de hors-texte.” If tamed slightly into stating that, at least 
from the literary perspective, nothing outside the text matters, Derrida’s curious 
proclamation brings to light a widely accepted claim. The extra-textual is thought to 
be the extra-literary, beyond the reach of anyone who wants to illuminate the nature 
of what we experience when we look between the covers of a novel. To try to step 
from literature to the extra-textual is to take a step away from the very object of 
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literary theory. And the humanist is typically taken to be the theorist who has failed 
to learn this basic lesson, the dolt, in a word, who keeps trying to turn the hors-texte 
into the object of literary investigation. 
It takes very little argumentation to bring to view the reason many philosophers 
believe that the humanist necessarily cannot correct his intuition, that in attempting 
to forge the connection between literature and life he will always end up losing the 
literary text. The sceptic who doubts that the humanist can offer this reconciliation 
has a very simple argument at his disposal. The sceptic argues that the humanist 
must accept the following constraint: he must prove that the value he wants to 
attribute to a literary text is an actual property of the text itself. If he does not meet 
this constraint, the sceptic reasonably points out that the humanist will fail to 
identify a proper literary value, and thus he will default on his promise to tell us 
something about the nature of literature. But if the humanist accepts this constraint – 
and he clearly must if he wants to shed light on what we come into contact with in 
our experience of a work of literary fiction – there seems to be no possibility of 
giving a linguistic ground to the humanist’s claim that literary language can tell us 
something about the way our world is. As Peter Lamarque argues: 
The particulars presented in a novel are fictional, and how can any view, 
however objective, of fictional particulars, give us truth? Ex hypothesi, it 
is not a view of the real world.2 
Implicit in the above reasoning is a claim that has the status of a truism in most 
corners of the philosophy of fiction: literary language eschews worldly reference 
and representation. It thus appears to cast aside the very tools by which we can use 
language to create a picture of how things stand in our world. We take, habitually, 
the notion of reference to describe how a string of words can be understood as being 
about something (by referring to it or otherwise offering a linguistic representation 
of it). But literature sends its words out to fictional rather than actual addresses, 
referring to and so “about” the contours of purely imaginary worlds. 
We might recall Plato’s famous anti-literary fulmination in the Republic here. 
His insight, a reasonable one itself, is that there is something genuinely odd in the 
very idea of literary language: literature speaks our language as it were – it borrows 
our words and grammar, our idioms and cultural references – but it does very 
strange things with these words. In the language of narrative fiction the rails of 
reference run not from word to world but from word to chimeras, creatures of an 
author’s imagination. And from this it might well appear that literature talks quite 
literally about nothing, that it is a mere flatus vocis. Very few would agree with the 
conclusion Plato draws from this – that literature should be banned because it invites 
the innocent among us to mistake fictions for reality – but his claim that the fictional 
element in literary language implies that it speaks of worlds other than our own 
would strike much contemporary philosophy as neither odd nor antiquated. For 
when we find a use of language that neither refers to nor represents reality, it 
appears to us, just as to Plato, that we have lost all linguistic justification for 
claiming that this use of language could be trying to tell us something about reality. 
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The language of literary fiction shares in the sense of our language, of course; 
an occurrence of the word “pain” in a literary text still means “pain.” But it does not 
use our language to talk about our world. Rather, it uses it to talk about imagined 
worlds (or possible worlds, or make-believe worlds, depending on the precise theory 
to which one is committed). There is, as it is often described, a referential barrier 
that runs between our world and fictional worlds, a representational divide we 
appear unable to bridge. Thus if the humanist must show the connection to reality to 
be in some sense internal to a work of literary fiction, and if all we find when we 
look inside a literary text are words, all of which reach out to fictions rather than 
reality, the sceptic claims that the humanist intuition must be senseless. Indeed, the 
humanist’s conception of literary language appears to be built upon a paradox, a 
desire to understand literature in terms of precisely what literature turns out to be 
contrasted with: a vision of the way our world is. 
III. 
Yet why, precisely, do we feel that the humanist must embrace a paradox if he still 
wants to claim that literature speaks about our world? The sceptic responds by 
simply repeating his argument: he tells us that he has already answered this 
question. And at first we do feel the tug of necessity here; we do feel that there is 
just no other option open to the humanist. But with a few moments of reflection we 
can see that the sceptic’s anti-humanism does not simply fall in fine a priori fashion 
from his reflections on the absence of worldly representation and reference in 
literature as, say, idealism does from Berkeley’s famous esse est percipi. In the latter 
case, the position is implied by the very words used to state the argument: it just 
says so much. The same is not true of our sceptic’s claim. Saying that literature 
refuses to represent reality does not in any straightforward sense just amount to the 
claim that there is no point of contact between world and literature. There is an 
implicit assumption we need to unearth, something that explains why we feel the 
force of entailment here – we need to ask what gives us this sense that the sceptic’s 
argument reveals the impossibility of the humanistic conception of literary language. 
As with most cases in which we feel the presence of paradox without quite 
seeing its source, there is a larger picture in place, exerting its force on us from 
behind the scenes. This is what is happening here: there is another commitment, 
some more basic picture we are beholden to, by virtue of which the sceptic’s 
arguments appear so reasonable. We know that the sceptic hangs his anti-humanism 
on his arguments against the presence of worldly representation and reference in 
literature. So the question becomes: what makes us think that humanism is senseless 
just because of their absence?  
What we feel, in feeling the pull of the sceptic’s arguments, is the presence of a 
certain picture of how language and reality are basically hooked up. We feel that 
there is a divide between language and reality, and that bridging the gap requires the 
semantic tools the sceptic has taken from the humanist. The sceptic’s argument that 
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these semantic tools are unavailable to the humanist has much force because of the 
role these tools play in this picture. They are the tools for bringing language to bear 
on reality, and naturally we feel that the humanist is lost when they are taken from 
him. Without them we appear to be left with mere language, words with no worldly 
point of contact. Our readiness to accept the sceptic’s argument is explained in terms 
of how we hear his arguments. And we do so standing on this more basic picture of 
the word-world relation, that of a gap between language and reality that can only be 
bridged by the semantic tools that the sceptic has turned against the humanist. 
The idea of the divide is at best metaphorical, though two thousand years of 
debates between idealists and realists have provided many occasions to invoke the 
picture of a separation in kind between the conventional and the natural, language 
and reality. It is the idea of the gap between world and word that we must bridge if 
our words are to connect us to reality, the picture – however one precisely wants to 
describe it – that informs many of philosophy of language’s basic dualisms, that of 
the divide between (to play on the famous Sellarsian distinction) the logical space of 
nature and the logical space of language, between the things we talk about and the 
things in themselves, between the natural and the conventional, word and world.  
This picture can be illustrated in a great number of ways, but for our purposes 
we might say that it tells us that language and world are separated by a window. 
When language speaks about reality, it looks out of the window and describes what 
it sees. It attempts to mirror or, as it is more commonly put, “represent” what is on 
the other side of the window. When we explain the relationship between a linguistic 
representation and its object, we invoke the common distinctions between a 
referring expression and its referent, a word and the bit of world to which it 
corresponds, or reality and our sentential renderings of it. We look through the 
window and use our words (however we want to explain this) to mirror, like 
landscape sketchers, what we see. The idea of wedding word and world becomes a 
question of representational accomplishment, of whether what we say when we look 
out the window, is a fair portrait of how things stand on the other side. 
A picture of this sort explains why the sceptic casts doubt on humanism with 
such ease. How can we, if we have a picture of this sort in place, see literature as 
ever connecting us to the world? When reference to reality and representation of 
world drop out, we lose the idea that a use of language can describe the actual, and 
with this picture in place we cannot even envision an alternative mode of contact: 
humanism is made utterly senseless. For the question obviously becomes: since 
literature does not look out of this window when it speaks – since it does not even 
attempt to mirror the actual, or to refer to and represent the real – how could it 
possibly have anything to say that is genuinely informative of extra-textual reality? 
We just cannot imagine what a point of contact would look like if we speak of 
literature within this framework of the word-world relation. 
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IV. 
The view of language that the sceptic exploits is this picture in which the 
relationship between word and world is cast in terms of an initial opposition; this 
picture that tells us that they remain divided from one another until we succeed in 
uniting them by way of representation. As intuitive and entrenched as this picture of 
the word-world relation may be, it is not compulsory. It has been widely attacked by 
philosophers working in the tradition in which, as Blackburn puts it, “Wittgenstein 
is admired as the high priest.”3 This tradition distinguishes itself from 
representationalist and other divide-endorsing pictures by refusing to cast the 
relation between world and word in terms of a basic opposition. Hilary Putnam, in 
what is perhaps the most succinct statement available of this alternative, writes:  
What I am saying, then, is that elements of what we call “language” or 
“mind” penetrate so deeply into what we call “reality” that the very 
project of representing ourselves as being mappers of something 
“language independent” is fatally compromised from the very start.4 
The interesting thing about this alternative picture (and more generally the 
philosophical tradition that underlies it) is that it can be best seen as an inversion of 
a very traditional question. It asks us to approach the understanding of the word-
world relation by beginning not with the standard question how does word inform us 
of world? but rather by turning this question around and asking how does world 
inform word? In the first case the discussion begins by asking how language might 
get beyond itself and touch reality, and thus the roots of the idea of the divide are in 
place in the very way we formulate the question. In the second case we begin by 
asking how it might be possible to see language as in some (yet unspecified) sense 
having world within it. This distinction moves us away from wondering how a 
purely contingent and arbitrary creature of convention such as a natural language 
might be an accurate mirror of independent reality. And in its place it asks us to 
explore the possibility that language is informed by the world in the very building of 
its systems of speech; indeed that world is woven into the fabric of our language. 
We try to find a level at which reality is blown so directly into language that we are 
entitled to claim that world “is fused into the foundation of our language game.”5 
And this allows us to see, I will argue, to reject the idea of a gap between the world 
and language that is presupposed in the reasoning that makes literary language look 
like an oddity and humanism an impossibility. 
There is a fear that, if we speak of our connection to the world by first stating 
that language is our sole point of contact, we will ultimately end up trapped by 
language, unable to escape it and find our way to reality. The first step in the 
argument I will present – Wittgenstein’s argument that we cannot get between 
“language and its object” – is also the same step that is often thought to lead directly 
to linguistic idealism. The fear, more specifically, is that if we begin by claiming 
that we are linguistic creatures through and through, fully determined in what claims 
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we can make about reality by the conceptual categories and vocabularies we inherit 
from our language, we will then slide hopelessly into a sort of prison of pure 
convention, locked in language as it were. One of the reasons we are inclined to 
think this way is that, still clinging to the picture of the divide, we think that opting 
for language is just a way of opting for the linguistic side of the divide to the 
exclusion of the side of reality. But, we might notice, this leaves us in the curious 
position of seeing our language, our perspective, our form of life, as alienating just 
because they are ours. We come to see language and culture as an obstruction to our 
connection to reality rather than an expression of it. And this, as the           
Wittgenstein-inspired position I will elaborate tells us, is precisely what we must try 
to avoid.  
The following quotes from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (PI 
henceforth) offer a good point of entrance into our discussion: 
Grammar tells what kind of object anything is.   (PI § 373) 
Essence is expressed by grammar.   (PI § 371) 
What Wittgenstein is attacking here is the idea of a second voice – that of reality as 
it “really” is apart from how it is expressed in our language – that can add a claim to 
the effect that “you are right to say thus” when we speak about the world. And 
Wittgenstein means this not in the linguistic idealist’s sense that we have nothing 
but mere words, that nothing but mere linguistic convention plays any role in 
validating what we say, without any participation of the extra-linguistic (as though it 
is not the fact that there is a chair in the corner of my room that entitles me to claim 
so much but some linguistic oddity, not a “worldly” fact but only a “wordy” fact, 
whatever this might be). He means it in the sense that “grammatical” rules – the 
constitutive rules of language – specify what we can meaningfully claim to be the 
case, and thus we look there to see what we can sensibly say of reality. There is no 
sense to the idea that the justification of what we say lies fully outside language, as 
though in speech we send our words out into the world and wait to see whether 
reality will receive them. It lies within our language, within the perspective with 
which we confront reality. Grammar, in the broad sense in which Wittgenstein uses 
the term, provides the conditions for claiming anything to be (as Aristotle often said) 
a this, the very condition for discerning a thing as this or that sort of thing, for 
speaking about anything as being something at all. The “essence” of what we speak 
about – conceived not as a metaphysical presence but as this linguistic expression of 
“what kind of object anything is” – is found within our frame of reference, our 
language. What the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus found in logic, the later 
Wittgenstein finds in grammar, the rules of everyday natural language. Whereas he 
once thought that the structure of an ideal logical language would reflect the 
structure of the real – logic was for the early Wittgenstein “the great mirror” of 
reality – he later came to embrace the grammar of natural language for establishing 
this connection between word and world. 
When we ask questions about the nature of the things we speak about, we 
cannot think of this as implying a comparison between the “real” object and the way 
language frames the object; it cannot be thought of as guided, even in principle, by 
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an idea of establishing an adequate match or representational relation between the 
expression of world in language and the way the world really is. The reason for this 
should be clear: it makes no sense to think that we can step outside our linguistic 
frame to query how our “picture” compares to the reality it “depicts.” But this is not 
because what is outside our frame is simply unavailable to us – if we mean by this 
that reality lies there only we cannot see beyond our representations of it. For what 
we fail to notice if we think this way is that talk of representation and “mirroring” is 
illicit at this point, or at any rate uninvited by anything we have said thus far. We 
begin by accepting that “language tells us what kind of object anything is.” But we 
do not take “language” here to imply “rather than reality,” as though there is a 
choice between the two and our opting for language intimates the absence of any 
participation of reality in determining the linguistic specification of “what kind of 
object anything is.” 
Wittgenstein wants us to see that we can understand how words might refer to 
or represent world only if we ask the much more basic question of what sorts of 
prior connection between word and world are presupposed in the very possibility 
that sentences can represent and refer? He asks us to see that understanding the 
basic association between word and world requires an account of how language 
draws various items in the world – various bits of reality – into its grammar, which 
it can then use as instruments or standards of representation. As he argues in his 
famous example, the Paris meter-stick 
is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor 
that it is not one metre long […] But this is, of course, not to ascribe any 
extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the 
language-game of measuring with a metre-rule. – Let us imagine samples 
of colour being preserved in Paris like the standard metre. We define: 
“sepia” means the colour of the standard sepia which is there kept 
hermetically sealed. Then it will make no sense to say of this sample 
either that it is of this colour or that it is not. – We can put it like this: 
This sample is an instrument of the language used in ascriptions of 
colour. In this language-game it is not something that is represented, but 
is a means of representation […] It is a paradigm in our language-game, 
something with which a comparison is made. And this may be an 
important observation, but it is none the less an observation concerning 
our language-game – our method of representation.   (PI § 50) 
We find in this example an elegant metaphor for the relationship between grammar 
and representational and referential uses of language. The metre-stick in the above 
example is “not represented but is an instrument of representation” because we give 
it status in our language as the standard (what grammar calls “essence”) of being a 
metre long, for representing objects in the world as counting as a metre. Of course 
the full story of how language comes to use world as a standard of representation 
will be more complex than this. In the case of simple objects such as chairs and 
rocks, the story may be the fairly familiar one of coming to name an object and 
agreeing on the name we have given it – more complicated, but perhaps not too 
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interestingly so, than what we find in the example of the metre-stick. In the case of 
our more complex terms such as “personhood,” “goodness,” “love,” and so on, the 
story will likely boil down to social history. Jealousy, to give a simple example, 
develops grammatically as our culture develops institutionally. We develop 
institutions based on the pledge of fidelity (such as in marriage); and once we have 
examples of people betraying these institutions, we can use the behavior of the 
wounded (Dido of Virgil’s Aeneas, for example) as a standard by which we can, so 
to say, go on to represent the word “jealously.”  
The point is, we are able to represent and refer to the world in speech because 
we use the world as a standard of representation and reference when speaking about 
the sundry objects we experience. And so when we want to illuminate the nature of 
the objects we talk about – what we are saying about the way the world is when we 
say that this is that sort of thing – we do not try to take a stab at the nature of the 
thing as it “really” is apart from how we say that it is. We come to our 
understanding of the reality of the things we talk about by reflecting on the story of 
how these bits of the world have been brought into and given shape by our way of 
life. We come to understand the way our world is, in short, by reflecting not on 
represented objects but on our standards of representation.  
Thus we are not to think that the act of using sentences to refer to or represent 
the world carries the entire burden of our linguistic connection to reality. We use the 
world to fix the use of the words in our language, and thus we make the leap to 
representational and referential speech because language already aligns us with 
reality – and we should hear this as running very much contrary to the notion that 
representation explains the basic, initial if you like, union of language and reality. 
Language absorbs world, building it into the fabric of its grammar. And we account 
for this not by claiming that language can perform some mysterious metaphysical 
act. We rather show that the story of the source of our standards of representation is 
a tale of cultural activity, a matter of how a living practice develops standards of 
representation by building words upon world. 
These aspects of our natural world and human history that we draw into 
language as standards of representation become what Wittgenstein calls linguistic 
criteria. Our descriptions of reality are made possible by the fact that we possess 
these shared linguistic criteria. They explain how it is that we are able to speak in a 
common tongue of anything as being this sort of thing, how it is that we are able to 
“word the world together.”6 They do not “make it the case” that the world is really 
as we say it is or “establish the truth” of what language calls reality. They provide 
the conditions of any sort of talk, talk of truth included. Criteria determine the 
boundaries of meaning and sense, of what we can intelligibly claim to be the case. 
They are the specifications of the rules of the game, as it were, the standards that 
account for our alignment with others in communication. They do not function in 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a replacement for representation and correspondence 
talk. The possession of shared criteria expresses the condition, the bedrock, of the 
possibility of any talk at all.  
There is a temptation to think of social theories of meaning of the sort 
Wittgenstein offers as yet one more chapter in the book of anti-realism, as though 
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saying that criteria are a product of social engagement with one another and our 
world leads to what it is now fashionable to call “constructivism.” The fear is that 
offering a social rather than metaphysical ground to our criterial connection to 
reality will invariably lead us to see these criteria as so contingent and arbitrary that 
we end up finding ourselves with no justification for speaking of these criteria as 
connecting us to something real at all. In On Certainty Wittgenstein offers an 
argument that allows us to overcome this fear, one which shows us that an insight 
into our criteria is indeed an insight into something “thickly” real. Like many of 
Wittgenstein’s most interesting arguments, it expresses a profound point with the 
simplest of insights. It begins by drawing us precariously near anti-realism, and the 
beauty of the argument lies in how it allows us to keep our balance just before 
falling over. Consider the following quotes: 
I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: 
it is the inherited background against which I distinguish the true and the 
false.   (OC § 94) 
And: 
If the true is what is grounded, the ground is not true, nor yet false.     
(OC § 205) 
At first glance this may strike us as nothing more than a revised argument for 
idealism, for the claim being made is that the ground language offers us for speaking 
about the world – our linguistic criteria – cannot be said to be true. But notice also 
that the ground cannot be said to be false. And this is curious. I cannot claim truth or 
falsity for it, so what can I say about it at all? Does not this imply that there is just 
nothing to say, that – as Rorty prods for much the same reasons – there is no longer 
any reason to talk about a connection between language and reality? Indeed, is it not 
right to say what linguistic sceptics have always said, that we cannot know that 
language offers us an alignment with the way the world is? 
The answer to this question, like most honest answers, is yes and no. I certainly 
cannot know that the criteria of language truly reveal how the world is, for there is 
no truth to be mentioned here that would support my claim that I know it. Criteria 
express the conditions of truth and falsity, and thus they are not open to assessment 
for truth and falsity themselves. This much Wittgenstein makes clear and this much 
the linguistic sceptic has right (and this is why he is so often hard to silence: we 
cannot just say that he is wrong, that his sceptical hypothesis is simply false). When 
she says “you do not know that language gets the world right” I must answer “no, I 
do not know that.” But notice that, unlike the linguistic sceptic, my saying that I do 
not know this is not a concession that a truth-value is missing where there should be 
one. It is not a concession that there is some adjudicating fact that is unfortunately 
unavailable to us. The sceptic takes our inability to claim knowledge here to qualify 
what sort of belief we can have about the worldly reach of criteria. But what 
Wittgenstein is saying is that there is no belief at this level. Whereas the sceptic 
takes this mandatory “I do not know” to show up an epistemic defeat, a failure of 
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knowledge, Wittgenstein responds by saying there is no defeat because the battle is 
not epistemic: it is not a failure of knowledge because knowledge-claims do not 
apply here. This is an unusual first step in an argument that promises to unite 
language and reality, but if we follow the idea it will lead us somewhere very 
interesting.  
The specific problem with the linguistic sceptic is that he demands grounds for 
the very grounds we have for speaking. Now the grounds the sceptic argues we lack 
are indeed absent: there is nothing that could voice an assurance that language truly 
expresses reality as it is. But this is not because linguistic criteria are groundless, if 
we mean by this that we have somehow managed to see they are free-floating and 
that where we once thought that there was a kind of metaphysical anchor we now 
see that there is nothing at all. What is wrong with saying “groundless” is precisely 
that we are speaking about the grounds of language – to use “groundless” here is to 
fail to understand what we are talking about: bedrock, beneath which we cannot go. 
To ask to have our linguistic criteria, our language, vouched for is to ask for grounds 
for our criteria. But this, of course, amounts to asking for criteria with which we can 
evaluate the truth of our criteria, grounds for our very grounds of meaningful 
speech. And by this logic we then must ask for an evaluation of these newly 
acquired criteria and grounds – what grounds them? – and so on until we find 
ourselves with a very nasty infinite regress. The sceptic’s question ceases to be 
meaningful at this point, requiring as it does that he speak without the support of 
criteria in fashioning her repudiation of our criteria. Whose criteria does he use to 
carry out this repudiation, to state his sceptical hypothesis? They cannot be the 
criteria of our language, for these are what he is questioning. He asks, “How do I 
know that things are as we say they are, that this is really a chair, the sun, a human, 
etc.?” What else should we say? What else could we coherently call these things? 
And on what do we stand when we picture an alternative?  
The sceptic’s question does not place a wedge between what we say and the 
way the world is so much as it dissolves the possibility of meaningful speech 
altogether. In this respect the sceptical impulse is not unlike a certain Scholastic 
penchant for asking how much time elapsed before God created time. Language 
refuses to be an ally here. In trying to repudiate the alignment with reality we find in 
criteria the sceptic speaks from the dark, asking an impossible question rather than 
one which makes us doubt that our criteria reach all the way into our world. The 
sceptic does not reveal a gap between language and world in this sense, then: the 
vocabulary he employs in stating his sceptical hypothesis is drained of its force and 
empty. He attempts to take up a cognitive perspective towards the possibility of 
having any sort of cognitive perspective at all, and in so doing he loses language – 
he is in effect silenced by his own words.  
Wittgenstein’s response comes at a price, but one that brings reality down to 
earth and thus to the our-worldly level in the process. We lose the idea that we can 
have our linguistic alignment with reality vouched for, shown to be true all the way 
down as it were. We might call this the metaphysical craving, and its satisfaction is 
denied us. The sceptic, for his part, does make us realize this. Since we cannot 
respond to his “how do you know” with “of course we know,” he makes us realize 
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that we cannot step outside our form of life and speak meaningfully about its 
linguistic success. But Wittgenstein wants to say that if we lose the ability to claim 
truth for our alignment with reality, we also lose the ability to doubt it in the way the 
sceptic envisions.  
This is the reward for what might appear to be a huge sacrifice. What forces us 
to accept that language aligns us with reality is not a right we win from any 
metaphysical or ontological insight: “What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one 
could say – forms of life” (PI 226e), and we cannot step outside the conditions of 
meaningful speech to try to see what grounds it. We cannot speak of a match 
between criteria and the way the world is, nor of adequate representation. But this is 
because there is no gap that can be meaningfully mentioned at this level. It is not a 
hypothesis that our criteria match the facts. It is not a deduction or inference that 
allows us to make this claim. It is a “grammatical truth,” a claim forced on us by the 
very words we use to communicate with one another. We can say that an insight into 
criteria is an insight into reality not because criteria show us how word truly 
matches up with world, but because there is, we might say, no dividing distinction to 
be made between the two at this level. This picture brings the idea of the word-
world relation down to earth by making their alignment a fact of life, evidenced by 
the simple but profoundly revealing point that we succeed in making ourselves 
understood to one another. The union of word and world is grounded and given 
expression in the fabric of our living human practices, made visible not through any 
feat of metaphysical inquiry but by seeing what is already plainly before us: a shared 
form of life. 
V. 
The humanist’s sceptic, like the traditional semantic sceptic, plays on our fear that a 
view into language, cut off from any actual thing we might use language to talk 
about, is a view of words divorced from reality. What we have done is to replace 
this picture of language that makes literature look to be isolated from reality because 
of its failure of worldly representation with one in which language is seen as 
expressing world within itself, not as connecting to an independent reality by 
mapping it but by building it into its “grammar,” its criteria, in such a way that there 
is no longer any sense to the idea of language as empty of world just on account of 
its failure to represent or refer to it. What Wittgenstein allows us to see is that the 
connection between language and reality is prior (in understanding, as Aristotle 
might say) to the level at which the humanist’s sceptic gives his arguments. But 
Wittgenstein also offers us a way to structure the humanist intuition, as we should 
be beginning to see. What we have now is a vocabulary that allows us to meet the 
sceptic’s challenge directly, namely to show that we can identify something quite 
densely real immediately within the literary work, internal to it rather than hors-texte. 
What I am going to call the “basic humanist claim,” the ground-level claim          
Wittgenstein makes possible for the humanist, can be characterized as follows. We 
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want to say that for some aspect of a work of literature that arouses our worldly 
interest, we can claim of it that “this is φ” in such a way that there is no wedge to be 
placed between the fiction’s presentation of φ and what φ is. We take the 
demonstrative as functioning to pick out not a represented worldly object (the 
sceptic has taken this from us) nor a pure creature of fiction (which the sceptic says 
it must pick out) but φ just as it is. For those aspects of cultural life that fuel the 
furnaces of literary creation, we want to say that they are seen, just as they are, in 
the text: that this is jealousy, this is anger, this is suffering, and so on. And we want 
to be able to say this in such a way that the force of the demonstrative is one of 
identifying directly within the text something more properly called “life” than the 
merely lifelike, veritas rather than verisimilitude, world rather than a fictional 
mimesis of it.  
Let us give some structure to this discussion with a concrete critical example. In 
re-reading Othello I see that I have missed something; it is one of those instances of 
finding a new layer of complexity in a work read a number of times before. 
Although I very well know that Othello is the subject of Iago’s angry discussion 
with Roderigo in the first act, I notice for the first time that never once is Othello 
mentioned by name. The first time Othello is explicitly referred to it is not by his 
proper name but by his ethnicity: he is “The Moor” (I.i.40). Iago is Othello’s ancient 
and confidant – they know each other intimately – and if not for his anger we would 
certainly expect him to call Othello by his proper name, and this I now see is subtly 
suggestive. A few lines later Roderigo adds color to our picture of this nameless 
Moor by calling him “thick-lips” (I.i.66); and I begin to see a progression – in that 
vague way we become attuned to something taking shape when we read a literary 
work – that culminates in the first important scene of the tragedy. Iago decides to 
deliver his initial blow by telling Brabantio that his daughter has secretly married 
Othello. Again, Othello’s name is never used, and the words Iago uses reveal why: 
Your heart is burst, you have lost half your soul; Even now, now, very 
now, an old Black ram is tupping your white ewe; arise, arise, Awake the 
snorting citizens with the bell, Or else the devil will make a grandsire of 
you.   (I.i.87-90) 
Zounds, sir, you are one of those that will not service God, if the Devil 
bid you. Because we come to do you service, you think we are ruffians, 
you’ll have your daughter covered with a Barbary horse; you’ll have your 
nephews neigh to you; you’ll have coursers for cousins, and gennets for 
germans.   (I.i.110-13) 
I am one, sir, that come to tell you, your daughter, and the Moor, are now 
making the beast with two backs.   (I.i.115) 
Iago’s tactic in the above passages is to appeal to the crudest part of Brabantio: his 
gut-level sense of blood and purity, his racial instinct. Iago offers an image, 
cunningly crafted to pierce Brabantio’s paternal instinct, of his daughter with an 
African animal, being “tupped” by a black ram who will bring not proper 
grandchildren but cross-breeds into his family line.7 There is neither a marriage nor 
a man depicted in Iago’s words, just the image of a “white ewe” copulating with a 
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black beast. One would have to be quite naïve to call Iago’s tactic here something 
other than racist. What is striking, and certainly brilliant, about the passage is how 
perfectly it captures racism, how, we might say, essentially racist it is. We see the 
gradual construction of a dehumanized picture of Othello. It begins with a reduction 
of his identity to what separates him from everyone else, his ethnicity; and from here 
on all of the attendant expressions of racism are brought to life: the notion of the 
perversion of mixed blood, the idea that an act of love with a racial outsider amounts 
to sex with a sub-human, an animal, and so is a violation of one’s body and family. 
In order to eliminate a few possibilities that humanists have traditionally and 
mistakenly used when trying to forge a connection between literature and life, let me 
say a few words about how one ought not try to make Othello speak about our 
world. To begin with, by “this is racism” I do not mean to pick out some mimetic 
function of the work, say, the fact that Iago is acting as a real racist would. Trivially 
he is, or else we would not be inclined to call his tactic racist. But I mean something 
deeper than that the racism we see there looks like or imitates real racism. I want to 
say that it is racism. Nor – to dismiss another possibility – is my claim to be taken as 
saying that the text refers to or represents some extra-textual state of affairs. How 
would we explain this? Do we say that it represents a universal of some sort, that by 
“this is racism” I mean to say that the text is a representation of some strange 
metaphysical entity, perhaps Racism As Such? This is one of the faults of many 
older forms of humanism – their (bloated) metaphysicalism – that we should try to 
avoid. It is an unwanted idea, and in any case most current literary theory has, I 
think, finally shown us that the only legitimate application of notions of reference 
and representation to a work of literature is that of fictional reference and 
representation, to record how a novel describes an imaginatively created world. 
Lastly, I am not saying with my “this is racism” that the text or the scenes we have 
reviewed amount to the claim that racism is thus and such sort of thing, as though 
my “this” functions to pick out a proposition of some sort that is implied by the text. 
As far as I can see, the text does not state either directly or indirectly a truth-valued 
proposition about the nature of racism. Again, the sceptic is right here: what the text 
describes and makes assertions and claims about, is the (fictional) world of its 
narrative line. 
Wittgenstein allows us to avoid these errors of traditional humanism without 
silencing Othello on the way our world is. To let the cat out of the bag, the sort of 
humanistic explanation Wittgenstein opens up for us is the following: when I claim 
of Othello that “this is racism,” my “this” has, I suggest, the force of registering that 
the text speaks on what Wittgenstein would call the criterial level of what racism is, 
bringing before us language as it is involved with reality at “bedrock” rather than in 
acts of reference and representation. With slight but instructive bombast, we can say 
that when Iago sets to turning Brabantio against Othello, he becomes our word for 
racism – so complete is Iago’s expression of racism that we see exposed in his 
words the criteria for this fixture of our form of life.  
This is not to attribute any extraordinary powers to Shakespeare, except that 
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power over words we know that writers of his endowment possess. To account for 
this we need only to point out that, as we have already seen, Shakespeare’s Iago, 
though a creature of fiction, is nonetheless a fiction that draws together at such a 
level of clarity and order everything we call “racism” that no wedge can be placed 
between the text’s expression of it and what this fixture of our culture most basically 
is. The “is” here, of course, is not the existential “is” of the actual or the empirical. It 
is the “is” of what Wittgenstein calls “essence,” our language’s specification of what 
the world is for us. Just as language “expresses essence,” (PI § 371) we are claiming 
that the language of Othello expresses racism. Just as criteria tell us “what kind of 
object anything is” (PI § 373), we are claiming that literary language in general can 
be a specific mouthpiece of “what kind of object anything is.” My “this is racism,” 
then, does not record either the referential or representational successes of Othello, 
for there is no success to be spoken of here. It records the success of its expression 
of racism, not as a simple expression of Sinn, but of the fundamental connection to 
our world that underlies what the sceptic took to be just a “mere” word. 
In Inconvenient Fictions, Bernard Harrison expresses the distinction as I want 
to recommend it:  
Literary language, the language of narrative fiction and poetry is, root 
and branch, constitutive language. As such it is non-referential and it 
makes no statements […]. It is a language occupied solely with itself, in 
a sense. The mistake promoted by the Positivistic vision of language is to 
suppose that this sense can be absolute. Language is everywhere 
hopelessly infected with the extra-linguistic: the relationship between its 
signs runs ineluctably by way of the world. So there is, just as the critical 
humanist has always maintained, a strong connection between language 
and reality; only it does not run by way of reference and truth. Rather, it 
permeates the thickness of the language we speak.8 
Our humanist argues that he has provided a picture of language that permits us to 
make a similar claim, that literature can bring before us reality as it lies within our 
language rather than reality as we come into contact with it in referential and 
representational speech. For if literature represents nothing real, we now can see it 
as bringing into full view our standards of representation, our linguistic criteria “for 
what the world ‘is’, without themselves being removed from that world.”9 When we 
say of what we find in a work of literature that this is racism, this is jealousy, this is 
suffering, we are testifying to the fact that literature has the power to open up 
language and expose this reality as it is woven into the fabric of our language – that 
it has the power to beat, if you will, the world out of our words. In this respect, when 
we find ourselves in the presence of the literary we come into contact with 
something very much like what Harrison calls “constitutive” language, for we see 
language showing us its structure and admitting the reality upon which it is built. 
We thus find that we do not need worldly reference and representation to 
account for literary language’s ability to speak out our world. Indeed we do not need 
to look outside the literary work to explain the humanist connection at all, for there 
is nothing outside of the text that matters to the humanist. We do not need to attempt 
to unite the literary with anything hors-texte. We can look deeper into what is 
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already within our language. Wittgenstein shows the humanist that if he looks deep 
enough, he will find there our world as well, not as a represented object but as 
reality as it “permeates the thickness” of the language both we and the literary work 
of art speak. If this is the case, the humanist, far from being incoherent, is right to 
insist that literary fiction can offer crucial cognitive insights into the way our    
world is. 
 
 
 
 
1 See Bernard Harrison (1993) and David Schalkwyk (1995). 
2 Peter Lamarque, 1996, p. 105. 
3 Simon Blackburn, 1998, p. 231. 
4 Hilary Putnam, 1990, p. 28. 
5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1980, § 558. Referring to a disposition of water, Wittgenstein 
says: “This fact is fused into the foundation of our language-game.” 
6 Stanley Cavell, 1979, p. 316.   
7 Should it be worth mentioning, I am not, in emphasizing the text’s references to 
Othello’s blackness, asking that we understand the matter as though it is in some way of a 
piece with race and blackness as it is addressed and understood in (for example) twentieth-
century American literature. Iago’s strategy here is to dehumanize Othello by making him an 
outsider, an “other” as it is fashionable to say; and Othello’s race is clearly the brush with 
which Iago paints this picture, regardless of what race and blackness might signify for Iago, 
Shakespearean audiences, or the structure of the first act. Critics of Othello, at least since 
Coleridge (whose argument against reading Othello as a “veritable Negro” is arguably itself a 
classic of racist reasoning), generally agree on this interpretation. The Shakespeare scholar 
Harold Bloom puts the point well, if grandiloquently, when he writes of Iago: “the passed-
over officer becomes the poet of street brawls, stabbings in the dark, disinformation, and 
above all else, the uncreation of Othello, the sparagmos of the great captain-general so that he 
can be returned to the original abyss, the chaos that Iago equates with the Moor’s African 
origins” (1998, p. 438). 
8 Bernard Harrison, 1991, p. 51. 
9 David Schalkwyk, 1995, p. 288. 
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I. Preliminaries
Wittgenstein’s remark at the end of the Tractatus, commending silence for 
everything other than scientific statements, is perhaps his best-known remark. No 
doubt it is so well known partly because it comes at the end of the work and partly 
because it is so resonant, especially in the German original: 
Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen. 
The remark is fascinating also because it seems to be both momentous and trivial, an 
effect which may well have resulted from the influence of Kraus. Of course, 
Wittgenstein’s remark at the end of the Tractatus is hyperbole, a rhetorical device 
that is perhaps one of the things he learned from Kraus. But there is also a paradox 
in its being said at all, for it is not the sort of thing that can be said, according to the 
doctrine of the Tractatus. This paradox raises questions about the Tractatus as a 
whole, one of which concerns what sort of work Wittgenstein supposed he had 
written. Another arises in connection with the famous letter to Ludwig von Ficker,1 
in which Wittgenstein said that the more important of the two parts of the work was 
everything he had not written. A third question arises in connection with 
Wittgenstein’s life-long silence2 about political matters, even though he lived 
through very troubled times that had many a direct impact on him, and even though 
he was very close to a number of people – Russell, Keynes, and Kraus in particular 
– who commented regularly and prominently on political and social matters. Was
Wittgenstein’s political silence a continuing application of the concluding line of the
Tractatus, perhaps long after he had repudiated its main philosophical doctrines? Or
was the Tractarian silence something that Wittgenstein refined rather than
repudiated?
In this paper I will first discuss Tractarian silence and what becomes of it in 
Wittgenstein’s later work, then consider how Kraus’s work fits into this framework 
of thought and what line of thought Wittgenstein might have taken from him, and 
finally come to the matter of what each did and did not say about Hitler, concluding 
with an appreciation of the roots of Wittgenstein’s silence in his “work of 
clarification.” 
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II. The Silence of Wittgenstein
The silence at the end of the Tractatus is not isolated or arbitrary. On the contrary, it 
is the logical culmination of one main line of argument in the book, the line of 
argument that has the distinction between showing and saying as its core. The key 
thing about this silence is not the absence of noise but the absence of saying 
anything. It may be that most of our noise and certainly most of our utterances are 
attempts to say something; but we can certainly make noise without saying 
anything. Some of what we do when we do not really say anything, and some of the 
noise we make when we do not really say anything, may be important, even of 
critical importance. Wittgenstein’s point may be put by saying that being 
meaningful in the sense of having importance does not entail being meaningful in 
the sense of having sense. 
Just as saying does not just consist of utterance, so also silence does not merely 
consist of the absence of noise. What can be said has sense, which means both that it 
can in principle be either true or false and that it can in principle be completely and 
uniquely clarified by logical analysis. Anything that cannot be true or cannot be 
false is senseless – and therefore cannot be said, even though it be not only uttered 
but even shouted. Contradictions cannot be true and therefore say nothing (or 
everything). Tautologies cannot be false and therefore say nothing. Contradictions 
and tautologies are both senseless. It does not matter if we shout them from the 
rooftops, as perhaps Kraus may have been inclined to do. Shouting does not 
constitute saying something. Therefore even shouting can be a form of silence, when 
we construe silence as not saying anything.  
Just as Wittgenstein did not speak until he was four, we might also say that he 
again practiced silence in the decade from 1918 to 1928. During this decade he 
engaged in little philosophical discussion. The silence was never complete. In prison 
camp in Monte Cassino he read and discussed Kant and Frege with Ludwig Hänsel.3 
When released, he met with Russell to discuss the Tractatus. While teaching 
elementary school in Lower Austria, he met a few times for philosophical 
discussions with Frank Ramsey. No doubt these discussions were serious. But they 
were brief interludes in the silence that lasted until he had finished working on the 
house for his sister, had heard L.E.J. Brouwer’s lecture, and had begun meeting with 
Moritz Schlick. Silence was significant in Wittgenstein’s life as well as in his early 
philosophical thought. 
It is well known that Wittgenstein often quoted Goethe’s line, “Im Anfang war 
die Tat” (e.g., OC § 402).4 It is less often acknowledged that this motto is a version 
of Tractarian silence. The point of the silence, after all, is not that there is nothing 
but speech. Quite the contrary, it is part of the view that the most important things 
cannot be said – neither the important logical things about the form of reality nor the 
important ethical things about life. Whatever can be said has one and only one 
complete analysis. But analysis itself cannot be analyzed, and the beginning and end 
of analysis must be shown rather than said. The beginning therefore must be a 
showing (a deed) rather than something said (a word). In this sense the beginning and 
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the end must be a kind of silence, and Goethe’s line from Faust fits not only with 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophical standpoint but also with the Tractarian silence. 
“In the beginning was the deed” contrasts of course with the opening words of 
the Gospel of John, “In the beginning was the word.” The contrast is fascinating, 
with manifold applications. Goethe certainly did not mean to be anti-Christian, and 
there is little difficulty for a Christian to prefer the synoptic gospels with their 
emphasis on the deeds of Jesus to the Johanine gospel with its emphasis on doctrine. 
That is one application. A deconstructionist might take Goethe’s remark as a 
rejection of Christian logocentrism – another application. From a Tractarian point of 
view one could understand the remark as stressing the primacy of showing over 
saying. This application might also be made by one wishing to stress the continuity 
of Wittgenstein’s later work with the Tractatus. On the other hand a commentator 
like Norman Malcolm or Jaakko Hintikka might try to use this remark to contrast 
Wittgenstein’s early emphasis on propositions (on what can be said) with his later 
emphasis on doing things (language-games as forms of activity). 
Let us look at PI § 78 (p. 36e): 
Compare knowing and saying:  
how many feet high Mont Blanc is —  
how the word “game” is used —  
how a clarinet sounds.  
If you are surprised that one can know something and not be able to say 
it, you are perhaps thinking of a case like the first. Certainly not of one 
like the third. 
This paragraph makes a point perspicuously. Wittgenstein declines to say what the 
point is, but his examples show us the point. Something further is shown by this 
section coming at the end of passages that introduce the idea of family resemblances 
among uses of a word. The point clarifies for us something about the relation 
between two concepts, and in that sense it is a logical point. Or perhaps better: a 
“grammatical” one. In the passage where he mentions the ten influences on his 
thinking (CV, p. 19e), Wittgenstein speaks of his work of clarification. PI § 78 
(quoted above) is without question an instance of such clarification. Unlike the 
clarification mentioned in the Tractatus, however, this passage contains no analysis. 
The method of clarification is rather that of perspicuous representation 
(übersichtliche Darstellung). Perspicuous representation is a continuation of the 
earlier emphasis on showing rather than saying (as characteristic of philosophy and 
logic), and it also examplifies the connection between meaning and use. This 
method of clarification, which became dominant in his later work, can well be 
thought of as an elaboration of how to be effective without saying anything – how to 
use silence. Three points are worth stressing: clarity remains an intrinsic aim, 
analysis is subordinated to contextual considerations, and silence is something to use. 
In the remark, in which Wittgenstein notes influences on his later as well as his 
earlier work (CV, pp. 18e-19e), he speaks without qualification of what he is doing 
as “work of clarification.” The clarification serves no further purpose but is an end 
in itself, as Matthias Kross has correctly argued.5 Wittgenstein did not change what 
he was doing but rather how he was going about it. 
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The most significant change in how he went about it is the replacement of 
analysis by context as the dominant crux of clarification, as elaborated in the 
opening sixty-five sections of the Philosophical Investigations.6 Analysis may still 
be a method of clarification where truth-claims are involved and where they are to 
be tested through their implications, for this is a context in which Frege’s demand 
for analytical clarity makes sense. Wittgenstein begins the Philosophical 
Investigations, however, with an investigation of the use of expressions which make 
no truth claim at all, and in these cases understanding requires us to pay attention to 
the context, in particular to what the person is doing when or through speaking. 
Hence the basis of linguistic meaning, even when it is to be clarified analytically, is 
the uses of language (language-games) that are woven into the fabric of “this 
complicated form of life” of ours (PI, p. 174e). 
That silence is not just an emptiness, but rather something to be used in the 
context of showing something that cannot be said, may account for Wittgenstein’s 
reported admiration of George Fox, the seventeenth-century charismatic and 
mystical genius who gathered together the “peculiar” people called Quakers and 
founded the Religious Society of Friends.7 Wittgenstein gave Norman Malcolm a 
copy of the Journal of George Fox as a Christmas present in 1948, and Malcolm 
reports that Wittgenstein read it with admiration.8  
The significance of the Quaker connection is fourfold. There is first and 
foremost the matter of silence, prominent in Quaker practice and at the end of the 
Tractatus. There is next the emphasis on the present, prominent in Fox’s remark, 
“There is no time but this present” (adopted by the American Friends Service 
Committee as a theme for one of its annual meetings some years ago) and finding an 
echo both in Tractatus 6.4311 and in the conversation with Schlick and Waismann, 
where Wittgenstein insists that “we have already got everything, and we have got it 
actually present; we need not wait for anything” (WVC, p. 183). There is thirdly the 
matter of insisting on alternatives: for Fox and the Quakers it is alternatives to things 
that government finds necessary, such as bowing, swearing, doffing one’s hat, 
imprisoning miscreants, and warring against enemies; one Quaker historian has 
called the Alternatives to Violence Project the cutting edge of contemporary 
Quakerism.9 Wittgenstein is equally critical of alleged necessities, both in Tractatus 
6.37, where he says that the only necessity that exists is logical necessity, and in his 
later philosophical practice, where he often responds to claims of necessity by 
noting possible alternatives and commenting that the alleged necessity is one of a 
number of ways in which things may proceed. There is finally the matter of style of 
thinking, eschewing metaphysics on one side and theology on the other. It is a style 
in which dogmatic starting points are replaced with queries, a Quaker practice 
documented in Fox’s Journal and a striking feature of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophical work that certainly does not find its origin in any of the ten sources of 
influences he listed in 1931 (CV, p. 19e); Wittgenstein’s style, his thinking and 
teaching fit this Quaker pattern, in that on many pages queries outnumber assertions. 
An important part of Quaker practice – some think it the most vital testimony to 
the world – is to seek the “sense of the meeting.” This practice emerges from 
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worship, where the predominance of silence and the lack of a presiding officer mean 
that it is up to each person to feel when the group is of a common mind. Often there 
is an informal consensus to that effect afterward, and it is said that the meeting was 
“gathered.” In meetings for business it is the job of the clerk not only to help the 
group become of one mind but also then to record the sense of the common mind. A 
social scientist might insist that this common mind or consensus is best to be 
understood as a complex function of the minds of the constituent individuals 
(following the widely accepted principle of “methodological individualism”), but 
such reductive individualism is contrary to both the thinking and the experience of 
Friends. The thinking is that one gives up one’s attempt to control the outcome and 
seeks not what conforms most to one’s personal beliefs and interests but rather what 
is inherent in that which binds the group together. The experience is that of being 
surprised by what happens. It is true that there could be no groups without 
individuals, and that individuals must contribute to the formation of the group’s 
mind, but it does not follow that the group does not really have a mind of its own, 
nor that one must first understand the individual minds in order to understand the 
group mind. 
Wittgenstein wrote extensively on mental matters, or philosophy of psychology, 
and what he had to say has received extensive comment. Much of the comment, 
however, is exegesis and defense of Wittgenstein’s rejection of inner processes and 
of traditional behaviorism10 rather than a consideration of the commonality (or 
commonability, to use Philip Pettit’s word) of mind. It is obvious, however, that 
many of the elements of thought that Wittgenstein pays close attention to, especially 
those connected with logic or grammar, are common rather than individual or 
idiosyncratic. A proposition determines just one point in logical space, but it 
presupposes the whole of logical space (TLP 3.42) – and any other proposition by 
any other person presupposes exactly the same logical space. Logic is a common 
element of thought – not something individual, and certainly not solipsistic. The 
same is true of grammar, in the sense in which Wittgenstein speaks of it in his later 
work: it provides a framework for “this complicated form of life” (PI, p. 174e) we 
humans share, no matter how wide the divergences in vocabulary, morphology, and 
syntax. Wittgenstein sought to characterize the features of these common elements 
of thought as earnestly as any Quaker has sought to articulate the common mind of a 
Friends meeting. 
Two recent books have taken up this theme. Kimberly Cornish, in The Jew of 
Linz,11 devotes the final part of the book (chapters 8-12) to arguments that attribute 
to Wittgenstein a “no-ownership” view of the mind, the upshot of which is that 
consciousness is social rather than individual, a view that he calls “mental 
socialism.” Early evidence for this reading comes from Wittgenstein’s remark that 
“there is no such thing as the soul – the subject, etc. – as it is conceived in 
contemporary superficial psychology” (TLP 5.5421). Cornish – not altogether 
convincingly – marshals further quotations from Wittgenstein’s later work, as well 
as from medieval sources, Goethe, Schopenhauer, and Geach, to argue that 
Wittgenstein held the same view of mind through his latest writing.  
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The other book is The Common Mind by Philip Pettit.12 Although Pettit 
distinguishes his view from Wittgenstein’s, in that his publicity conditions on rule-
following are different from those in the Wittgensteinian literature, he does see such 
publicity conditions as entailing that there is something mental that is common to 
some group – or at least is available to becoming common (is “commonable”). Pettit 
makes a powerful case for this view, though without attributing it to Wittgenstein, in 
the final pages of the book. Though Pettit distinguishes his view from that of 
Wittgenstein (or Kripke’s Wittgenstein), it is nonetheless arguable that, if Cornish is 
in general right about Wittgenstein, Pettit, especially in the final section of the 
“Postscript,” gives a better account of what Cornish is attributing to Wittgenstein 
than Cornish does himself.  
We might take Wittgenstein’s admiration for Fox as further indirect evidence 
that he responded favorably to a view of mind or thinking that was common or 
commonable rather than solitary and solipsistic. The practice of silence is, for 
Quakers, an important part of the discipline of attending to what is common; so, too, 
for Wittgenstein, though in a different way. For Wittgenstein the important part of 
what is common is grammar, which is the basis of philosophy.13 Making 
grammatical remarks is no doubt as much a language-game as the others 
Wittgenstein discusses, but it depends on there already being other language-games 
and therefore could not be a primitive language-game. Furthermore its focus is not 
on the substance of what is said (its truth or validity or other cogency) but on the 
possibility (meaning) of what is said. Hence Wittgenstein’s insistence that 
philosophy remain silent on matters that concern science and morals:  
It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. 
[…] And we may not advance any kind of theory. […] We must do away 
with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.        
(PI § 109, p. 47e) 
Philosophy puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. 
Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, 
for example, is of no interest to us. 
One might also give the name “philosophy” to what is possible before all 
new discoveries and inventions.   (PI § 126, p. 50e) 
III. The Silence of Kraus
In 1931 Wittgenstein listed Kraus as one of ten people – and one of several Jews – 
who influenced him. The context is an interesting and somewhat enigmatic self-
assessment, partly in regard to he himself being Jewish: 
Amongst Jews “genius” is found only in the holy man. Even the greatest 
of Jewish thinkers is no more than talented. (Myself for instance.)   
(CV, p. 18e)
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Wittgenstein went on to describe his particular talent and to mention some of those 
who influenced him most: 
I think there is some truth in my idea that I really only think 
reproductively. I don’t believe that I have ever invented a line of 
thinking. I have always taken one over from someone else. I have simply 
straightaway seized on it with enthusiasm for my work of clarification. 
That is how Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, 
Loos, Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa have influenced me. Can one take the 
case of Breuer and Freud as an example of Jewish reproductiveness? – 
What I invent are new similes.    
[…]  
What I do think essential is carrying out the work of clarification with 
COURAGE: otherwise it becomes just a clever game.    
[…]  
It is typical for a Jewish mind to understand someone else’s work better 
than he understands it himself.   (CV, pp. 18e-19e)
Throughout the list of influences there runs a sharp critique of dominant practices 
and accepted ways of doing or saying things. One might think of this list when 
reading Wittgenstein’s comment about his own work, “I destroy, I destroy, I 
destroy!” Kraus was perhaps the most trenchant of the social critics, but Frege’s 
polemics, though more concerned with scholarship and argumentation, are as 
devastating and unrelenting as anything in Kraus. 
In the case of Kraus the criticism is partly political and partly directed against 
social pomposity in general, but the politics left little imprint on Wittgenstein. The 
core of Kraus’s own work as well as his influence on Wittgenstein concern 
language. Kraus (1874-1936) was fifteen years senior to Wittgenstein, and he 
established his unique and influential journal Die Fackel before Wittgenstein was 
ten. It is difficult to characterize Kraus’s career, since he worked in so many ways, 
but a unifying theme to his plays, his poetry, his criticism, and his journalism, was 
his love and care for an ideal of language and his contempt for the prevailing ways 
of his time. He was anything but silent. His antiwar play, The Last Days of Mankind, 
ran to 800 pages, and his journal appeared more or less regularly for thirty-seven 
years. He was loosely socialist, but his main enemy was corruption of the language. 
His diatribe against Heine concerned Heine’s introduction of the feuilleton into 
German papers. The feuilleton, which features high-brow intellectual essays on 
topics of no political importance, is usually written in a florid style that never spares 
adjectives, adverbs, metaphors, or similes; the feuilleton has remained one of the 
popular features of many German newspapers. One of Kraus’s principal targets was 
Austria’s “best” paper, Die Presse, which once offered him the job of writing and 
editing its weekly feuilleton. 
The triumph of Hitler was not the first or only time that Kraus, in spite of being 
a prolific writer, was silent in the ordinary sense, and Tractarian silence is a regular 
feature of his most pungent style of writing. The first public silence of Kraus, the 
first noticeable interruption in the publication of Die Fackel, occurred in 1914, at the 
outbreak of World War I. Harry Zohn writes:  
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The outbreak of World War I forced him [i.e., Kraus] to bear witness to 
what he regarded as the beginning of the end. [...] Kraus’s initial reaction 
to the new “great times” was silence. The torch was temporarily 
extinguished, and for several months the torch-bearer was too stunned to 
participate in the flood of words all around him.14  
He wrote two extraordinary anti-war works, his 800-page play, The Last Days of 
Mankind, and his biting satirical diatribe, In These Great Times. Here are some of 
the barbs from the latter work: 
In the realm of poverty of imagination where people die of spiritual 
famine without feeling spiritual hunger, where pens are dipped in blood 
and swords in ink, that which is not thought must be done, but that which 
is only thought is unutterable. Expect no words of my own from me. [...] 
He who encourages deeds with words desecrates words and deeds and is 
doubly despicable. [...] Let him who has something to say come forward 
and be silent!   (p. 71)
That last line is as fine an invocation to silence as the last line of the Tractatus. In 
both cases silence becomes the instrument of a powerful moral witness. 
Since I am neither a politician nor his half-brother, an esthete, I would 
not dream of denying the necessity of anything that is happening or of 
complaining that mankind does not know how to die in beauty. I know 
full well that cathedrals are rightfully bombarded by people if they are 
rightfully used by people as military posts.   (p. 72f) 
In this passage Kraus speaks, but with heavy-handed irony. From Wittgenstein’s 
point of view, such irony is not really saying anything. Anyone who understands 
Kraus realizes that he means just the opposite of what the words seem to say. To put 
it another way, Kraus shows us something by “saying” something he obviously does 
not mean. To the extent that Kraus restricts his writing and speaking to irony and 
satire, he is engaged in showing rather than saying and therefore remains silent in 
the Tractarian sense.  
It is worth noting that the irony here is directed against explanations and 
justifications of what was happening in the war. When he speaks of the 
encouragement of deeds with words desecrating both deeds and words, he surely has 
war propaganda in mind, the ringing words of patriots. There is a strong consensus 
between Kraus and Wittgenstein about the abuse of language in such justifications: 
the speaker seems to be saying something that could be true or false, but there are no 
facts that could possibly make such sentences true or false (Kraus’s ironic response 
is equally not an abuse, because it is obviously showing us an absurdity rather 
making a truth-claim). Kraus was from the beginning antagonistic toward the press, 
but its role in publishing and popularizing the rationales for violence made him 
intensify his attack: 
If one reads a newspaper only for information, one does not learn the 
truth, not even about the paper. The truth is that the newspaper is not a 
statement of contents but the contents themselves; and more than that, it 
is an instigator. If it prints lies about horrors, these turn into horrors. 
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There is more injustice in the world because there is a press which 
fabricated it and deplores it! It is not nations that strike one another; 
rather, it is the international disgrace, the profession which rules the 
world not despite its irresponsibility but by virtue of it, that deals 
wounds, tortures prisoners, baits foreigners, and turns gentlemen into 
rowdies. Its only authority is its unprincipledness, which, in association 
with a rascally will, can change printer’s ink directly into blood. O last 
unholy wonder of the times! At first everything was a lie, and they 
always lied so that lies might be told only elsewhere; but now, thrown 
into the neurasthenia of hatred, everything is true. There are various 
nations, but there is only one press. The newspaper dispatch is an 
instrument of war like a grenade, which has no consideration for 
circumstances either.   (p. 77f)
Kraus was equally outraged by the rise to power of Hitler, against whom he had 
warned in 1922, and his initial reaction was again silence. Here is Zohn again: 
“Mir fällt zu Hitler nichts ein.” (I cannot think of anything to say about 
Hitler.) This is the striking first sentence of Kraus’s Die Dritte 
Walpurgisnacht […], a prose work written in the late spring and summer 
of 1933 but not published in its entirety during Kraus’s lifetime. That 
sentence [...] may be indicative of resignation and impotence [...], but it is 
also a hyperbolic, heuristic device for depicting the witches’ sabbath of 
the time. [...] There had been no Fackel for ten months when no. 888 
appeared in October 1933. Its four pages contained only Kraus’s funeral 
oration on his architect friend Adolf Loos and what was to be the 
satirist’s last poem, with its poignant closing line, “The word expired 
when that world awoke.” Kraus sadly realized the incommensurability of 
the human spirit with the brutal power structure across the German 
border, and on the second page of his work he asks this anguished 
question: “Is that which has been done to the spirit still a concern of the 
spirit?” The equally anguished answer he gives himself is this: “Force is 
no object of polemics, madness no object of satire.”15  
We see in this last remark not only anguish but also recognition that a distinctive 
linguistic activity requires its appropriate context. It is said that after the war Charlie 
Chaplin admitted that he might not have made The Great Dictator if he had known 
the immensity of the evil. The madness of German fascism destroyed the context in 
which satire and polemics made sense. Just as Wittgenstein spelled out limits of 
philosophy and of science, so also Kraus recognized limits of satire. 
IV. Political Silence
Arnulf Zweig published an interesting, somewhat tentative, essay on 
“Wittgenstein’s Silence” a few years ago.16 The silence in question is Wittgenstein’s 
silence, both during and after the war, about the Holocaust. There are two sorts of 
response to the moral shadow cast by Zweig’s essay. One suggests that 
Wittgenstein’s actions may have compensated for his lack of deeds, and the other 
portrays his silence as stemming from very deep principles and insights. 
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Kimberly Cornish makes a dramatic inference from established historical data, 
relying on our imagining what might have been Wittgenstein’s two separate lives 
during his second period in England. Wittgenstein and Hitler were both in the 
Realschule in Linz at the same time for a year; and they were of the same age, 
having been born within a fortnight of one another; and Hitler does write in Mein 
Kampf of being incensed by an arrogant Jew while at the school. Wittgenstein can 
therefore, so argues Cornish, be assigned an unknowing and unintentional role in the 
formation of the beliefs and sentiments that led Hitler to the “final solution.” This 
took no extra time or energy on Wittgenstein’s part, and for it he of course deserves 
neither credit nor blame. But Cornish goes on to assert, with evidence more 
voluminous albeit less consequential, that Wittgenstein was the Soviet recruiter in 
Cambridge who got Burgess and others from Cambridge to spy for the Soviet Union 
in the thirties and forties. What a feat this was! It would have required a great deal 
of time, travel, concentration, judgment, discretion, and secrecy. One can imagine 
that Wittgenstein might have realized his earlier relation with Hitler and determined 
to do something to make up for it – a warrior for a second time, though in a different 
kind of war with a vastly different role. The definitive characteristic about this role 
is its secrecy, not a hint of it emerging from any of Wittgenstein’s friends. 
There is much we do not know about Wittgenstein’s life. Reading Kimberly 
Cornish’s book one comes away with a sense that Wittgenstein, that extraordinary 
man, might well have had several other sides. He did, of course, a prodigious 
amount of philosophical work, filling notebooks with his thoughts. Anyone who has 
tried to do such will know that the work he did seems enough to fill a great deal of 
one’s time. In addition there were also the relaxing moments, listening to music or 
going to “B” movies. But those who have looked closely into his life tell us that 
there was much more. McGuinness recounts Wittgenstein’s front-line experiences in 
the Great War, and one realizes from Wittgenstein’s notebooks of that period that he 
composed the Tractatus while actively engaged at the front.17 Since the 
philosophical writing and the military life each seem like full-time activities, the 
account McGuinness gives makes one realize that Wittgenstein was capable of 
much more than is an ordinary individual. So, though I remain unconvinced, 
perhaps Wittgenstein’s acts spoke more loudly in the political context of the 1930s 
and 1940s than any of us realize.  
Nonetheless he remained silent about politics in all his works and 
correspondence. The silence is so striking that it must be construed as deliberate, 
and therefore as an act of considerable discipline. No doubt this discipline had 
various sources, but one of its roots is a line of thought he seized on from Kraus: 
that the great underlying problem of the times, and a key factor in making him feel 
alienated from the civilization by which he was surrounded,18 was the abuse and 
corruption of language. Of course part of the act of seizing upon this line of thought 
was Wittgenstein’s conviction that he understood Kraus’s line of thought better than 
Kraus did! 
One key to Wittgenstein’s version of the abuse and corruption of language is 
contained in Tractatus 6.37 and 6.375: 
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There is only logical necessity. 
Just as there is only logical necessity, so too there is only logical 
impossibility. 
If one looks at political speeches, wartime slogans, and party platforms, one 
encounters a plethora of modal claims that are not matters of logic at all. This 
phenomenon occurs with both fascists and socialists and (in the American context) 
with both Republicans and Democrats: President Bush said that Saddam Hussein 
left him no choice, and President Clinton that Slobodan Milosevic left him no choice 
– and Presidents Hussain and Milosevic have of course made analogous (but
incompatible) modal claims. Even after the fact, historians continue to invoke
necessities and impossibilities that lie far outside the domain of logic, in order to
explain the events. All these common, almost ritualistic political and historical ways
of using language fly in the face of Wittgenstein’s characterization of the scope of
modality. From the line of thought Wittgenstein articulated, these historical and
political statements could not really be modal at all, but rather some other sort of use
of language masquerading as modal claims. It is the masquerade that constitutes an
affront not only to logic but to Wittgenstein’s sense of morality.
Wittgenstein, although he changed his views about many things and came to 
speak more of grammar than of logic in connection with necessity (see PI § 246-
251, pp. 89e-90e, and § 371-373, p. 116e), continued to regard necessity and 
impossibility as rooted in the framework of language, rather than in the world.19 It is 
this persisting view that lies behind his well-known remark about metaphysics: 
The essential thing about metaphysics: it obliterates the distinction 
between factual and conceptual investigations.   (Z § 458, p. 81)
He might have made a similar remark about political and historical discourse. Such 
an attitude is clearly indicated by his having become “extremely angry” at Norman 
Malcolm for Malcolm’s having said that a British plot to assassinate Hitler was 
incompatible with British national character: 
He considered it to be a great stupidity and also an indication that I was 
not learning anything from the philosophical training he was trying to 
give me. He said these things very vehemently, and when I refused to 
admit that my remark was stupid he would not talk to me any more, and 
soon after we parted. He had been in the habit of coming to my lodging 
in Chesterton Road to take me on a short walk with him before his bi-
weekly lectures. After this incident he stopped that practice.20 
I take it that Wittgenstein saw the point about metaphysics as central to his whole 
philosophy, and to the work of clarification about the distinctions necessary for 
understanding the highways and byways of language, and that it was really stupid of 
Malcolm not to see that “national character” plays the same sort of role in political 
and historical discourse that “form” and “essence” play in metaphysics. That is, it 
disguises a modal claim, where it is easy to see, once the disguise is removed, that 
the required logical foundation is entirely lacking. Malcolm must at that moment 
have seemed an integral part of the very civilization from which Wittgenstein felt 
alienated. 
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Wittgenstein’s outburst may have been nothing but pedagogical despair, with 
no value judgment implied, as he says in the “Sketch for a Preface.” Perhaps by 
“value judgment” he meant a condemnation, which he would understandably have 
been unwilling to endorse. But it is difficult to believe that he did not see Malcolm’s 
remark as a moral as well as a logical failure, albeit not a culpable failure. From his 
earliest discussions with Russell, Wittgenstein saw logico-linguistic clarity as 
intimately connected with moral purity. Political pronouncements and historical 
explanations inevitably involve the same sort of blurring of the vital distinction 
between the conceptual (logical) and the factual that he explicitly attributed to 
metaphysics. So of course he remained silent about the momentous political events 
of his day. His political silence was a moral act. It was a persistent and 
conscientious implementation of final words of the Tractatus. And it was, ironically, 
a tribute to Kraus, from whom he had taken the seminal thought that what is rotten 
and despicable in our civilization stems from abuse of language. 
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KRAUS  ON  WEININGER,  KRAUS  ON  WOMEN,  KRAUS  ON  SERBIA 
Barry Smith 
State University of New York at Buffalo 
Most men profess to respect woman 
theoretically, in order that much more 
thoroughly to despise her practically; here this 
relationship has been reversed. Woman could 
not be highly valued: but women are not for all 
that to be excluded, from the start and once and 
for all, from all respect.1 
I. Preamble
Otto Weininger was born in Vienna on April 3, 1880. The above passage is taken 
from the only work he published in his lifetime, a big book entitled Geschlecht und 
Charakter: Eine prinzipielle Untersuchung  (roughly: Sex and Character: An 
Investigation of the Principles). This work contains arguments to the effect that: 
man alone is rational; 
there has never been and could never be a woman genius; 
women, like children, imbeciles, and criminals, should have no voice in 
human affairs;  
woman is infinitely porous, infinitely malleable, and infinitely open to 
external influences; 
woman has no soul;  
love and understanding are mutually incompatible;  
woman is exclusively and continuously a sexual being, man only 
secondarily and intermittently so;  
it is the duty of all women to strive to become men; 
every man, even Goethe, even Napoleon, even Kant, is part woman; 
women do not exist.  
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At the age of twenty-two, Weininger received from the University of Vienna the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy summa cum laude for a dissertation on the biology, 
psychology, and sociology of the sexes entitled “Eros and Psyche.” On the same day 
he converted to Protestantism – something highly unusual for a Jew in Catholic 
Austria. His dissertation grew within the year into the 600 pages of Geschlecht und 
Charakter. Part I, on “The Sexual Manifold,” is largely scientific in temper and has 
some scientific basis in the biology of Weininger’s day.2 Part II, on “The Sexual 
Types,” includes new chapters on the metaphysics of sex, on talent and genius, on 
the erotic and the aesthetic, and on Jewishness: “The problem of the Jew = the 
problem of woman = the problem of the slave.” 
It is an implication of Weininger’s work that all human relations, and not only 
human sexual relations, are immoral, that it is in a certain sense impossible to lead a 
moral life on this earth. Four months after the publication of the work – not “some 
years later,” as is asserted by Germaine Greer on page 79 of The Female Eunuch – 
Weininger committed suicide. On the 3rd of October 1903 he rented a room in the 
house on the Schwarzspanierstrasse in which Beethoven had died. The next morning 
he shot himself in the left side of the chest. His book, which had initially received 
little attention, immediately became the object of a cult. Weininger’s friends and 
disciples published articles and pamphlets in defense of his ideas. Fragments from 
his notebooks and diaries were collected and published in a volume bearing the title 
Über die letzten Dinge (On the Last Things). And Sex and Character itself, which 
eventually went through more than twenty-five editions in German, was almost 
immediately translated into six other languages, including Hebrew and English. 
Thinkers of the calibre of Strindberg, Wittgenstein, Joyce – and Kraus – not only 
took Weininger seriously, but suffered a profound and lasting influence.3 Strindberg 
credited Weininger with having solved “the most difficult of all problems” – the 
problem of woman. “I spelled out the words,” Strindberg wrote, “but it was he who 
put them together.” Shortly after Weininger’s suicide, Strindberg wrote to 
Weininger’s friend Artur Gerber, as follows: 
Stockholm, 22 October 1903 
I understood our dead friend, and I thank you. Some years ago as I stood 
there, like Weininger, with the hope of going further, I wrote in my diary: 
Why do I go on? Cato gave himself up to death when he found that he 
could not hold himself upright above the swamp of sin. It is for this 
reason also that Dante absolved him from his suicide (Inferno). Now it is 
I who am sinking, and I will not sink, therefore  …  torment! –               
 I was on my way upwards, but a woman has dragged me back down 
to the ground … But still I went on living, because I believed that I had 
discovered that our association with the earthly spirit woman was a 
sacrifice, a duty, a test. We are not permitted to live as Gods here on 
earth; we have to amble about in all this filth, and yet still stay pure, etc. 
[…]                                                                                                        
Your unknown friend in the distance,                               
August Strindberg.4  
 KRAUS  ON  WEININGER,  KRAUS  ON  WOMEN,  KRAUS  ON  SERBIA 83 
 
 
 
 
In a letter of July 1903 Strindberg describes Sex and Character as a “frightening” 
book that had “probably solved the hardest of all problems.” Strindberg also wrote 
an obituary of Weininger in which he affirms that all the spiritual and material 
riches of humanity had been created by males. Woman’s love for man he describes 
as “50% animal heat and 50% hate.”5 
Weininger on the other hand was subject also to attacks. These emanated, above 
all, from members of the churches, and from the Vienna psychoanalytic movement. 
In 1904 there appeared in a German medical series a book entitled Der Fall Otto 
Weininger (The Case of Otto Weininger) by one Ferdinand Probst. Probst’s book is 
an exercise in posthumous psychopathology. As Kraus wrote: “The psychiatric 
troublemakers are no longer content to destroy the living. They have started to 
render expert opinions also on the dead …”6  
Sigmund Freud himself described Geschlecht und Charakter as a “rotten book, 
which cannot be taken seriously”.7 Freud also accused Weininger of having stolen 
some of his own ideas in the writing of Geschlecht und Charakter – for another 
principal thesis of Weininger’s work is that all human beings, and indeed all 
sexually reproducing organisms, are physiologically and psychologically bisexual. 
II.   Feeling vs. Truth 
Weininger is an ethical realist. He believes that there exist ultimate values which in 
and of themselves demand realization and whose demand for realization outweighs 
all other considerations. A human being, if he is to lead a moral life, must respect 
these values in his thoughts and actions, regardless of the consequences to his 
personal well-being or to the well-being of the society in which he lives. He who 
fails in this observation is a moral criminal. To the extent that he is conscious of his 
failure he suffers guilt, and there is, for Weininger, a logical tie between ethical guilt 
(ethical punishment) and the actions in which it resides. The reality of guilt is a 
logical mark of the reality of the values Weininger calls ultimate.  
Nowadays people rarely talk of “ultimate” values. Rather, the measure of 
ethical value is taken to be the advantage of society as a whole. The extent to which 
the isolated individual succeeds in leading a moral life is thus shorn almost 
completely of its ethical significance. 
Weininger’s ethical realism will appear as an even more formidable stumbling 
block to the contemporary reception of his views when we examine the precise 
nature of the “ultimate values” to which he is committed.8 The following would be 
an approximation of a complete list: 
[M1] truth, knowledge, honesty, intellectual rigor, consistency, 
clarity and distinctness of thought; 
[M2]  the ability to reason, to differentiate, to impose an order upon 
and to distance oneself from the subject-matter of one’s thoughts; to 
isolate principles and to recognize essences or types; to see the general in 
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the particular; to grasp what is constant in a world of change, to forget 
nothing; 
[M3]  the ability to act in such a way that the principle of one’s 
actions is clearly understood, and therefore also in such a way that one 
can accept responsibility for those actions; reason and will should 
coincide; logic and ethics should become identical; the ability to act 
where action is due, to act in accordance with a will to value; thus one 
should respect the qualities of resolution, decisiveness, and courage; and 
one should abjure complacency and pompousness.  
To the extent that an action satisfies the above, its value will exhibit permanence; 
our willingness to accept responsibility for it will be capable of enduring forever. 
The action will, correspondingly, impose a permanent order upon some segment of 
the world we experience, of a type which appears most notably in the worlds of 
philosophy and of artistic creation (and especially in music). The world itself, on the 
other hand, acquires from the ethical point of view a wholly passive, submissive 
character, the character of something that is to be shaped according to the moral or 
aesthetic will of the experiencing subject. The list of values might accordingly be 
extended: 
[M4]  a high value is placed on those actions that impose a permanent 
form on that which is formless; the will to value is manifested as a will to 
form. 
Finally, the above, purely subjective criteria of the ethical life will be seen to imply 
a specific constraint upon one’s relations with one’s fellow human beings (that is to 
say, upon those of our thoughts and actions which impinge upon our fellows): 
[M5]  a human being is to be treated with absolute respect as an equal 
(potential) source of ethical legitimacy (of truth and of right); he should 
not be treated in an instrumental way, as a means to one’s own ends, 
however highly valued those ends may be.  
I have called the above M-values: we may think of them, for the moment, as the 
values of the mind. Note that even where M-values have a bearing upon our 
relations with others, they are wholly individualistic. No ultimate value is placed 
upon, say, the health of the society in which one lives, not even upon the survival of 
the human species. Ultimate values can in Weininger’s eyes be brought to 
realization only through the reason and will of a single individual – not, for 
example, through changes in society brought about by political means. Value is 
indeed divorced from the nexus of causes and effects. The individual should seek 
not to concern himself with the affairs and amenities of the world in which he lives. 
Rather, he should seek to travel light.  
It is possible to set forth a complementary list of what might be called W-values 
by picking out those qualities isolated by Weininger as directly antagonistic to the 
above. These would include, in no particular order: 
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[W1]  instinct, feeling (as a substitute for or as a beclouding 
accompaniment of thought); partiality; the inability to distance oneself 
from the subject-matter of one’s thoughts; 
[W2]  passion, sentiment, sensuality, love (conceived as a bond 
between individuals somehow leading to an erosion of their respective 
individualities); togetherness, sociability, solidarity, compassion; 
comfort, domesticity, well-being, survival;  
[W3]  spontaneity, impulsiveness, pragmatism, the tendency to be 
swayed by temporal events instead of dominating them; 
[W4]  acting in such a way that one works with rather than against 
nature; being concerned to accept and live within the flow of events 
rather than to impose an enduring form or order upon the world; living 
for the moment; 
[W5]  self-abasement, self-sacrifice, the offering of oneself as a 
means to the ends of another, or the treatment of another as a means to 
one’s own ends.  
W-values are the values of the world. They are values pertaining to what goes on 
inside the realm of what happens and is the case, values relating to the stream of 
causes and effects. Where M-values relate to the individual intellect and to its ability 
to understand and thus also to stand apart from or transcend the objects of its 
thinking acts, W-values relate primarily to the body and to the nexus of instinctual 
relations between the body and its surroundings. 
III.   Man and Value 
It is not merely that W-values have no legitimacy as values in Weininger’s eyes (so 
that man has no moral duty to observe them). Weininger believes that any attempt at 
their promotion, whether on an individual or on a social level, is positively 
detrimental to the realization of M-values in the universe as a whole. Hence his 
belief that the W-values are ethically evil, and that they correspond, from the ethical 
point of view, to the dark, sensualistic side (the weaker side) of human nature. If  
W-values are conceived as values, then this is because man has been oppressed by 
woman. To uphold them now may be conceived as a form of atavism. And it is 
undoubtedly a form of atavism to wish to renounce modern scientific enlightenment 
in favor of, say, the form of life of the coven or of the tribe.  
For Weininger what I have called M- and W-values are, respectively, the values 
of the absolute man and of the absolute woman. To the extent that someone has it 
within him to recognize that it is his duty before God (before his conscience, before 
the universe as a whole) to bring about the realization of value, to that extent he is a 
man. The absolute woman, as Weininger conceives her, is incapable of experiencing 
this duty. At best she may suffer the inclination to realize (M-) values not for their 
own sake, but in order to impress a man.  
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It should be stressed again that no actually existing human being exhibits in a 
pure form either the ideal type man or the ideal type woman. We are all to a greater 
or lesser extent bisexual; we all have within ourselves finite amounts of male and 
female “plasma,” as Weininger conceives it. Moments of masculinity and 
femininity, of reason and sensuality, and of light and darkness form interdependent, 
mutually inseparable parts of every human being. Weininger goes so far as to claim 
that it is possible to determine numerically the distribution of male and female 
“plasma” in any given individual. A predominance of femininity is marked, for 
example, by large breasts and hips, by a preoccupation with sexuality and with 
appearance to the detriment of the life of the mind. High masculinity is 
characterized by the presence of facial hair and a prominent jaw, and by the capacity 
to divert one’s attention away from purely sexual and personal concerns to other 
spheres, such as war, politics, athletics, or philosophy. Weininger argues in fact that 
it is possible to assign degrees of masculinity or femininity even to whole groups of 
human beings. The Jews, for example, he regarded as the archetypically feminine 
race, closely followed – in reflection of their lack of interest in the intellectual life – 
by the English. A perfect marriage, against this background, would be one in which 
the M- and W-quotients of the marriage partners each add up to 100% when 
summed together. 
IV.   On Self-Transcendence 
In Part II of Geschlecht und Charakter, Weininger moves on to consider human 
sexuality not in relation to physiological and psychological fact, but rather in 
relation to pure or metaphysical possibility, to the possibility that human beings 
should recognize their moral duty, or their guilt, or that they should exercise their 
freedom as thinking, willing subjects. Pure possibilities of this kind, Weininger 
insists, are not constrained by facts of psychology or physiology. The latter relate 
exclusively to regularities actually exhibited in the world of what happens and is the 
case. Pure possibilities, in contrast, may obtain even in a world in which they are, as 
a matter of empirical fact, never realized. Weininger now goes on to argue that it is 
possible, in this metaphysical sense, that the human subject wills that he/she be 
released from the canker of bisexuality, that he/she be cleansed of what is, in 
Weininger’s eyes, the evil in his/her soul … and become Man. While this act of will, 
as pure possibility, is not constrained by empirical reality, its success or failure will 
depend on the particular mental and physical powers, upon the character of the 
individual in question. The attempt to realize the ideal type man can at best, 
Weininger believes, succeed only partially and momentarily, and then only in 
human beings of genius. At worst – for example, in the case of human beings who 
are, by Weininger’s lights, predominantly female – it must tragically fail. Yet not to 
make the attempt is to abandon oneself to the forces of immorality. 
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V.   Horizontal and Vertical Ethics 
I shall suppose in what follows that whatever may be said of Weininger’s respective 
evaluations of the M- and W-values, the distinction, at least, is well-founded. It 
gives rise to a division between what might loosely be termed vertical and 
horizontal conceptions of ethics. Vertical conceptions rest on a view of ethical value 
as residing in a linear, one-directional relation between the individual and some 
higher authority (God, as something like a father or a fearful judge, in the simplest 
possible account, though the higher authority may be, for example, the conscience 
of the subject in question, or some higher self or “moral law within”). Such a 
vertical relation may be seen also in Freud’s account of ego and superego, and it is 
present also in Kafka, for example in The Judgment.9 Horizontal theories, in 
contrast, view ethical value as arising out of the existence of reciprocal relations 
between human beings, interrelations conceived as involving some sacrifice of our 
respective individualities (the kind of denial of the self which occurs, most 
evidently, in the relation between the mother and her child, and which is seen by 
most proponents of a horizontalist ethic as arising from the very fact that individuals 
live together as members of a common society/tribe/race/class). Horizontalist 
conceptions of God see Him not as judge or father, but as something like a social 
worker, a friend, or a cloud of benevolence. The propensity to recognize and to 
respect vertical values is manifest in the world’s major religious traditions in the 
idea of a last judgment and of God as source of absolute justice. It is manifest in the 
systems of government and of law that have grown up in civilized societies, in the 
idea of a divine right of kings, with its conception of the monarch as a direct 
representative of God on earth. 
That societies based exclusively on horizontal values (such as the hippy 
commune or the Fourierist phalanx) have been notoriously short-lived, is in 
Weininger’s eyes entirely predictable. For it is a precondition of the continuity and 
survival of larger social groupings that the respect for vertical values should be 
deeply rooted in its constituent religious and secular institutions, even if this is 
accompanied by liberal helpings of the rhetoric of love and mutual sacrifice. 
VI.   The Categorical Imperative 
For Weininger, of course, the health or continuity or stability of a society is of as 
little ethical significance as is the survival of the individual. What is of ethical 
significance is exclusively the realization of vertical values. This standpoint may 
seem strange, yet Weininger was able to draw support for his conception from 
almost the entire tradition of Western philosophy. For the principal philosophers of 
the West have given overwhelming priority to vertical rather than to horizontal 
intuitions in their accounts of value – and we should not be tempted to suppose that 
this uniformity of views is simply the result of the fact that the history of humankind 
has as yet seen no woman philosopher of the rank of Plato or Aristotle. The 
uniformity is to be traced, rather, to a purely philosophical idea, which received its 
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earliest formulation some three thousand years ago when the sentence “God created 
man in His own image” was first conceived: the idea of individual separateness, of 
loneliness, of freedom from the herd, as an achievement of mankind.10 This idea has 
colored the thought of the West since Judaic times. It has undergone successive 
modifications: in the writings of Plato with his conception of the philosopher as a 
man blessed with god-like spirit; in the medieval conception of man as microcosm;11 
in the monadology of Leibniz; and in the Cartesian cogito. It reverts to its primeval 
form in the writings of Nietzsche. 
With Kant, however, as seen through Weininger’s eyes, the idea of individual 
separateness undergoes an almost complete detachment from its Judaeo-Christian 
origins. Kant, for whom the words “I stand alone! am free! am my own master!” 
represent the very root of ethics, instituted a new stage in the development of 
humankind. His work made possible the reversal of the Judaic premise, the 
propounding of a thesis of total autonomy, to the effect that it is the isolated, 
individual subject who creates God in his own image. This thesis, present only in 
seedling form in Kant’s own writings, first exploded with full force in the works of 
the later German idealists, which consist in large part of attempts to draw out its 
implications. It may appear grotesque to see in Weininger the culmination of a 
development which began with Kant and Fichte and was carried to successively 
greater heights by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Yet we shall see that, of all the 
inheritors of the idealist tradition, Weininger was alone in recognizing and 
embracing certain tendencies intrinsic to the higher morality of the Kantian world 
view, tendencies which reveal, once they are made explicit, that the entire edifice is 
fundamentally defective.  
Kant’s ethical views may be summarized as follows. He insists, first of all, 
upon the necessity to realize, in one’s actions, an intrinsic unity of reason and will. 
The moral worth of an action lies not in the purpose to be attained by it, but in the 
principle in accordance with which it is decided upon.12 Secondly, he insists that our 
relations with our fellows can be ethical only to the extent that we act so as to treat 
humanity, as well in our own person as in the person of another, ever as end, and 
never merely as means.13 Weininger conceived himself as having merely made 
precise the implications of this imperative of the Kantian ethic. But there is a further 
strand in Kant’s thought, expressed in his categorical imperative:  
“Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that 
it should become a universal law.” […] the universal imperative of duty 
may also run as follows: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to 
become through your will a universal law of nature.”14  
To fulfil this imperative is to bring about a unity of reason and will. 
VII.   Overturning Kant 
It is not easy to see how a universalizing principle of this kind can be brought into 
harmony with the radically egoistic conclusions that Weininger wishes to draw from 
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the Kantian ethic. According to the more usual interpretations of Kant, this last 
clause of the categorical imperative is to be understood as imposing a constraint, 
indeed a considerable constraint, upon those types of action which can be counted as 
“ethical” within the terms of the earlier clauses. It is seen, in effect, as a fifth column 
of horizontalism within the Kantian framework. 
Weininger, however, turns the usual, comfortable, liberal interpretation of Kant 
on its head. For him the proposition of universalizability is no more than an 
afterthought that is, strictly speaking, redundant. For he holds that all of those 
actions which, of themselves, exemplify the unity of reason and will, and which do 
not involve the use of another merely as means, are such that the principles in 
accordance with which they are executed are, of necessity and without further ado, 
universalizable. If an action is ethical in accordance with the earlier clauses, then 
this is of itself sufficient to vouchsafe that it is the duty of all human beings to 
respect the principles that underlie it. This is the case even if, for particular types of 
human being, the attempt to exercise this duty must tragically fail. Universalizability 
is thereby conceived not as a prior constraint upon what may count as ethical. 
Rather, whatever is ethical is to be treated, if necessary via force majeure, as 
universalizable. Because it is ethical to be a man and unethical to be a woman (to 
abandon oneself to the merely female characteristics in one’s biological make-up), it 
follows that it is the duty of every human being to will that the dark forces of 
sensuality within his or her breast should be surmounted. Woman must – in the 
spirit of at least some contemporary feminists – become man. Because the 
universalizability condition has been conceded so insubstantial a cutting edge, the 
thesis of total autonomy reaches its simplest possible expression within the 
Weiningerian ethic: act on those maxims through which you can will that they serve 
as laws even in a world emptied of fellow human beings. 
In a world denuded of all consciousnesses outside myself, the W-values of 
community and compassion crumble into so much dust. The same cannot be said, 
however, of the M-values of truth, integrity, and resolution. Even in such a world I 
would still, according to Weininger, be burdened with the duty to exercise a will to 
value, to think honestly and rigorously, to forget nothing, to accept logic as the 
judge of all my thinking acts. One is reminded of the moral of Grillparzer’s Weh 
dem, der lügt – that every lie, however small, assaults the foundations of the entire 
human condition. 
VIII.   Sex and Morality 
The next stage in Weininger’s development of the Kantian ethic consists in an 
argument to the effect that – superficial appearances notwithstanding – all of us are 
already living in a world in which we are in any case cut off from our fellow 
humans, that ultimate loneliness is not something we are ever able to escape. Here 
Weininger, with the courage of the monomaniac, is merely pointing out that there is 
a sense in which the Kantian imperative rules out any contact between human 
beings which would have positive ethical value. Kant’s injunction to treat humanity 
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ever as end, never solely as means, implies first of all, and familiarly, that the 
innocent contemplation of a pretty face be repudiated as immoral, since this 
involves the use of the owner of the face merely as the means to one’s own personal 
gratification.  
But then all sexual relations, whether they are entered into voluntarily or 
involuntarily, also necessarily involve the use of another merely as means. This is 
clear in the case of relations between client and prostitute. However, when reflecting 
upon sexual relations that are not purely mercenary, there remains the lingering 
feeling that – even though the desire for sexual gratification may give rise to the 
treatment of one’s partner as mere means – the existence of other bonds between 
persons in love might somehow cancel out the immorality which would otherwise 
result. Kant, for example, in a letter to C.G. Schütz of July 10, 1779, states – without 
a shred of argument – that the immorality which should arise from “the reciprocal 
use of each other’s sexual organs by two people” is cancelled out “if the 
cohabitation is assumed to be marital, that is lawful, even if only according to the 
right of nature; the authorization is already contained in the concept [of marriage].” 
Once we examine the nature of such bonds, however, we see that they rest entirely 
on the moment of reciprocity: M’s willingness to allow W to do his cleaning and 
cooking is seen as being balanced by the willingness of W to allow M to house, 
clothe and feed her. But reciprocity cannot cancel out immorality. That two persons 
are using each other, as reciprocal means, is a double immorality; it is an immorality 
compounded by collusion. Relations between parent and child, too, involve the use 
of one person for the gratification of another. The child is brought into the world 
without his permission having been sought, and molded according to specifications 
that he is not given the opportunity to approve. Indeed, virtually all relations 
between human beings, including the simplest forms of trade, and even an act so 
trivial as riding on a bus, become impossible for the thorough-going Kantian who 
would lead a strictly moral life. Each involves the use of another solely as means to 
the agent’s own personal ends. It thus appears that the current pejorative use of the 
word “exploitation” to characterize the relations between, say, an employer and his 
employees, or between a husband and a wife, has – with its implication that these 
perfectly commonplace ties are somehow immoral – fundamentally Kantian roots. 
What those who talk of exploitation have not seen, is that the alternatives canvassed 
(workers’ control of the means of production and the like) serve, from this same 
Kantian point of view, merely to distribute the immorality among a somewhat larger 
group of people.  
IX.   Woman Has No Ego 
It will by now be clear that the Kantian ethic, in its Weiningerian form, conflicts 
radically with more familiar conceptions of ethical value. Doing good for one’s 
neighbor, for example, is seen to involve the morally repugnant assumption that the 
neighbor her/himself would be so unethical as to be willing to collude in our being 
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used as means to her ends. Where the right-minded person is perfectly happy to 
accept that there is an element of exploitation in the great majority of everyday 
transactions, and where he of a leftward bent is ready to use the fact of exploitation 
as an excuse to subvert the whole common life of humankind in order to substitute 
relations which are, in his eyes, somehow non-exploitative, Weininger draws the 
conclusion that truly ethical relations between human beings are unattainable, that 
human relations as such constitute at best a distraction from the ethical life. The 
problem of loneliness, then, is unresolvable. Our various frantic attempts to solve 
this problem – travel, sexual conquest, the gathering of worldly possessions – are to 
be dismissed as so much moral abuse. The only truly moral course is to submit to 
the duty to accept one’s isolation before the world as a whole, to recognize (to will) 
that there is no problem of loneliness at all. That this is one’s duty is not, in the end, 
susceptible to any proof. The horrifying, tragic fact for man, alone in the universe, is 
that it has no further sense to submit to this duty.15 Here we meet bedrock. Only 
something like the grace of God can help us.  
It is the vertical order of the mind which makes possible – even in a wholly 
solipsistic world – the phenomena of conscience and guilt. These and other related 
ethical phenomena, as well as what Weininger calls the phenomena of logic 
(reflection, analysis, introspection), have their foundation in a relation between 
higher and lower strata of the mind, between what Weininger calls the soul, or 
intelligible ego, and the merely sensual self. The phenomena of logic and ethics 
arise where the soul is set in judgment over the empirical ego. And where – as in the 
case of Weininger’s absolute woman – the logical and ethical phenomena are 
absent, where the mind is just a flow of sensuous data, there the ground for the 
assumption of a soul or intelligible ego falls away. The perfectly feminine being 
recognizes neither the logical nor the ethical imperative, and the words “law,” 
“duty,” and “duty before oneself” are words and concepts that are alien to her. Thus 
the conclusion is perfectly justified that she lacks also a supersensual personality. 
The absolute female has no ego.16 
X.   On Wittgenstein 
It is no accident that so much in the above calls to mind the thinking of the early 
Wittgenstein. Recall, in particular, Wittgenstein’s question as to what constitutes the 
difference between a happy, harmonious life and an unhappy one. This difference 
cannot be anything physical. Even if everything that we want were to happen, this 
would only be, so to speak, a grace of fate; for there is no logical connection 
between will and world which would guarantee it, and we could not in turn will the 
supposed physical connection. But how, if a man cannot ward off the misery of the 
world, can he be happy at all? Wittgenstein’s answer is: through the life of 
knowledge, for which we might read: life spent in pursuit of the M-values of truth, 
honesty, intellectual rigor, and so forth. 
Good conscience is that happiness which is vouchsafed by the life of 
knowledge. The life of knowledge is the life that is happy in spite of the misery of 
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the world. The only life that is happy is the life that can renounce the amenities of 
the world. Here we return, through Weininger, to Plato’s (and the Stoic) conception 
of the philosopher (of the one who leads a life of knowledge) as being blessed with a 
godlike spirit. He alone is able to come into contact with the divine order of the 
world and thereby reproduce that order in his soul. He alone is able to view the 
world as a whole, sub specie aeterni, to liberate himself from the sphere of what 
happens and is the case.  
In the Notebooks of 1916, we find only random remarks on matters such as 
these, interpolated with reflections on logic and formal ontology and with 
expressions of Wittgenstein’s distress at the fact that what he says is not yet clear. 
Only in the Tractatus, completed two years later, do they begin to be consolidated 
into the framework of a consistent theory. And only there – where we find no more 
talk of the “life of knowledge” as the highest good – do the no longer simply 
Weiningerian implications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of the ethical become clear. 
XI.   Kraus on Woman 
Die Fackel served as the platform for Kraus’s constant stream of abuse against the 
moral, social, sexual, political, aesthetic, legal, medical, and above all grammatical 
failings of his contemporaries. His principal aim was to impede as far as possible – 
and paradoxically through the medium of journalism – the erosion of thought and 
culture that he saw as an inevitable consequence of the spread of journalistic cliché. 
He spent several thousands of pages, in issue after issue of his journal, bewailing the 
extent to which the press, by continuously feeding its readers with ready-processed 
feelings and opinions, had denatured their intellectual and emotional lives and 
destroyed their capacity for moral (and aesthetic) judgment. Journalism and its allies 
– the information and war-propaganda organs of the state, a medical profession (and 
some of Kraus’s most vituperative attacks were directed against the new pseudo-
profession of psychoanalysis) ready to prostitute itself and its jargon to the services 
of the state – were conceived by Kraus as enemies of language itself. And in the 
case of Viennese Society vs. the German Language, Kraus himself served as both 
judge and defending council. The synchronisation of word and deed he saw as 
yielding a universal criterion of the ethical. Every misuse of language, however 
small, assaults the foundations of the entire human condition. And thus if, as Kraus 
saw it, his contemporaries once fully grasped the meaning of their utterances, if they 
once truly experienced the reality contained within their words, then their lives and 
their world would change; the otherwise all-pervading hypocrisy would become 
impossible. If writers and speakers fully realized what they write and say, if they 
saw and felt the full impact of the verbal reality that inheres in their words and has 
only to be uncovered for its effect to be revealed, then they would write and speak 
differently, and indeed live differently. It is as if we were to say that nobody who 
had ever fully imagined an execution could fail to plead for the abolition of capital 
punishment.17 
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As Kraus became more and more convinced of the hopelessness of his task, his 
critique of the misuse of language gradually became transformed into a form of 
linguistic theology, skirting the limits of intelligible discourse. Kraus saw the “fall” 
of German life, as marked by the rise of National Socialism, as a linguistic event, an 
apocalypse brought about by the black magic of printers ink. The issue of Die 
Fackel of July 1934 consists of a 170-page letter to “the stupid reader, whoever he 
may be,” in which Kraus explains “why Die Fackel does not appear.”  
XII.   Kraus and Language 
The decay had set in, Kraus believed, because language had been robbed of its 
rightful and natural position of authority in the abode of thought; for the true writer, 
in Kraus’s eyes, is one who does not seek to interpose his own ego between 
language and the world. He is not one who has a perfect command of language, but 
one who is commanded by language, one who recognizes that language must be 
treated with respect if she is to give of her best – Kraus was fond of pointing out that 
“language” (die Sprache) is of feminine gender. As he himself expressed it: 
Language is the sovereign mistress of thought, and whosoever succeeds 
in reversing this relation will find that she makes herself useful about the 
house but will bar him from her womb. 
My language is the common prostitute that I turn into a virgin.18 
Modern writers, and particularly journalists, had increasingly sought to use language 
as the instrument of their ideas, and their efforts resulted in thoughtless, heartless 
(artless) pap (compare Heidegger’s remarks on the inauthenticity of Gerede or 
chatter.) But not only has language been thus unnaturally forced into a passive, 
unresponsive role, robbed of its powers of directing the course of thought and of 
setting a limit to the thinkable; the debauchery of language has also brought a 
warping and a misdirection of the masculine principles of deliberation, dominance, 
and control. The modern world is accordingly a world in which (masculine) 
boorishness has triumphed over (feminine) sensitivity, a world in which the private 
life of humankind has been muzzled by brute force. It has thereby cut itself off from 
that concentration of thought and feeling, that harmonious coupling of language and 
experience, which is the precondition of culture.  
XIII.   The Personal and the Political 
Kraus published in Die Fackel some of the writings that appeared in defense of 
Weininger after the latter’s death, including writings of Strindberg. We can now see 
that he turned Weininger’s work on its head. Out of Weininger’s vilification of the 
feminine principle he carved a eulogy of the absolute female which served in turn as 
the basis for his own attacks on the hypocritical attitudes toward woman and 
sexuality which pervaded the Viennese society of his day. 
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Weininger disparaged woman for her sensuality, her monomaniacal obsession 
with sex and the trappings of sex (beauty, sensuality, clothes, hair), her 
feeblemindedness, her impressionability, her illogicality, her fickleness, her 
superficiality, her ability to be easily pleased – and just as easily upset. Kraus 
glorified woman for these same qualities.19 Weininger affirmed that the only hope 
for woman lay in her striving, however vainly, to become man. Kraus found nothing 
more repugnant, more unnatural, more lacking in charm, than the educated woman. 
What for Weininger is the soul-destroying capacity of woman to divert the 
attentions of man away from the truly moral life, Kraus saw as her glorious capacity 
to nurture and inspire. 
Weiningerian individualism, with its vilification of the feminine principle, is 
transformed, through the filter of Kraus’s vision of language, into an individualism 
that accepts the (restraining) power for good of precisely those qualities that 
Weininger had so vehemently disparaged. The dualism of masculine light and 
feminine darkness, a dualism in which the forces of culture (M) and nature (W) are 
diametrically opposed, is supplanted by an opposition between boorishness and 
sensitivity, between the mindless public world of incompetent journalists and 
bureaucrats and the interlocking private worlds of individual men and women. 
Individual morality and public law, for Kraus as – in a different way – for 
Weininger, must thereby relate to entirely separate domains. Hence Kraus’s 
glorification of the prostitute, a victim of the confusion of these two domains. Hence 
his recommendation of the rural life and of the provinces, where character has not 
yet been laid waste by journalism, where printers ink has not yet discolored the 
natural life and signifies nothing further than a means which is ready to hand for the 
communication of “the serious, upright feelings of the private individual.”20 Hence 
his continuous stream of attacks against the activities of the Austrian public hygiene 
authorities, who would bring before the courts matters “which properly belong only 
before the Highest Judge – and probably would not interest even Him.”21 The 
disgust people felt at the practices uncovered by the hygiene authorities Kraus saw 
as being rooted in the fact that even the most harmonious affairs in our private lives, 
when dragged out into the open, seem disgusting to eyes and ears for which they are 
not intended.22 
XIV.   Protestant and Catholic Anti-Liberalism 
Kraus, Weininger, and also Wittgenstein were part of a wider counter-liberal 
undercurrent in turn-of-the-century Austria to which Loos, Engelmann, Hänsel, 
Hofmannsthal, Ficker, and Ebner also belonged. These are thinkers who in different 
ways shared a distaste for the modern world and for modern ways of thought, and 
who therefore did not conceive their work as an attempt to persuade the public of 
the rightness of certain views. They were well aware that the thoughts expressed 
would not find general acceptance, but would at best evoke a spark of agreement in 
those few scattered individuals who had already had those thoughts themselves. 
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Thus also they were often content to express their thoughts in the form of aphorisms 
that were only asymptotically intelligible.  
It is possible to distinguish within this counter-liberal movement two more or 
less coherent tendencies of what, with some hesitation, we can call Protestant and 
Catholic anti-liberalism. The division is not one that can be made to rest simply on 
the overt religious confessions of their respective adherents. It is more appropriately 
characterized by appeal to certain family resemblances between the philosophical 
backgrounds, interests, and beliefs of the individuals involved. Thus the Protestant 
strain is marked by the prominence of Nordic writers (Kant, Kierkegaard, Ibsen, 
Strindberg, Hamsun) in the intellectual biographies of its principal adherents. 
Representatives of the Catholic wing, on the other hand, tended to look to the South 
of Europe, to the traditions of classical Greece and Italy, to the Baroque, and to the 
native Austrian heritage of Grillparzer and Stifter.  
We have already seen the workings of Protestant anti-liberalism in its most 
extreme form in the writings of Weininger. Recall that on the day on which he 
received his doctorate Weininger converted to Protestantism. Catholic anti-
liberalism might best be represented by Kraus and by the members of the Brenner 
Circle. Kraus abandoned the Jewish faith in 1899 and was baptized (in secret) into 
the Catholic Church in 1911 (he left the Church in 1923), having come to regard 
atheism as an unnatural state, comparable to an artificially constructed language.  
The Protestant and Catholic anti-liberals have this in common: they turned their 
backs on the existing political order of society. Both stressed the importance of a 
radical separation of the public and the private, and believed that what was of 
intrinsic value was rooted in the latter. Where they differed was in their 
understanding of the locus of the private sphere. Catholic anti-liberals retained a 
belief in certain pre-liberal values of communal life. They adhered – in theory if not 
in practice – to the values of the family and of local and neighborly traditions, and 
they turned against the facelessness of the metropolis. This generated a belief in the 
importance of a pluralism of authority in society and in the necessity to preserve 
hierarchical forms. The Protestant anti-liberal, on the other hand, conceived value as 
residing in the isolated individual (in the vertical relation between the individual ego 
and his God, or conscience). Protestant anti-liberalism thereby stripped ethical value 
of its connection with the sphere of what happens and is the case.  
Where Protestant anti-liberalism is not recognizably a political doctrine of any 
form, its Catholic counterpart can be clearly understood as a form of (wistful) 
conservatism. Catholic anti-liberals sought, in effect, to return to a time when the 
values of preliberal (or “altliberal”) Austria as they conceived it were still taken for 
granted. But they did not, however, act in a simply political fashion: the individuals 
involved were not, as one now says, agents of reactionary forces in society. Catholic 
anti-liberals could see perfectly well that the attempt to bring about a restoration of 
the lost order in society by means of political agitation could only further 
consolidate the deterioration of those natural ties between individuals that they 
wished to nurture and sustain. They sought, rather, to exploit those havens of 
undistorted human life within society where political and ideological interference, 
the interference of modernity, had not yet made its mark. They sought to preserve 
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those bastions of humanity in the (almost certainly hopeless) fight against the 
decline of intellectual and moral standards brought about by the growth of the city 
and by the spread of democracy and journalism.  
Thus Protestant and Catholic anti-liberals counterposed to the rationalistic 
conceptions of humankind derived from the Enlightenment two distinct but equally 
sceptical images of man. The Protestant anti-liberals, in emphasizing the absolute 
identity of man (and woman) before the moral law, are capable of generating absurd 
consequences to the effect that, for example, woman must strive to discover the 
moral law within her (must strive to become like man), even though, because of the 
intensity of the forces of darkness which beset her, this attempt will inevitably and 
tragically fail. The Catholic anti-liberal, in contrast, draw attention to and indeed 
glorify the differences between human beings, recognizing that a naturally existing 
complementarity obtains between individuals of different types and that this, so long 
as it is allowed to express itself naturally, can only have positive ethical value. 
Catholic anti-liberalism is therefore on the one hand more realistic than its 
Protestant counterpart: it can allow, for example, that a woman can lead a truly 
moral life as a woman, by practising those womanly virtues which, from a more 
rigorous point of view, have to be dismissed as of merely superficial importance. On 
the other hand, it is less optimistic in recognizing intrinsic ethically relevant 
differences between human beings, in implying that there are human beings who, 
because of their intrinsic nature, are cut off from the highest forms of moral or 
intellectual excellence. 
XV.   Kraus on Serbia 
Kraus, notoriously, was an enemy not only of journalists and psychoanalysts but 
also of military authorities and war-mongering politicians. His antimilitarism 
expressed itself most poignantly in his massive onslaught on Alice Schalek, a 
female war correspondent who was the incarnation of everything that Kraus 
opposed. Kraus longed for a golden age when everything could be relied upon to 
remain in its natural place. He sought harmony and he hated the boorishness of the 
male, whether as bureaucrétin, as bumbling general, or as journalist. Schalek, a 
female pioneer, a “male-female perversion” (“mannweibliche Pervertierung”) who 
had secured for herself a posting as war correspondent in the front lines of the First 
World War through energetic persuasion of her employers at the Neue Freie Presse. 
In Kraus’s Last Days of Mankind, a female journalist modelled on Schalek is one of 
the few characters who figures repeatedly at different places in the plot; her 
activities at the front are represented as one of the most extreme horrors of the war.  
Schalek is an early incarnation of what, in the era of CNN, has become a 
commonplace: a journalist who is herself a star and places herself at the very center 
of events. Kraus presents his version as driving through battlefields as if she is 
passing through museums, taking her own photographs of the corpses along the way 
and becoming enthralled at the bodies of the “simple man” in the trenches. She    
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hounds a troop of wounded men marching by with the question “Was für 
Empfindungen haben Sie?” (“How do you feel?”). 
Schalek, like her CNN successors, brings the war into your living room. She 
brings the human side of war as it actually happens. But this means that no longer is 
anything in its proper place. Schalek not only has the insidious effect of making war 
acceptable, but her enthusiastic hopping around in the trenches in the thick of battle 
means that there is now no haven from the war, and this means that there is now 
nothing – no noble ideals – worth fighting for. 
XVI.   Promotional Trips to Hell 
From Die Fackel: 
I am holding in my hand a document which transcends and seals all the 
shame of this age and would in itself suffice to assign the currency stew 
that calls itself mankind a place of honor in a cosmic carrion pit. Even 
though any clipping from a newspaper has signified a clipping of 
Creation, in this instance one faces the dead certainty that a generation 
deemed capable of this sort of thing no longer has any nobler possessions 
to damage.23 
 
 
Battlefield Round Trips by Automobile!  
organized by the Basel News 
Promotional Trips from Sept. 25 to Oct. 25                 
at the Reduced Rate of 117 Francs 
 ___________________  
Unforgettable Impressions 
No Passport Formalities!  
[…] 
Especially recommended as an autumn trip! 
[…] 
You stay overnight in a luxury hotel – service and gratuities included. […] 
You ride through destroyed villages to the fortress area of Vaux with its 
enormous cemeteries containing hundreds of thousands of fallen men. […] 
“…A trip to the battlefield area of Verdun conveys to the visitor  
the quintessence of the horrors of modern warfare. […]” 
You have time after lunch to view battered Verdun, the Ville-Martyre.  
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1 Weininger, Geschlecht und Charakter, 462. 
2 See Janik 1985b. 
3 Ford Maddox Ford and William Carlos Williams were among the early admirers of 
Geschlecht und Charakter in the United States (Sengoopta 2000). 
4 Appendix to Weininger 1920. 
5 Sengoopta, op. cit. 
6 Die Fackel 169, Nov. 23, 1904, 6-14; cf. Szasz, 144. 
7 Abrahamsen 1946, 55; see Sengoopta 2000. Weininger approached Sigmund Freud with 
an outline of Sex and Character in the autumn of 1901. Freud refused to recommend 
publication, and advised Weininger to spend “ten years” gathering empirical evidence for his 
assertions. “The world,” Freud said, “wants evidence, not thoughts.” Weininger retorted that 
he would prefer to write ten other books in the next ten years. 
8 See GuC, II, chs. 6 and 7, and the essay “Wissenschaft und Kultur” in UdlD, 142-182. 
9 Compare the discussion of the self as “inner tribunal” in Smith 1981. 
10 Cf. Durzak, 16f. 
11 GuC, e.g., 222. 
12 Kant, 65. 
13 Kant, 91. 
14 Kant, 84 (original italics); compare Sengoopta, op. cit., 55ff, where the relation between 
Man and Woman is compared to the Aristotelian relation between form and matter.  
15 GuC, 209ff; Bíro, 73. 
16 GuC, 239f. 
17 Stern, 78. 
18 Kraus, 1986, 135 and 293. 
19 See Iggers, Ch. 7; cf. Greer in The Female Eunuch, whose view of the characteristic 
female traits of illogicality and emotionality comes close to that of Kraus. Greer holds that 
these traits are in fact advantages: “If women had no ego, if they had no separation from the 
rest of the world, no repression and no regression, how nice that would be!” 
20 Kraus, Die Fackel, Nov. 7, 1913, 29. 
21 1908, 287f. 
22 Cf. Iggers, 164. 
23 Translated in Zohn, 89. 
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DAVID  LEWIS  ON  MEINONGIAN  LOGIC  OF  FICTION 
Dale Jacquette 
Pennsylvania State University 
I. Semantics of Fiction
In “Truth in Fiction,” David Lewis raises four objections to a Meinongian semantics 
of fiction. Lewis does not deny that a Meinongian logic of fiction could be made to 
work, but identifies disadvantages in Meinongian semantics as a reason for 
recommending his own possible worlds alternative.1 
A Meinongian semantics proposes to explain meaning without ontological 
prejudice.2 It analyzes the meaning of the sentence “a is F” in the same way and by 
reference to the same semantic principles, regardless of whether or not a happens to 
exist. Meinongian semantic domains admit existent and nonexistent objects, 
including objects ostensibly referred to in fiction, and permit reference and true 
predication of constitutive properties to existent and nonexistent objects alike. A 
Meinongian theory thus interprets the sentence “Sherlock Holmes is a detective” as 
true, on the grounds that what we mean by the putative proper name “Sherlock 
Holmes” is a nonexistent object described in the fiction of Arthur Conan Doyle that 
truly has the property of being a detective in the same way and in the same sense as 
an existent detective.3 
Lewis proposes an alternative to Meinong’s object theory that considers the 
truth of a sentence in a work of fiction only within an explicit story-context. He 
explains truth in fiction by (selectively) prefixing (most) problematic sentences with 
the operator, “In such-and-such fiction...” For example, “Sherlock Holmes is a 
detective,” on Lewis’s analysis, becomes, “In the Sherlock Holmes stories, Sherlock 
Holmes is a detective.” This is by no means a trivial transformation that reduces the 
truth of sentences ostensibly about fictional objects to tautologies, analytic or other 
a priori truths. For it does not follow logically or analytically that Sherlock Holmes 
in the Sherlock Holmes stories is a detective, since the stories might have described 
Sherlock Holmes as something other than a detective. The effect of Lewis’s 
proposal is to relocate the truth conditions for a sentence in or about fiction from the 
immediate content of the sentence to the fictional context in which the sentence 
appears or to which it applies. The advantage he sees in modal story-contexting is 
that it avoids the need for nonexistent Meinongian objects. 
Writing the Austrian Traditions: Relations between Philosophy and Literature. 
Ed. Wolfgang Huemer and Marc-Oliver Schuster.  Edmonton, Alberta:  
Wirth-Institute for Austrian and Central European Studies, 2003.  pp. 101-119. 
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II.   Lewis’s Challenge to Meinong 
Why not be a Meinongian? What is so bad about nonexistence? Why is it 
undesirable to refer to nonexistent objects, and why should it be a problem for 
nonexistent objects to have properties just as existent objects do? How does it help to 
explain the possession of a property by an object for it to be true that the object exists? 
Lewis’s modal story-contexting of truth in fiction is in some ways simpler, but 
in other ways more complex, than the Meinongian theory he criticizes. It is simpler 
in excluding nonexistent objects. But it entails further complications of its own by 
requiring a distinction between the semantics for sentences about existent objects as 
opposed to sentences ostensibly about nonexistent objects. A Meinongian theory by 
contrast offers a unified, ontically neutral account to explain the meaning of 
sentences regardless of whatever objects may happen actually to exist or not exist. 
Lewis’s theory is also made more complicated by virtue of positing modal semantic 
structures of fictional worlds inhabited by objects that do not actually exist.4 To 
choose between a Meinongian or Lewis-style semantics of fiction, we must 
therefore come to terms with conflicting intuitions about potentially 
incommensurable aesthetic and philosophical values that might cause us to prefer 
one explanatorily comparable semantic theory over another. If Lewis, as he admits, 
has no knockdown objections to offer against a Meinongian theory of fiction, then 
the preferability of Lewis-style modal story-contexting over a Meinongian 
semantics strongly depends on whether he has successfully uncovered any 
significant disadvantages in Meinongian semantics as compared with modal story-
contexting. Lewis accordingly considers four problems in a Meinongian logic of 
fiction: 
 
• The problem of distinguishing properties predicated of nonexistent 
Meinongian objects versus existent entities, and hence of 
distinguishing the referents of predications involving existent entities 
versus predications involving nonexistent Meinongian objects.  
• The problem of distinguishing a multiplicity of otherwise individually 
indistinguishable, indefinitely numbered nonexistent Meinongian 
objects posited in a work of fiction by means of a nonspecific term of 
plural reference in the absence of adequate identity conditions. 
• The problem of restricting the range of quantifiers in comparing the 
properties of nonexistent Meinongian objects in a work of fiction with 
those of other nonexistent Meinongian objects in another work of 
fiction, or with the properties of existent entities. 
• The problem of interpreting inferences about the properties of 
nonexistent Meinongian objects in a work of fiction, especially in 
conjunction with true propositions about the properties of existent 
objects that may also be mentioned in the story.  
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The objections are related and in different ways call attention to the same underlying 
scepticism about whether properties can reasonably be attributed to the nonexistent 
objects described in a work of fiction. All four objections, however, can be 
answered or refuted, thereby blunting Lewis’s charge that a Meinongian semantics 
is at a theoretical disadvantage in comparison with modal story-contexting. A 
comparison of Meinongian object theory semantics with Lewis-style modal story-
contexting, moreover, shows that the two are not incompatible. By itself, without 
Meinongian object theory, Lewis’s proposal is subject to equally powerful 
countercriticisms. Lewis-style story-contexting needs to be combined with a 
Meinongian semantics of fiction in order to avoid Lewis’s objections to Meinongian 
object theory and to avoid Meinongian objections to Lewis’s story-context-
prefixing. 
III.   Real and Fictional Objects and Properties 
Lewis’s first objection depends on a peculiar definition of Meinongian semantics. 
Lewis describes a Meinongian theory of fiction as one that interprets “Holmes wears 
a silk top hat” and “Nixon wears a silk top hat” as completely on a par, taking 
descriptions of fictional characters at face value as having the same subject-
predicate form. “The only difference,” Lewis claims, “would be that the subject 
terms ‘Holmes’ and ‘Nixon’ have referents of radically different sorts: one a 
fictional character, the other a real-life person of flesh and blood” (p. 261). Lewis 
rejects this way of contrasting real and fictional objects. He asks: 
For one thing, is there not some perfectly good sense in which Holmes, 
like Nixon, is a real-life person of flesh and blood? There are stories 
about the exploits of super-heroes from other planets, hobbits, fires and 
storms, vaporous intelligences, and other non-persons. But what a 
mistake it would be to class the Holmes stories with these! Unlike Clark 
Kent et al., Sherlock Holmes is just a person – a person of flesh and 
blood, a being in the very same category as Nixon.   (pp. 261-262) 
Yet a Meinongian can and should regard Sherlock Holmes, despite being a fictional 
character, as a flesh and blood human being as much as Richard Nixon. Lewis does 
not further explain what he means by a Meinongian semantics. But it is central to 
Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie that nonexistent objects can have the same 
constitutive properties in the same sense as existent entities, regardless of their ontic 
status. The existence or nonexistence of an object is something else again. Contrary 
to the opinion of Shakespeare’s brooding Prince Hamlet, to be or not to be is not 
always the question.  
A nonexistent object, in a Meinongian semantics, can be a detective, a winged 
horse, or anything else that thought might freely intend. Sherlock Holmes for a 
Meinongian is as much flesh and blood as Richard Nixon. Of course, Sherlock 
Holmes’s flesh and blood is not real, actually existent flesh and blood, any more 
than, more particularly, say, Sherlock Holmes’s left eye is a real actually existent 
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eye, or his violin is a real actually existent violin. The fact that Sherlock Holmes is 
as much flesh and blood as Richard Nixon is no embarrassment to Meinongian 
object theory. Lewis distinguishes between the ontic categories of the referents of 
“Sherlock Holmes” and “Richard Nixon,” by saying that Holmes is “a fictional 
character” whereas Nixon is “a real life person of flesh and blood.” This is partly 
true and partly false. There is indeed a difference in the ontic status of the referents 
of the proper names “Sherlock Holmes” and “Richard Nixon.” It is true to say that 
Holmes is fictional, and to say that Nixon by contrast is “a real life person.” But it is 
not true to say that Nixon by contrast with Holmes is a “person of flesh and blood.” 
Lewis argues that it would be a mistake to say that Holmes is something other than 
“a person of flesh and blood, a being in the very same category as Nixon” (p. 262). 
But a Meinongian logic of fiction is not required to say that Holmes is not made of 
flesh and blood, and Meinongians will more typically insist that Sherlock Holmes, 
despite being a fictional nonexistent Meinongian object, is as much flesh and blood 
as Richard Nixon.  
Thus, Lewis’s first problem disappears. If we take Lewis’s insight a few steps 
further, however, we might ask about a work of fiction in which the author declares 
in all sincerity that Holmes is an actually existent entity or real-life being. What are 
we to say then about the properties and ontic status of Holmes? Existence, unlike the 
property of being a detective or playing the violin, is not a property that authors can 
freely bestow on their fictional creations by their narratives.5 Meinong’s object 
theory accordingly makes an important distinction between nuclear (konstitutorische) 
and extranuclear properties (ausserkonstitutorische Bestimmungen).6 Nuclear or 
constitutive properties are those such as being red or round, made of flesh and 
blood, being a detective or playing the violin, that can be had by existent or 
nonexistent Meinongian objects without prejudging their ontological status. 
Extranuclear or extraconstitutive properties by contrast are those such as being real, 
existent, subsistent, complete, necessary, or unreal, nonexistent, nonsubsistent, 
incomplete or impossible; these properties cannot be truly or falsely predicated of an 
object without thereby expressing a definite commitment to an object’s ontological 
status. Constitutive ontically neutral properties can be freely truly predicated of 
objects, as when a novelist or mythmaker dreams up nonexistent fictional objects 
such as Holmes with the constitutive property of being a detective, smoking a pipe, 
shooting cocaine, or playing the violin. But extraconstitutive ontically commital 
properties cannot be freely truly predicated of objects by any act of imagination. A 
work of fiction, as a result, in which an author maintains that Holmes truly exists, 
does not truly predicate existence of Holmes. If an author says that Holmes is a 
detective, on the other hand, then, in a Meinongian semantics, Holmes truly is a 
detective. 
The difference, properly applied, between ontically neutral nuclear or 
constitutive properties and ontically committal extranuclear or extraconstitutive 
properties solves many problems in Meinongian semantics. It absorbs the difficulty 
Lewis mentions, along with strengthened versions such as Russell’s problem of the 
existent round square and Lewis’s insufficiently disambiguated problem of the real-
 DAVID  LEWIS  ON  MEINONGIAN  LOGIC  OF  FICTION 105 
 
 
 
life flesh and blood Holmes.7 We need only distinguish between the properties a 
Meinongian semantics regards as freely truly attributable to existent or nonexistent 
objects, and those that are not freely truly attributable, when they have the special 
function of truly or falsely attributing definite ontic status to an existent or 
nonexistent object. To the extent that Lewis fails to observe these basic Meinongian 
distinctions, his first criticism of Meinongian semantics is misdirected. 
IV.   Indefinitely Numbered Fictional Objects 
Lewis’s second objection to Meinongian interpretations of fiction is logically more 
interesting. He considers a work of fiction in which an indefinitely numbered 
“chorus” of fictional relatives is said to attend a fictional character: 
We can truly say that Sir Joseph Porter, K.C.B., is attended by a chorus 
of his sisters and his cousins and his aunts. To make this true, it seems 
that the domain of fictional characters must contain not only Sir Joseph 
himself, but also plenty of fictional sisters and cousins and aunts. But 
how many – five dozen, perhaps? No, for we cannot truly say that the 
chorus numbers five dozen exactly. We cannot truly say anything exact 
about its size. Then do we perhaps have a fictional chorus, but no 
fictional members of this chorus and hence no number of members? No, 
for we can truly say some things about the size. We are told that the 
sisters and cousins, even without the aunts, number in dozens.   (p. 262) 
A chorus, as judged against certain background information in a given cultural 
context, according to Lewis, does not contain exactly sixty members, but, as the 
unnamed story maintains, at least some dozens of sisters and cousins. What might a 
Meinongian theory of fiction say about predications involving indefinitely 
numbered nonexistent objects? Does Meinongian semantics run afoul of the 
difficulties Lewis mentions in this objection? 
The property of numerability need not be essentially different from other kinds 
of constitutive properties such as being red or round, a detective, or a flesh-and-
blood person. We similarly do not know the exact height or weight of Sherlock 
Holmes from the stories, nor how many nonexistent cells or molecules Holmes has 
in his nonexistent flesh and blood. Nor do we need to know. A fictional object in a 
Meinongian semantics is incomplete with respect to many, perhaps infinitely many, 
constitutive properties and property complements. If a chorus in fiction does not 
need to be all male or all female or any particular distribution of genders, why 
should it have to have any particular number of members?  
A Meinongian in desperation might hold that the example Lewis describes 
involves an impossible Meinongian object, such as the round square. If to be a 
chorus consisting of no definite number of members is judged somehow to be a 
contradictio in adjecto, then the chorus that attends Sir Joseph Porter is implicitly 
impossible. Impossible as well as possible nonexistent Meinongian objects can be 
freely posited by the author of a work of fiction. But a defender of Meinongian 
semantics need not go so far in this direction to solve Lewis’s problem. There are 
several choices. A Meinongian can interpret the indefiniteness of the number of 
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chorus members in much the same way as s/he can interpret the incomplete 
information in a historical report of actual facts no longer subject to verification 
about the actual number of real members in a real chorus. In both cases, we can 
assume that there must be a definite number of chorus members, even if we do not 
know what the number is.  
The difference is that in the case of the real chorus there is a definite true 
answer to the question of how many persons were in the chorus, while in the work 
of fiction there is no definite true answer. But, again, this is not a problem unique to 
the indefinite numbering of fictional objects in Meinongian semantics. There is 
similarly no definite true answer to the question of Holmes’s eye color or the precise 
number of hairs on his head, even though we are probably right to affirm that if 
Holmes has eyes, then he has some definite eye color, and if he is hirsute, then he 
has some definite large number of hairs. What, then, is the special difficulty for a 
Meinongian semantics about an indefinitely numbered fictional chorus? 
V.   Quantifier Restrictions in Meinongian Semantics 
The third objection in Lewis’s discussion concerns the legitimate scope of 
quantifiers in Meinongian semantics. Lewis maintains:  
The Meinongian should not suppose that the quantifiers in descriptions of 
fictional characters range over all the things he thinks there are, both 
fictional and non-fictional; but he may not find it easy to say just how the 
ranges of quantification are to be restricted. Consider whether we can 
truly say that Holmes was more intelligent than anyone else, before or 
since. It is certainly appropriate to compare him with some fictional 
characters, such as Mycroft and Watson; but not with others, such as 
Poirot or “Slapstick” Libby. It may be appropriate to compare him with 
some non-fictional characters, such as Newton and Darwin; but probably 
not with others, such as Conan Doyle or Frank Ramsey. “More intelligent 
than anyone else” meant something like “more intelligent than anyone 
else in the world of Sherlock Holmes.” The inhabitants of this “world” 
are drawn partly from the fictional side of the Meinongian domain and 
partly from the non-fictional side, exhausting neither.   (p. 262) 
The disadvantage that is supposed to accrue to a Meinongian theory of fiction in 
light of this objection is difficult to understand. I have to strain even to grasp, let 
alone sympathize with, the problem Lewis seems to have in mind. Why should it be 
harder in principle to judge whether Holmes was more intelligent than Einstein as 
opposed to whether Darwin was more intelligent than Einstein? Comparative 
intelligence is as elusive a concept to define or apply to existent entities as it is in 
the case of fictional Meinongian objects.  
Lewis argues that we can meaningfully compare Holmes’s intelligence with 
Watson’s, apparently since they inhabit the same fictional “world.” We can do the 
same for persons who are either mentioned explicitly in particular stories or who, 
such as Newton and Darwin, belong to the real world historical background against 
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which the Sherlock Holmes stories are written and interpreted. Judging from 
Lewis’s examples, we supposedly cannot compare the properties of fictional objects 
from different works of fiction, nor achronistically with respect to real world 
persons who lived after the events of the Sherlock Holmes stories are supposed to 
have occurred. But why not? What is the logical difficulty in trying to decide 
whether Hercule Poirot was smarter than Sherlock Holmes, or the opposite, on the 
basis of how the two fictional detectives handle their respective fictional 
investigations or how they might most reasonably be projected to handle a 
hypothetical mystery to be solved, or, for that matter, as a reflection of the 
accomplishments attributed to them in their respective stories, together with 
whatever we can infer about the degree and kind of intelligence required for their 
achievement?  
Lewis does not explain his reason for thinking that the two kinds of cases are 
different. The problem of judging the comparative intelligence of Holmes and Poirot 
seems no more intractable in principle, just because Holmes and Poirot thus far do 
not happen to have appeared together in the same story, than it would be if someone 
were now to include them as interacting in the same work of fiction and would have 
to decide which of them could plausibly be portrayed as more astute. The fact that 
no single story has been written in which Holmes and Poirot match wits seems no 
more an obstacle to comparing their intelligences than trying to do so in the case of 
existent persons who never interacted in life because they lived many years apart, as 
in trying to determine whether Julius Caesar was smarter than Napoléon Bonaparte, 
or the reverse. Of course, arguing – or, rather, stipulating, as Lewis does – that there 
is an important difference in whether or not an individual occupies the same 
fictional world as another, or in a world up to a certain point in time of which the 
author of the fiction or the author’s characters could be cognizant, fits neatly into 
Lewis’s alternative modal story-contexting semantics of truth in fiction. But we are 
not driven to Lewis’s approach by this particular criticism of Meinong’s object 
theory.8  
Lewis’s objection about the range of quantifiers in a Meinongian semantics of 
fictional objects is inconclusive. He considers the sentence, “Sherlock Holmes is 
more intelligent than anyone else, before or since” (p. 262). He recognizes that to 
interpret this quantified sentence in Meinongian semantics, “The inhabitants of this 
‘world’ are drawn partly from the fictional side of the Meinongian domain and 
partly from the non-fictional side, exhausting neither” (p. 262). This is perfectly 
true, but unproblematic. A Meinongian theory of fiction can quantify univocally 
over all objects generally, both existent and nonexistent. Or, it can restrict 
quantification more precisely to all or some existent or nonexistent Meinongian 
objects, both generally and as referred to in all or some definite stories, or in all or 
some definite historical periods, geographical or cultural milieux. The formal logical 
devices by means of which such quantification can be achieved are similar to those 
found in classical logic. They include unrestricted quantification over conditionally 
restricted subsets of the domain, and restricted quantification. A Meinongian 
semantics permits all of the desired limitations in quantifiers ranging over the 
Meinongian model of existent and nonexistent objects. The theory allows fiction 
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makers and interpreters to express complicated properties and comparisons of 
properties among real and fictional objects. 
VI.   Inferences for Meinongian and Existent Objects 
The fourth and final objection in Lewis’s critique calls attention to problems in 
drawing inferences about fictional objects from their properties as described within 
a work of fiction, especially in conjunction with background assumptions about the 
real world. Lewis considers a single example: 
Finally, the Meinongian must tell us why truths about fictional characters 
are cut off, sometimes though not always, from the consequences they 
ought to imply. We can truly say that Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street. 
I have been told that the only building at 221B Baker Street, then or now, 
was a bank. It does not follow, and certainly is not true, that Holmes 
lived in a bank.   (p. 262) 
It is true in one sense that the inference from the proposition that Holmes lived at 
221B Baker Street, and that the only building that has ever been at 221B Baker 
Street in the actual world was a bank, so therefore, Holmes lived in a bank, is 
deductively invalid. Lewis wants to correct the problem by prefixing these 
propositions with the special modal qualifier, “In such and such a fiction...,” which 
explicitly invalidates the inference. He continues: 
The way of the Meinongian is hard, and in this paper I shall explore a 
simpler alternative. Let us not take our descriptions of fictional characters 
at face value, but instead let us regard them as abbreviations for longer 
sentences beginning with an operator “In such-and-such fiction...” Such a 
phrase is an intensional operator that may be prefixed to a sentence φ to 
form a new sentence. But then the prefixed operator may be dropped by 
way of abbreviation, leaving us with what sounds like the original 
sentence φ but differs from it in sense. Thus, if I say that Holmes liked to 
show off, you will take it that I have asserted an abbreviated version of 
the true sentence “In the Sherlock Holmes stories, Holmes liked to show 
off.” As for the embedded sentence “Holmes liked to show off,” taken by 
itself with the prefixed operator neither explicitly present nor tacitly 
understood, we may abandon it to the common fate of subject-predicate 
sentences with denotationless subject terms: automatic falsity or lack of 
truth value, according to taste.   (p. 262) 
My reaction to the fallacy of Holmes living in a bank at 221B Baker Street is rather 
different from Lewis’s. I drive contextualization inward to distinguish an 
equivocation in the reference to 221B Baker Street in the true fictional predication 
that has Holmes living there as opposed to the true historical predication of the 
bank’s actual location. As I understand these objects in Meinongian semantics, they 
are not identical, but are misleadingly equivocally designated by the same term, 
“221B Baker Street.” The problem is widespread in Meinongian semantics. The first 
step in understanding the difficulty is to recognize how commonplace it is. 
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Napoléon is the name of a real emperor of France, and of a fictional character in 
Tolstoy’s War and Peace. The fact that both are designated by the proper name 
“Napoléon,” by itself, signifies nothing logically, no more than the fact that several 
persons in the real world can all be named “John Smith.” Tolstoy naturally takes 
advantage of many of the facts he assumes his readers know about the actual 
Napoléon in creating a fictional Napoléon that bears important points of 
resemblance to the real emperor. But this need not create undue confusion, 
regardless of whether or not we try to interpret Tolstoy’s fiction in a Meinongian 
semantics.9 
Of course, a problem is not solved by remarking on its frequent occurrence. It 
only leaves more loose ends to bring together. But at least it can be said that Lewis 
has not uncovered a new, previously unrecognized implication of Meinongian 
semantics. Meinongians have long advocated the need to distinguish between real 
and nonexistent objects that may go by the same name and that may even share a 
significant percentage of their constitutive properties. A disambiguation of 
equivocal references in and out of fiction is needed in order to avoid the kinds of 
invalid inferences to which Lewis calls attention. There are at least two different 
ways of story-contexting a true sentence about a fictional object: Lewis’s external or 
de dicto method, and an internal or de “re” method. We can distinguish the two 
methods in this way: 
 
• Lewis-style external de dicto story-contextualization 
In the Sherlock Holmes stories, Sherlock Holmes lives in London 
at 221B Baker Street. 
• Meinongian internal de “re” story-contextualization 
Sherlock Holmes in the Sherlock Holmes stories lives in London 
at 221B Baker Street. 
 
It is important to recognize that the de “re” external story-contextualization does 
not necessarily attach directly to an actually existent real world res or res extensa, 
but to an object generally irrespective of its ontic status. The difference in the two 
modes of story-contextualization is most dramatically explicated as a distinction by 
which Lewis-style external de dicto story-context-prefixing qualifies the truth of the 
entire sentence expressing a predication in fiction, and thereby of the predication of 
a property to a fictional object. By contrast, internal de “re” story-contextualization 
allows the univocal predication of disambiguated constitutive properties related to 
the real world or to a fictional world existent or nonexistent objects, including 
fictional Meinongian objects. The troublesome inference in Lewis’s fourth objection 
is equally blocked by either the external de dicto or the internal de “re” methods of 
story-contextualization. We cannot validly infer that Holmes lived in a bank in real 
life or in the Sherlock Holmes stories from the assumption that Holmes in the 
Sherlock Holmes stories lived in London at 221B Baker Street, and that 221B Baker 
Street, London, is in real life a bank. But internal de “re” story-contextualization, 
unlike external de dicto story-contextualization, serves only to clarify the exact 
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identity of a relevant fictional object such as Sherlock Holmes, London, or 221B 
Baker Street, as the one belonging to a certain work of fiction. 
What happens if I perversely write a story about Sherlock Holmes in which I 
deny that Holmes is a detective or that he lived in London at 221B Baker Street, at 
the same time denouncing all the earlier Sherlock Holmes stories as false? In one 
sense, I am free to do so. But my impact on the presumptive story context of the 
Sherlock Holmes stories is likely to be negligible. If I am sufficiently clever and 
lucky, I might be able to change the content of the Holmes stories context in this 
way. But it will take much more than merely penning the single sentence I have just 
written. I may need to develop an entire interesting story or novel-length work that 
justifies itself as a literary creation on its own merits in addition to reversing some 
of the properties Sherlock Holmes has acquired in what are recognized as the 
canonical sources of the Holmes stories.  
At the very least, I would need to embed the sentence in a discussion in a 
philosophical article that over time occasioned enough discussion to have the 
denials of properties Holmes shares in the other stories become an accepted part of 
the larger Sherlock Holmes story context. This could happen, but not easily and is 
not likely. The Sherlock Holmes who is a London detective who lives at 221B 
Baker Street is relatively safe at least from my efforts to undo his well-established 
identity. Ironically, the less known a fictional character is, the more insulated it is 
from character-transforming sequels, spinoffs, parodies, and philosophical thought 
experiments. In the event that my perverse story should become sufficiently 
entrenched in the popular consciousness or recognized as necessary to include in 
canonical Holmes story-contextualizations, there would still be good reason to 
distinguish Holmes in what had previously been the canonical story-context in 
which Holmes is a detective living in London at 221B Baker Street from Holmes in 
my perverse story-context, where he is not a detective and does not live in London 
at 221B Baker Street. If necessary to avoid confusion in semantic analysis, a theorist 
could, but hopefully will never need to, go so far as to write: 
 
• Sherlock Holmes in the non-Jacquette Sherlock Holmes stories is a 
London detective living at 221B Baker Street. 
 
As opposed to: 
 
• Sherlock Holmes in the Jacquette Sherlock Holmes stories is not a 
detective and does not live in London at 221B Baker Street. 
 
I am not arguing that internal de “re” story-contextualization of true sentences in 
fiction is preferable to Lewis-style external de dicto story-contextualization. I only 
want to observe that the internal de “re” method does not inherit the exceptions 
Lewis acknowledges to his external de dicto story-contextualizations. It is easy to 
see that Lewis’s proposal faces special problems when he story-contexts entire 
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sentences and larger units of discourse, instead of particular references to individual 
fictional characters or objects. 
VII.   Lewis’s Modal Analysis of Fictional Worlds  
The proposal to attach story context prefixes to some sentences in a work of fiction 
provides only part of Lewis’s modal semantics. The truth of the sentence, “In the 
Sherlock Holmes stories, Holmes is a detective,” requires analysis. The ordinary 
language prefix functions as a fictional modal operator, saying in effect that it is not 
categorically true that Holmes is a detective, but only in certain logically possible 
worlds associated with the Sherlock Holmes stories.  
Lewis describes a standard modal structure in which a proper subset of logically 
possible worlds is distinguished as “somehow determined” by a work of fiction. A 
sentence with its Lewis-style story-contexting prefix is true in Lewis’s modal 
system if it is true in every such logically possible world. Thus, he explains:  
Our remaining task is to see what may be said about the analysis of the 
operators “In such-and-such fiction...”. I have already noted that truth in 
a given fiction is closed under implication. Such closure is the earmark of 
an operator of relative necessity, an intensional operator that may be 
analyzed as a restricted universal quantifier over possible worlds. So we 
might proceed as follows: a prefixed sentence “In fiction f, φ” is true (or, 
as we shall also say, φ is true in the fiction f) iff φ is true at every possible 
world in a certain set, this set being somehow determined by the fiction f. 
(p. 264) 
The possible worlds approach is interesting and worth developing. But there are also 
drawbacks in applying modal structures to the logic of fiction. It is important first of 
all to recognize that modal interpretations are not precluded from Meinongian 
semantics. There is no reason why a Meinongian logic of fiction could not also be 
interpreted by means of logically possible worlds. If we think it is true that Sherlock 
Holmes might have killed Moriarity, then we may find it indispensable to appeal to 
the modality of this “might” by positing a subset of logically possible worlds in 
which Holmes has the property of having killed Moriarity. The question remains 
whether it is necessary to suppose that fictional objects exist in nonactual logically 
possible worlds, or whether they can have different properties without existing in 
any logically possible world. The point is that Meinongian logic and a modal theory 
of logically possible worlds are not exclusive choices. We can and may need to have 
both. The question is rather whether the logically possible worlds approach favored 
by Lewis-style de dicto modal story-contexting by itself without nonexistent 
Meinongian objects can provide an adequate semantics of fiction.10  
There are difficulties first of all about how a fictional world is to be specified. It 
is one thing to speak loosely of a fictional “world” as that part of a semantic domain 
designated as containing nonexistent objects associated with the propositions of a 
work of fiction. It is another matter to invoke an entire logically possible world 
associated with a work of fiction or within which the propositions of the fiction are 
true, and the action of the plot, if any, takes place, involving the fictional characters 
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and objects of the story. The modal approach without benefit of Meinongian object 
theory must posit nonactual logically possible worlds in which Sherlock Holmes 
exists as a complete entity, with definite eye color, a definite number of hairs on his 
head, a definite number of blood cells at any given time, and so on. Such exact 
specification is not required within the modal theory as a practical task, but the 
possibility is presupposed. We can wave a wand and stipulate that there are such 
worlds. But the modal interpretation seems unnecessarily complex in its 
implications when we recall that its primary philosophical justification is to avoid 
referring and truly predicating constitutive properties to nonexistent objects.11 
Consider that Lewis’s (counterpart) modal semantics of fiction is committed to the 
existence of indefinitely if not infinitely many different logically possible worlds in 
which, for example, a counterpart Holmes exists and has precisely 2,000,000 hairs 
on his head on a certain day, and another in which another relevantly similar 
counterpart Holmes exists and has precisely 2,000,001 hairs, and so on, in every 
combination with every other minute specification of Holmes’s complete set of 
properties as an existent object in distinct nonactual logically possible worlds. If 
Lewis has no decisive refutation of Meinongian object theory, and the question of 
whether or not to go the Meinongian route is mostly one of comparative aesthetic 
factors like simplicity, economy, fecundity, and the like, then Lewis’s modal 
structures bereft of Meinongian object theory might be at a distinct disadvantage in 
the choice between competing semantics of fiction.  
Another limitation of Lewis’s non-Meinongian modal analysis is even more 
discouraging. There is no reason to suppose that a work of fiction cannot ostensibly 
refer to and truly predicate properties of fictional objects that cannot exist in any 
logically possible world. Meinong, as an implication of the free assumption of 
intended objects, allows the semantic domain of object theory to include not only 
contingently nonexistent objects, but also metaphysically impossible objects, such 
as the round square. Meinong need not say contradictorily that the round square is 
both round and such that it is not the case that it is not round, or square and such that 
it is not the case that it is not square. But we should not imagine that there can be 
any logically possible world where the round square exists and truly has the 
property of being both round and square. Other more subtle examples are also 
available. Suppose that an author writes a sequel to the Sherlock Holmes stories in 
which Holmes meets Gottlob Frege, who, according to the story, successfully effects 
the reduction of mathematics to logic. There may be logically possible worlds in 
which Holmes meets Frege, but there are surely no logically possible worlds where 
mathematics turns out to be reducible to logic. Lewis addresses the problem of 
impossible fictions when he writes: 
I turn finally to vacuous truth in impossible fictions. Let us call a fiction 
impossible iff there is no world where it is told as known fact rather than 
fiction. That might happen in either of two ways. First, the plot might be 
impossible. Second, a possible plot might imply that there could be 
nobody in a position to know or tell of the events in question. If a fiction 
is impossible in the second way, then to tell it as known fact would be to 
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know its truth and tell truly something that implies that its truth could not 
be known; which is impossible.   (p. 274) 
Since my intuitions about truth in impossible fictions are largely at odds with 
Lewis’s, I can only try to articulate my views and recommend others to test their 
agreement or disageement against my misgivings. Lewis distinguishes between 
blatant and latent impossible fictions. As an example of blatant impossibility in 
fiction, Lewis considers a story like the one above about Frege, concerning the 
troubles of the man who squares the circle. A latently impossible fiction by contrast 
is one in which an author through forgetfulness or the like inadvertently falls into 
inconsistency, as when Conan Doyle in different stories attributes to Watson the 
property of having been wounded only once both in the shoulder and in the leg.12 
Where the plot in a work of fiction is blatantly impossible, Lewis claims that 
anything, every proposition, is (vacuously) true. He states: 
According to [...] my analyses, anything whatever is vacuously true in an 
impossible fiction. That seems entirely satisfactory if the impossibility is 
blatant: if we are dealing with a fantasy about the troubles of the man 
who squared the circle, or with the worst sort of incoherent time-travel 
story. We should not expect to have a non-trivial concept of truth in 
blatantly impossible fiction, or perhaps we should expect to have one 
only under the pretence – not to be taken too seriously – that there are 
impossible possible worlds as well as the possible possible worlds.     
(pp. 274-275)  
Why should we suppose that according to the story Lewis mentions it is equally true 
that the man who squared the circle did not square the circle? Or, with reference to 
the previously mentioned story, why conclude that Frege both reduced mathematics 
to logic and did not reduce mathematics to logic, that Sherlock Holmes met Frege 
and that it is not the case that Holmes met Frege, that grass is green and grass is not 
green? Why suppose that there must occur such inferential explosion in the 
semantics of fiction, except as a consequence of a questionable allegiance to the 
paradoxes of strict implication in a classical modal framework? I do not suppose 
that the authors even of blatantly impossible fictions intend any and every 
proposition to be logically implied by introducing impossible objects or impossible 
elements of plot. I am also unprepared to adopt whatever consequences follow from 
a Lewis-style modal story-contexting de dicto approach to the logic of fiction when 
the acceptability of such a theory as opposed to a Meinongian de “re” theory is the 
problem at issue.  
The alternative for an unconventional modal analysis of fiction may then be to 
expand Lewis’s modal structures to include logically impossible as well as logically 
possible worlds, as some logicians for other reasons have already proposed.13 
Another solution might be to replace the classical propositional logic that Lewis 
presupposes with a paraconsistent logic.14 These suggestions represent significant 
departures from anything Lewis envisions, and their complexity and ontic 
prodigality would need to be evaluated in comparison with an arguably more 
straightforward revisionary Meinongian object theory. 
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Lewis recommends a different type of analysis for fictions that are not so 
blatantly impossible. He inquires: 
But what should we do with a fiction that is not blatantly impossible, but 
impossible only because the author has been forgetful? I have spoken of 
truth in the Sherlock Holmes stories. Strictly speaking, these (taken 
together) are an impossible fiction. Conan Doyle contradicted himself 
from one story to another about the location of Watson’s old war wound. 
Still, I do not want to say that just anything is true in the Holmes stories! 
(p. 275) 
I do not understand why Lewis thinks that absolutely anything is true in the blatantly 
impossible story of the man who squares the circle, but not in the Holmes stories. 
What explains the difference?  
Lewis suggests that we maintain logical consistency in the inconsistent Holmes 
stories by splitting them up into distinct story-contexts. He is willing to follow such 
a practice even within a single story for the latently inconsistent fragments of its 
distinguishable parts. This suggests that it is not so much the blatancy of 
inconsistency in the squared circle story that makes its impossibility unavoidable, 
but the fact that a single object is defined as having impossible properties in a single 
compact story subcontext, rather than as the effect of incompatible properties 
attributed to the object in separate sentences included in the unfolding of a story. 
The distinction seems superficial, since an inconsistency distributed over multiple 
sentences might be every bit as blatant as one that is condensed, from the standpoint 
of the author’s deliberate intentions versus forgetfulness in concocting an 
inconsistent fiction. 
To see that there is no clearcut distinction between blatantly and inadvertently 
impossible fictions, consider the case of Piggy in William Golding’s Lord of the 
Flies. Piggy is described as nearsighted. But the bullies among the stranded children 
who eventually revert to a state of nature steal his glasses and use them to start fires, 
which cannot be done with the concave lenses needed to correct for nearsightedness. 
Is this a blatant or latent impossibility? Should the answer depend on what Golding 
intended, and how much he can reasonably be assumed to know or not to know 
about geometrical optics? Must the semantics of fiction first settle the problem of 
the intentional fallacy of which Monroe C. Beardsley and William K. Wimsatt 
warned the interpreters of artworks?15 It appears that we cannot decide the status of 
the impossibility in these works simply by appealing to the question of whether or 
not it can be resolved by fragmenting the story. We can separate those parts of the 
text that contain sentences describing Piggy as nearsighted as belonging to a 
different substory than those describing his glasses being used to concentrate rather 
than diffuse sunrays in starting a fire. But this does not resolve the impossibility. 
Nor does it seem reasonable to attribute to Golding the desire to fictionalize even the 
laws of physics in the “world” projected by his novel. And Piggy, as the particular 
character he is portrayed as being, seems to vanish if he is not held together by the 
properties of being both nearsighted and having the kind of glasses the other boys 
covet for their fire-starting ability, and by the power their possession confers.16 
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The question is not one of blatancy or latency, but of how inconsistency of any 
sort in an impossible fiction is to be understood. Shall we posit nonexistent 
impossible Meinongian objects or offer some variation of Lewis’s modal story-
contexting interpreted in terms of logically possible or impossible worlds. 
Meinong’s de “re” semantics in this light appears significantly simpler in 
comparison with Lewis’s de dicto modal story-contexting. Are the aesthetic 
tradeoffs required by a non-Meinongian modal approach to the semantics of fiction 
adequately compensated by satisfying the pretheoretical desire at all costs to avoid 
referring to and truly predicating properties of nonexistent objects? Lewis evidently 
believes so. But in the absence of a more powerful argument against Meinongian 
theory, the difficulty and disadvantage seem to belong to Lewis’s modal analysis. 
VIII.   Toward a Universal Semantics of Fiction and Nonfiction  
It is a remarkable fact that writing and reading as well as talking and writing about 
fiction proceed so smoothly with so few occasions – primarily those manufactured 
by logicians and philosophical semanticists – in which it is necessary explicitly to 
disambiguate story context, internally or externally.  
That such disambiguation can always be done in an intuitively correct way is 
theoretically comforting, even if it bestows no practical advantage on reading or 
writing or thinking critically about fiction. A novel can be indistinguishable in 
content, phenomenologically, so to speak, from the reader’s standpoint, from a 
history, as in the fiction of Daniel Defoe, William Thackery, Tobias Smollett, and 
many other realistic writers. David Hume, in A Treatise of Human Nature, makes a 
similar observation: 
If one person sits down to read a book as a romance and another as a true 
history, they plainly receive the same ideas, and in the same order, nor 
does the incredulity of the one, and the belief of the other, hinder them 
from putting the very same sense upon their author. His words produce 
the same ideas in both; tho’ his testimony has not the same influence on 
them. The latter has a more lively conception of all the incidents. He 
enters deeper into the concerns of the persons; represents to himself their 
actions and characters and friendships and enmities: he even goes so far 
as to form a notion of their features, and air and person. While the 
former, who gives no credit to the testimony of the author, has a more 
faint and languid conception of all of these particulars, and except on 
account of the style and ingenuity of the composition can receive little 
entertainment from it.17 
The fact that fiction functions smoothly without explicit Lewis-style semantic 
prefixes suggests that philosophically unprejudiced producers and consumers of 
fiction do not regard the reference and true predication of constitutive properties to 
nonexistent objects as indistinguishable from that occurring in science or history or 
extradisciplinary true-or-false factual reporting. This is also why the fine line 
between fiction and science or history is sometimes easy to blur, and why scientific 
and historical frauds can be perpetrated. Such facts are more philosophically 
116  
 
 
 
 
significant for logic and semantics than is often appreciated. They powerfully 
suggest, as Meinongians insist, that the reference to and true predication of 
constitutive properties to existent, abstract, or nonexistent objects function 
univocally in precisely the same way in fiction as in science or history. The logic of 
thought, if it is to be metaphysically indifferent and ontically neutral, must be the 
same for any discourse, regardless of its intention in conveying what happens to be 
true or what happens to be false. What is it to logic whether or not Sherlock Holmes 
exists? What is it to logic whether or not phlogiston or the planet Vulcan exist, or, 
for that matter, whether or not protons and neutrons or the planet Neptune exist?18 
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We sometimes speak of the world of a fiction. What is true in the Holmes stories 
is what is true, as we say, “in the world of Sherlock Holmes.” That we speak this 
way should suggest that it is right to consider less than all the worlds where the 
plot of the stories is enacted, and less even than all the worlds where the stories 
are told as known fact [...] But it will not do to follow ordinary language to the 
extent of supposing that we can somehow single out a single one of the worlds 
where the stories are told as known fact. Is the world of Sherlock Holmes a world 
where Holmes has an even or odd number of hairs on his head at the moment 
when he first meets Watson? What is Inspector Lestrade’s blood type? It is absurd 
to suppose that these questions about the world of Sherlock Holmes have 
answers. The best explanation of that is that the worlds of Sherlock Holmes are 
plural, and the questions have different answers accordingly. If we may assume 
that some of the worlds where the stories are told as known fact differ least from 
our world, then these are the worlds of Sherlock Holmes. What is true of 
throughout them is true in the stories; what is false throughout them is false in the 
stories; what is true at some and false at others is neither true nor false in the 
stories.   (p. 270) 
12 Lewis writes, in Postscript B in the reprinted version of “Truth in Fiction”:  
An inconsistent fiction is not to be treated directly, else everything comes out true 
in it indiscriminately. But where we have an inconsistent fiction, there also we 
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have several consistent fictions that may be extracted from it. (Perhaps not in the 
very hardest cases – but I think those cases are meant to defy our efforts to figure 
out what’s true in the story.) I spoke of the consistent corrections of the original 
fiction. But perhaps it will be enough to consider fragments: corrections by 
deletion, with nothing written in to replace the deleted bits.   
(“Impossible Fictions,” Philosophical Papers, Vol. I, p. 277) 
13 See Graham Priest’s guest-edited issue of Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 
(1997), on “Impossible Worlds,” especially contributions by Edwin D. Mares, “Who’s Afraid 
of Impossible Worlds?” (pp. 516-526); Daniel Nolan, “Impossible Worlds: A Modest 
Approach” (pp. 535-572); and David A. Van der Laan, “The Ontology of Impossible 
Worlds” (pp. 597-620). See also Jaakko Hintikka, “Impossible Possible Worlds,” Journal of 
Philosophical Logic 4 (1975): pp. 475-484. In The Logic of Inconsistency: A Study in Non-
Standard Possible-World Semantics and Ontology (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1979), 
Nicholas Rescher and Robert Brandom distinguish between “inconsistent” and “impossible” 
worlds; see p. 4: “It is necessary to insist [...] that one should avoid speaking of inconsistent 
worlds as impossible worlds. This would be question-begging, for it is a prime aim of the 
present analysis to show that they can be considered as genuinely possible cases.” Rescher 
and Brandom’s logic is paraconsistent, but it is clear that a Meinongian semantics might 
interpret the modalities of impossible objects like the round square either by means of 
impossible or inconsistent worlds.  
14 See inter alia Stanislaw Jaskowski, “Propositional Calculus for Contradictory Deductive 
Systems,” Studia Logica 24 (1969): pp. 143-157; N.C.A. da Costa, “On the Theory of 
Inconsistent Formal Systems,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15 (1974): pp. 497-510. 
A valuable collection on paraconsistent logic is the extensive volume edited by Graham 
Priest, Richard Routley, and Jean Norman, Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent 
(Munich and Vienna: Philosophia Verlag, 1989); see also Graham Priest, Beyond the Limits 
of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995). 
15 William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” The Sewanee 
Review 54 (1946): pp. 3-23. 
16 William Golding, Lord of the Flies, introduction by E.M. Forster (New York: Coward-
McCann, 1962). 
17 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature [1739-40], edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, 
second edition revised with notes by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), Book I, 
Part III, Section VII, pp. 97-98. 
18 I am grateful to The Institute for Arts and Humanistic Studies, The Pennsylvania State 
University, for a Term Fellowship in 1997-1999, which made possible completion of this 
among related research projects. 
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PHENOMENOLOGICAL  REDUCTION  AND  AESTHETIC  EXPERIENCE: 
HUSSERL  MEETS  HOFMANNSTHAL 
Wolfgang Huemer 
University of Toronto 
In December 1906 Hugo von Hofmannsthal made a conference tour through 
Germany, reading his paper “The Poet and this Time.”1 On December 6 he was in 
Göttingen where he visited a distant relative, Malvine Husserl2 (née Steinschneider), 
and her husband Edmund Husserl. A few weeks after this meeting, on January 12, 
1907, Husserl wrote a letter to Hofmannsthal in which he thanks him for a present, 
presumably Hofmannsthal’s book Kleine Dramen.3 He goes on to compare 
Hofmannsthal’s theory of aesthetic experience to the phenomenological method. 
Husserl’s letter is of philosophical interest because it was written at a time when he 
was just beginning to develop the phenomenological reduction and, thus, to make 
his “transcendental turn,” that is, when he began to explore phenomenology. 
I. Husserl’s Letter
Let me first sketch briefly the timeline of Husserl’s development of the 
phenomenological reduction. The first publication in which Husserl introduces the 
phenomenological reduction is his Ideas from 1913. Husserl had begun to develop 
the phenomenological method much earlier, though. In his Logical Investigations  
from 1900/01 he took a methodological approach that he calls – clearly under a 
strong Brentanian influence – “descriptive psychology.” In the years to follow he 
began to revise this methodological approach. From the notes from the Nachlass, 
some of which were published in the meantime, we know that Husserl developed the 
phenomenological reduction in the years 1905-1907. Already in his lectures on 
time-consciousness from 1905 Husserl presents “statements that foreshadow the 
phenomenological reduction of his later philosophy” (Sokolowski, 1964, 74), but it 
is not until the time of his lectures on The Idea of Phenomenology between April 26 
and May 2, 1907, that he introduces the phenomenological reduction to a broader 
audience.  
Thus, at the time when Husserl wrote his letter to Hofmannsthal, he was in the 
process of elaborating his phenomenological reduction; interestingly, Husserl begins 
his letter by excusing its delay with the remark that  
Writing the Austrian Traditions: Relations between Philosophy and Literature. 
Ed. Wolfgang Huemer and Marc-Oliver Schuster.  Edmonton, Alberta:  
Wirth-Institute for Austrian and Central European Studies, 2003.  pp. 121-130. 
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finally syntheses of thoughts that were long sought for offered 
themselves. I was very busy fixing them. Your book Kleine Dramen, 
which was always next to me, was an important stimulus, even though I 
could read only a little at a time.   (Husserl, 1994, vol. VII, 133)4 
I think it is fair to assume that the “syntheses of thoughts” Husserl is writing about 
are related in some way or other to his elaboration of the phenomenological 
reduction. If that assumption is correct, Husserl states explicitly that Hofmannsthal’s 
work was an important stimulus for his development of the phenomenological 
reduction. 
Husserl goes on to state that Hofmannsthal’s purely aesthetic description of 
inner states is very interesting to him, as a phenomenologist. He explains that in 
recent years he has been working on the phenomenological method that 
requires us to take a stance that is essentially deviating from the “natural” 
stance towards all objectivity, which is closely related to that stance in 
which your art puts us as a purely aesthetical one with respect to the 
represented objects and the whole environment. The intuition of the pure 
work of art is taking place in a strict cancellation of each existential 
stance of the intellect and each stance of the feeling and the will, which 
presupposes the existential stance. Or better: the work of art puts us in (is 
forcing on us, as it were) a state of pure aesthetic intuition that excludes 
this kind of [existential] stance.   (Husserl, 1994, vol. VII, 133) 
Husserl distinguishes the natural attitude of everyday life, in which we take an 
existential stance towards the things in our environment from the purely aesthetic 
and the phenomenological attitude.  
Once we have taken the phenomenological attitude, our stance towards our 
physical environment, towards science and what is believed to constitute reality, 
changes radically. Everything becomes “questionable, incomprehensible, a riddle” 
(Husserl, 1994, vol. VII, 134). There is only one way to solve this riddle: by 
bracketing all questionable assumptions and beliefs, especially our existential 
beliefs, and taking objects as what they are, or better, as what they become in this 
attitude: phenomena. The task of the phenomenologist is to describe these 
phenomena in his reflective analysis. Husserl writes in his letter: 
If all perception is questionable, then the phenomenon “perception” is the 
only givenness [the only thing that is given unquestionably], and before I 
accept one perception as veridical, I look and research by merely 
observing [rein schauend] (merely aesthetically, as it were): what does 
veridicality mean, i.e., what is perception as such and what is the 
perceived objectivity?   (Husserl, 1994, vol. VII, 134f) 
According to this description of the phenomenological reduction, we have to apply a 
universal doubt, a methodological scepticism à la Descartes, and observe and 
describe those phenomena that cannot be doubted. And here again Husserl equates 
the “phenomenological look” with aesthetic experience.  
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Toward the end of the letter, however, Husserl stresses that there are some 
differences between the purely aesthetic stance and the stance of the 
phenomenologist. 
The phenomenological look is, thus, closely related to the aesthetic look 
in “pure” art; but, of course, it is not a look in order to enjoy 
aesthetically, but to research, to discover, to constitute scientific 
affirmations of a new (philosophical) dimension.                         
(Husserl, 1994, vol. VII, 135) 
Thus, while the phenomenologist and the artist take the same kind of attitude, they 
do so for very different reasons. In the purely aesthetic experience one looks for 
pleasure, while the phenomenological reduction serves philosophical and scientific 
goals. 
This last point of Husserl’s letter stands in direct contrast to one of the main 
theses of the paper, “The Poet and this Time,” that Hofmannsthal read on that 
evening, after his meeting with Husserl. Hofmannsthal discusses the role poets play 
in a time when life has become increasingly chaotic and people seem to have lost 
their interest in poetry and read instead many scientific and journalistic texts. 
Hofmannsthal claims that these people are looking for something other than the 
information conveyed by the scientists and the journalists: it is their thirst for poetry 
that makes them read all these technical texts. Even if they are reading the 
newspapers or scientific texts, they are, according to Hofmannsthal, looking for 
poetry, often without even knowing it. His point is that all these writers are poets to 
some degree because they all use the same instrument: the living language. Of 
course, only the real poets know how to create the magic of poetry. Only they can 
give the people what they are actually looking for and so satisfy their thirst for 
poetry. 
Thus, according to Hofmannsthal, the philosopher and the poet have the same 
goal, but only the poet can achieve this goal, while all other writers are doomed to 
fail. Husserl, on the other hand, seems to hold that the artist and the 
phenomenologist have two different goals, two completely different agendas, and 
that both can achieve their goals in their own ways. 
II.   Husserl’s Three Ways to the Phenomenological Reduction 
Husserl’s letter to Hofmannsthal is, as far as I know, the only place where he 
compares the phenomenological reduction to aesthetic experience of pure art. He 
does not even use this comparison in the lecture The Idea of Phenomenology that he 
gives only three and a half months later.  
Throughout his lifetime, Husserl continued to refine and revise his 
phenomenological reduction. At different stages of his development he explains the 
need for this methodological approach in different ways and even distinguishes 
between different kinds of reduction. Iso Kern has shown in his article “Three Ways 
to the Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction” that Husserl introduced the 
phenomenological reduction in three major ways: the Cartesian way, the way via 
intentional psychology, and the way via ontology. The first way has the most 
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relevance for the present discussion, but it is worthwhile reviewing the other two 
briefly. 
In the way via intentional psychology phenomenologists concentrate on mental 
phenomena and exclude physical phenomena from their research just as physicists 
concentrate on physical phenomena and exclude mental phenomena. Husserl 
develops this strategy from the 1920s on.5 
The way via ontology points, roughly speaking, to the fact that every perception 
of objects must remain “unintelligible” in principle as long as it is analysed in the 
natural attitude rather than understood in the context of a subjectivity that brings 
about the intentional relation. “The objects of experience and eventually the whole 
world come to be grasped in their basic structure [...] as an ‘index’ or ‘guide’ to the 
subjective a priori of constitution” (Bernet/Kern/Marbach, 1993, 70). 
The Cartesian way is characterized by the attempt to provide an Archimedean 
point, a secure foundation for all sciences. Outer perception cannot fulfill these high 
standards, since error is always possible. In consequence, we have to bracket our 
beliefs in the existence of the physical objects perceived. What cannot be doubted, 
however, are our occurring mental acts of perception. Thus, the phenomenologist 
studies these acts of perception as mere mental acts, without paying much attention 
to the objects towards which they are directed. In his letter to Hofmannsthal, Husserl 
motivates the phenomenological reduction in this Cartesian way, as we have seen 
above. 
In his later works, mainly in Crisis, Husserl criticizes the Cartesian way. He 
points out that it is characterized by a loss of the external world: when we bracket all 
our beliefs concerning the existence of objects in our physical environment we seem 
to lose the physical world and can study only the left-overs, as it were, or, as Husserl 
calls it, the phenomenological residuum.  
Moreover, the Cartesian way raises expectations it cannot fulfill. Since we give 
up our belief in the existence of the outer world for methodological reasons, we 
might expect that at a later point in the phenomenological enterprise we may return 
again to this belief after an appropriate justification. In other words, we expect 
Husserl to make a move that has the same result as Descartes’s move in the 
Meditations. Husserl, however, never fulfills these expectations, but rather calls 
them a misunderstanding;6 in the phenomenological reduction, the world becomes a 
mere “phenomenon” – and that is what it stays. In addition, the Cartesian Way leads 
to a solipsistic point of view that cannot provide a foundation to explain 
intersubjectivity. For these reasons, Husserl gradually became dissatisfied with the 
Cartesian Way to the phenomenological reduction and developed other ways to 
introduce his method. It was not until the nineteen-twenties, however, that Husserl 
abandoned completely the Cartesian Way. 
III.   The Strength of Husserl’s Comparison 
We have seen, in the letter to Hofmannsthal, that Husserl characterizes the 
phenomenological method as a bracketing of all beliefs in the existence of the 
objects in our environment, which are beliefs that become “questionable, 
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incomprehensible, a riddle” to the phenomenologist (Husserl, 1994, vol. VII, 134). 
Thus, he is clearly introducing the reduction through the Cartesian way – and he 
will do so again a few weeks later when he introduces the phenomenological 
reduction in his lectures on The Idea of Phenomenology.7 His later critique of this 
Cartesian way as a method attaining the phenomenological reduction explains why 
he does not exploit the comparison between phenomenological reduction and 
aesthetic experience elsewhere: the Cartesian way fails because it gives an 
incomplete and misleading idea of the phenomenological reduction.  
Between 1905 and 1907 Husserl struggles considerably to find a way to 
introduce the phenomenological reduction. Since it is a special kind of experience, it 
is difficult to explain it to anyone who has not personally experienced the 
phenomenological reduction. In his lecture The Idea of Phenomenology, Husserl 
says at one point, after describing the phenomenological reduction: 
This discussion is, of course, only a roundabout way [Umwege und 
Behelfe] of helping us to see what is to be seen here.   (Husserl, 1999, 35) 
In this context we can state that Husserl’s letter to Hofmannsthal is at least one more 
roundabout way of explaining what it is like to perform the phenomenological 
reduction, even though it is not a very successful one. 
IV.   What Husserl Should Have Said 
Does that mean that the comparison between the phenomenological reduction and 
Hofmannsthal’s aesthetical theory is a dead end, an unimportant subsection in the 
history of philosophy? It is, in the way Husserl explores it. Yet, there is another, 
more fascinating analogy between Husserl and Hofmannsthal that the former could 
have exploited.  
Hofmannsthal, as is well known, gained his first literary merits very early in 
life. At the age of seventeen he started under the pseudonym “Loris” to publish 
poems that caught the attention of the literary circles of the time. Hofmannsthal’s 
work in general, but especially his early work, is strongly characterized by the ideas 
of aestheticism. In this early period he wrote the dramas that were published in the 
collection Kleine Dramen and that he gave to Husserl as a present. 
A few years later, however, at the age of twenty-five, Hofmannsthal undergoes 
an important development. He experiences a crisis – or at least he pretends to do so 
– that is triggered by his emerging scepticism with respect to language. 
Hofmannsthal expresses this crisis in The Lord Chandos Letter, which becomes 
probably the best known of all his texts. He writes this letter in 1902, nearly four 
years before he meets Husserl. A fictional text with autobiographical elements, 
situated in the early seventeenth century, it is a letter from Lord Chandos to the 
philosopher Francis Bacon. 
In the first part of the letter Lord Chandos describes his early literary successes, 
and emphasizes that the act of writing had come easily to him in his early life. He 
enumerates all the plans he had had for literary works and states that in his earlier 
literary endeavors he had been strongly influenced by aestheticism. But this 
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description of his earlier writings and projects is only an introduction to the main 
point of his letter, which is to explain why he can no longer write as he used to. He 
states that he is now unable to identify with his early works and cannot continue to 
work on his earlier projects. Lord Chandos sums up his problems by saying: 
My situation, in short, is this: I have utterly lost my ability to think or 
speak coherently about anything at all.   (Hofmannsthal, 1986, 19) 
This inability to speak and think progresses in stages. First, he finds it impossible to 
use abstract words, and then this disability quickly spreads to all levels of language 
or, to put it in Wittgensteinian terms, to all other language-games. The words and 
phrases of everyday conversation seem more and more “undemonstrable to me, so 
false, so hopelessly full of holes” with the result that he must make a supreme effort 
to sustain even the most banal and everyday conversation and to hide the fact that he 
cannot use language in the way he used to (Hofmannsthal, 1986, 21). 
It is important to see that Lord Chandos is expressing doubts about language 
only; he does not question the existence of his physical environment, the “outer 
world,” or parts of it, but only his ability to refer to his environment by means of 
language: 
Everything fell into fragments for me, the fragments into further 
fragments, until it seemed impossible to contain anything at all within a 
single concept.   (Hofmannsthal, 1986, 21)  
This new state in which the poet finds himself is not only a state of loss – loss of the 
ability to apply language. There are “blissful and quickening moments” in which he 
has experiences he before never thought possible (Hofmannsthal, 1986, 22): 
There is something ineffable, you see, something one could probably 
never define, that makes itself known to me at such times, filling like a 
vessel some arbitrary feature of my everyday surrounding with a prodigal 
surge of more exalted life. [...] Each of them [i.e., everyday objects], or, 
for that matter any of a thousand others like them that the eye glides over 
with understandable indifference can all at once, at some altogether 
unpredictable instant, assume for me an aspect so sublime and so giving 
that it beggars all words. Or it may happen that only the idea of some 
object remote from me is suddenly accorded to the brim with that gentle 
but irresistible flood of divine feeling.   (Hofmannsthal, 1986, 23)8 
This crisis with respect to language progresses to another state in which the poet has 
a new state in which he has a whole new range of experiences. He does not 
experience new kinds of objects, though; it is not that his physical environment has 
changed – rather, he experiences his familiar environment in a new way.  
The Lord Chandos Letter was an important step in the development of 
Hofmannsthal’s work. It has often been interpreted as a critique of the pure 
aestheticism he had held earlier in his earlier years and the beginning of a stronger 
emphasis on the moral dimension of life. Still a matter for discussion is whether the 
crisis expressed in the letter was a radical turning point in Hofmannsthal’s life, “a 
crisis that compelled him to reject all that had gone before” (Janik/Toulmin, 1973, 
114), or whether, as a result of the disproportionate emphasis on the Chandos crisis, 
“the overall unity of Hofmannsthal’s work has been distorted and overlooked” 
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(Daviau, 1971, 29).9 For our discussion, however, this question is not relevant. What 
is important is that, with this letter, there is a whole new dimension to 
Hofmannsthal’s theory, and Husserl could have made a strong comparison between 
phenomenological reduction and aesthetic experience if he had exploited this new 
dimension of Hofmannsthal’s theory. There are several aspects of this comparison 
that could have worked for Husserl. 
First, in the phenomenological reduction as well as in Hofmannsthal’s state of 
crisis, we lose the ability to comprehend the world around us “with the simplifying 
glance of habit.” We do, however, gain a new way of experiencing our environment 
in which we “examine at curiously close range all of the things that surface in such 
[everyday] conversation” (Hofmannsthal, 1986, 21). Once they are in these new 
states of mind, Husserl and Hofmannsthal can experience their physical 
environment as they could not have done earlier, when they were still, to use 
Husserl’s expression, in the “natural attitude.” 
Second, as I have pointed out above, Husserl’s actual comparison fails because 
it emphasizes the Cartesian way as a step into the phenomenological reduction. A 
comparison with the Lord Chandos Letter would allow Husserl to discard this way. 
He could stress that the phenomenological reduction is a change of attitudes in 
which we open ourselves up to a whole new range of experiences, just as Lord 
Chandos’s changed attitude made it possible for him to have a range of new 
experiences. Lord Chandos is not sceptical with respect to the existence of the 
external world, but only with respect to our ability to speak about the external world. 
Hence, Husserl could have used this comparison to stress the point that in the 
phenomenological reduction we do not “lose the external world.” He could thus 
have anticipated his own critique of the Cartesian way, i.e., of the way he used to 
introduce the phenomenological reduction in its early stages. In addition, he could 
have emphasized that we gain a new way of describing these objects and mental 
experiences that are directed toward them. Thus, a comparison to Hofmannsthal’s 
later aesthetic theory could have helped Husserl express his intentions more clearly 
than the comparison, which he presents in the letter, to Hofmannsthal’s early theory. 
This does not mean, however, that the comparison is perfect or that 
Hofmannsthal’s crisis and Husserl’s phenomenological reduction are exactly the 
same kind of experience; in fact, they are quite different in several respects. Husserl 
thought that the two kinds of experiences serve two completely different purposes, 
whereas Hofmannsthal expresses his contention in the paper he read at Göttingen, 
i.e., four years after the Lord Chandos Letter, that all written language serves to 
quench the thirst for poetry – a goal that, according to him, only poets can achieve. 
Another crucial difference lies in the ways in which they introduce their new 
methods of looking at things: while Hofmannsthal describes his crisis as something 
that he slid into, something that came upon him without any effort on his part, 
Husserl presents his phenomenological reduction systematically, as the result of 
hard work and an active and deliberate attempt to establish a new method of 
philosophy.10 In addition, Hofmannsthal states that the experiences that he has in 
this new state of mind – and that he describes so eloquently in his letter – are 
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ineffable, while Husserl thinks that it is the task of the phenomenologist to describe 
what he experiences in the state of phenomenological reduction. 
V.   Conclusion 
The comparison between phenomenological method and aesthetic experience that 
Husserl makes in his letter to Hofmannsthal fails because Husserl refers to the 
aesthetic theory Hofmannsthal had held before he wrote the Lord Chandos Letter, 
i.e., he compares it to the theory that Hofmannsthal had modified four years before 
they met. However, Husserl could have made a strong point if he had compared his 
views to the ones Hofmannsthal actually held when they met. There is an important 
analogy between Husserl’s phenomenological method and Hofmannsthal’s aesthetic 
theory, but Husserl could not see that analogy at the time he wrote the letter.  
The question remains why Husserl refers to Hofmannsthal’s early aesthetic 
theory, i.e. to a theory Hofmannsthal gave up four years before Husserl wrote his 
letter. Why did he not consider the Lord Chandos Letter and Hofmannsthal’s 
language-crisis? I think there are several reasons. First, we know from the letter that 
Husserl had read Hofmannsthal’s book Kleine Dramen, a collection of plays 
Hofmannsthal wrote before his Lord Chandos Letter. Second, Husserl never was a 
great reader, so it is quite possible that he did not know about Hofmannsthal’s turn. 
And third, even if Husserl had known about Hofmannsthal’s turn, he probably could 
not have appreciated the advantages of this other comparison at the time since he 
had not yet recognized the problems of the Cartesian way for the phenomenological 
reduction in early 1907, when he wrote the letter to Hofmannsthal. 
 
 
 
 
1 “Der Dichter und diese Zeit,” printed as Hofmannsthal (1907). 
2 See Hirsch (1968, 109). 
3 For these biographical details, see Schuhmann (1977, 100ff) and Hirsch (1968, 108ff). 
4 Since Husserl’s letter has not yet been translated, I have translated all passages that are 
quoted. 
5 He argues for it for the first time in his lecture “Erste Philosophie” (1923/24). 
6 See Erste Philosophie (1923/24), Husserliana VIII, 174. 
7 In this lecture, the Cartesian way is already combined with the way via ontology. 
8 Translation slightly altered. 
9 For an interesting discussion on that topic see also Le Rider (1997, 101ff). 
10 This is mainly a difference of how the two have presented their ideas. Hofmannsthal 
expresses in a very eloquent way that he has “utterly lost my ability to think or speak 
coherently about anything at all” (Hofmannsthal, 1986, 19), which raises numerous doubts 
about whether the letter describes autobiographically an actual crisis Hofmannsthal went 
through. Husserl, on the other side, writes in a letter that he was driven by demons in his 
development of the phenomenological reduction. He writes about the decade between the 
Logical Investigations and Ideas: “A development has never been more straight, more goal 
oriented, more predestined, more ‘demonic’” (Husserl, 1994, vol IV, 412; my translation), 
which suggests that the development of the phenomenological reduction was not only the 
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result of a systematic effort, but also something that Husserl slid into, very much like 
Hofmannsthal’s description of being overcome by the crisis; see also Smith (1995, 102) and 
Schuhmann (1994, 6f). I want to take this occasion to thank Barry Smith for drawing my 
attention to this letter and Husserl’s “darker side.” 
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THE  “SOFT  LAW”  OF  AUSTRIAN  HISTORICAL  LOGIC
SINCE  THE  ENLIGHTENMENT  IN  THE  ARTS  AND  SCIENCES
Mark E. Blum 
University of Louisville 
A “national historical logic” is a normative manner whereby the culture tracks time 
and ascribes cause and effect to the events of public and private life. One can call 
the nation’s historical logic the pattern for structuring the “what,” “how,” and “why” 
of events. A national historical logic begins in the conception of individuals whose 
vision speaks to the populace of a time. A national historical logic is not only the 
formal historiographical creations of those who practice the discipline of history. It 
is also the historical perspective of novelists, dramatists, journalists, and other 
professionals who contribute to the historical understanding of the nation’s 
populace. Nationally, the conventions of a historical logic are known both 
informally in everyday expressions and in the more formal genres that govern the 
historical aspects of inquiry and expression. The genres of literature, historical 
writing, and scientific explanation into event-structures are composed intuitively in 
emulation of what is the sense of “right order” of the authorities in the many spheres 
of the nation’s culture. This intuitive construction is generated by the private as well 
as public demand for forms of narration that communicate a succession of events 
comprehensible to all parties. The dissemination of a national historical logic is a 
combined effort of the many institutional expressions of the nation’s culture – the 
press and other communications media, the schools, and other private and public 
organs. 
National historical logics are artful cognitive products that respond to national 
political-social experience. A national historical logic is the product of the 
contingencies of history. It is most often a manner of defending the populace and the 
state against the trials of time and event. A national historical logic becomes the 
support of tradition and continuity, although it can become a fecund influence upon 
the regeneration of cultural life when changed. A nation’s historical logic as an 
impetus for renewal occurs infrequently, mainly due to the difficulty and time 
required to reorient cultural norms. Indeed, historical-logical norms are most often 
hardly appreciated in their presence and meaning. Even when recognized, massive 
institutional response is required for changing a national historical logic. The 
outcome of this inertia is inadequate response to the emerging issues of a nation. As 
Writing the Austrian Traditions: Relations between Philosophy and Literature. 
Ed. Wolfgang Huemer and Marc-Oliver Schuster.  Edmonton, Alberta:  
Wirth-Institute for Austrian and Central European Studies, 2003.  pp. 131-142. 
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an artful defense and guide, a national historical logic can, as the Freudian superego, 
be mistaken in its normative guidance as times change within the nation. A national 
historical logic changes slowly, if at all, as its premises become embedded in the 
culture’s educational and policy-making norms. 
The “nation-state” is central to what its cultural-historical logic becomes. If we 
can accept the premises of Aristotle and Hegel, the human is a political animal. The 
zoon politikon is the creature of the polis. The polis since the Enlightenment, at 
least, is the nation. Austria developed its national historical logic under the influence 
of the structure of the Holy Roman Empire in its weaknesses and strengths. The 
Habsburg dynasty in particular gave form to the “what,” “how,” and “why” of the 
structure of historical events. Indeed, Austrian historical logic will have many 
elements that are analogous to how a family experiences time. Although I will 
comment upon Austrian historical logic since the Enlightenment, its structure as I 
present it began earlier with the emergence of Habsburg authority in Europe. Most 
prominent in its historical logic is the sense of an evolving form bridging times and 
places, like a family dynasty, which I will call a morphological logic. Historical 
cause within this morphological form will focus upon the reciprocality of diverse 
historical agents, as within a family milieu (and a multi-national state). In its best 
sense, Austrian historical logic promotes a vision of stability and equity among 
diverse voices. Its historical purview of an event is non-dramatic as an evolving 
form has neither radical breaks nor special emphases – every phase of maturation is 
equally important. 
Adalbert Stifter’s “das sanfte Gesetz,” “the soft law,”1 articulated in the 
introduction to his 1852 collection of novellas Bunte Steine,2 is one of the more 
explicit descriptions of this historical logic as a “right order.” While Stifter inherited 
these norms, his restatement of them with the profound humanism of his narratives 
is the best introduction to Austrian historical logic. In 1842, Stifter composed one of 
his many descriptions of natural events that earned him the Emperor’s medal for art 
and science several years later. This particular description of a forest begins one of 
his tales of human existence, entitled Der Hochwald. Stifter’s “soft law” of nature 
and humankind can be seen in the passage, and is an apt introduction for my 
discussion of Austrian historical logic in the arts and sciences since the 
Enlightenment: 
On the midnight side (that is, north) of the Austrian land a forest 
stretches its dawning streaks westwards for thirty miles, beginning at the 
source of the river Thaia and strives forward until that borderknot where 
the Bohemian land collides with Austria and Bavaria. There, as often 
with crystallized pinnacles, a multitude of immense saddles and ridges 
sprang against each other and pushed up a rough massif, which now 
manifests its forest shadow over three lands and sends down undulating 
rolling land and rushing streams to each on all its sides. The forest bends, 
like its kind often does, along the course of the line of mountains, and it 
goes then toward the midnight side many days journey further.                                              
The place of this forest swing, now comparable to a secluded sea inlet, is 
in the self-correction it betook, is what we intend to narrate.3 
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Stifter articulates an Austrian narrative norm of sensitivity to the durational Gestalt 
of a changing state-of-affairs inherited from his predecessors in the arts and the 
sciences (Gestalt as a conceptual approach to human perception is credited to the 
Austrian psychologist, sociologist, and poet Christian von Ehrenfels). Stifter’s forest 
is depicted as a living, changing, even self-correcting being that nonetheless 
maintains a form, albeit accommodative toward its contingent milieus, over time. 
Such a logic of change over time is what I will term a morphological understanding 
of history. All change is towards the fulfillment of a form, albeit a form whose 
growth may continue without foreseeable end. 
There is another unique aspect of this Gestalt recognition in Stifter and the 
Austrians that warrants Stifter’s term “the soft law”: the form is not a unity imposed 
upon particulars, rather it is a unity composed out of the aggregate of particulars. 
The form itself changes as the particulars meet immediate empirical challenges 
accommodatively, rather than the zero sum game of either/or (Oskar Morgenstern 
and John von Neumann, arguably stemming from lands with a deep Austrian 
heritage, have provided valuable insight into this aspect of game-theory). The forest 
does not pit its direction and being against an opposing force, such as the 
inhospitable ground of the massif or the “Grenzknoten” (a metaphor for “problem”) 
of the conjoining of the three lands. Rather, the trees are determined to find a way to 
grow that simultaneously preserves the parental form even as it borders on the 
inhospitable. 
The method in this morphological accommodation to external challenge is an 
avoidance of, indeed scepticism, toward inflexible ideas. The forest bends tree by 
tree when necessary. The Austrian historian Oswald Redlich has noted that Austrian 
historiography shuns “Übergeschichte,” where metacognitive categories reshape 
known facts.4 Rather, Austrian historiography is described by the majority of 
Austrian historians as “streng, exakt, objektiv” (Fellner, 1985, 93). History is the 
intersubjective movement of individuals toward each other and their environ, and 
the account focuses upon each particular relationship in depth and detail – like a 
Freudian case-study. The Austrian historian Ludo Moritz Hartmann emphasized in 
this tradition that whatever is individual belongs to a form generated by the 
intersubjective whole composed in that time by all individuals (Fellner, 1985, 168-
69, 173). Austrian historiography is not conceptually impaired in the absense of the 
broad explanatory principles of the German historicist tradition from Herder through 
Hegel to Marx, from Ranke to Dilthey to Meinecke; rather, the conceptual organizer 
of events is the very form itself comprised by the historical facts, cohered as a total 
Gestalt by those facts. Stifter describes this Gestalt composed of the aggregate of 
many particulars in his “soft law,” as he argues for the integration of the many 
smaller laws that characterize the singularity of each event in humankind or nature 
participating in the summative form (Vorrede/Bunte Steine in Stifters Werke, 2: 15-
17). If a unifying principle for the totality is to be sought, it is the “walten,” the 
proportionate “sway” of intersubjective integration from particular to particular 
(“Letter to Aurelius Buddeus [August, 1847],” in Stifters Werke, 1: 72). Is this good 
physics? Ernst Mach, the Austrian physicist, argued for what he called a physics, 
where rather than seeking the one explanatory law that generated all entailed 
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phenomena, the physicist restricted himself/herself to a rigorous description of the 
empirical facts and relationships of immediate phenomena.5 
The Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano spoke of the aggregative form 
generated by many as the “one in the many.” He refered to this in his text on 
aesthetics, as he discussed the reciprocal causality of the many aspects and 
dimensions of any work of art.6 Brentano’s parenting of modern phenomenology, 
the rigorous observation of how a thing or state-of-affairs presents itself, enabled 
him to see the differing Gestalts of the “one in the many.” Brentano, as he spoke of 
the principle of “the one in the many” understandably felt he had to address the 
seemingly self-evident proposition of science that there is a “one.”7 His modest 
embarrassment in his discussion stemmed almost certainly from the weight of 
German thought that there is a “one” behind all entailed particulars. Indeed, that is 
the counter-example to Austrian-German thought, the normative historical logic of 
the northern German lands since the Enlightenment, which is “the many in the one.” 
Franz Stuckert, in an essay on the North German writer and poet Theodor 
Storm, articulates quite clearly the converse historiographical idea of the German, 
the “many in the one.” Stuckert points out how an overarching principle subsumes 
all particular examples in Storm’s poetry into a “übergeordnete Einheit.”8 A 
Zeitgeist of that time and place, as it were, is created that all phenomena of that time 
share. He offers the following poem as illustration: 
 
Es ist so still; die Heide liegt  
Im warmen Mittagssonnenstrahle, 
Ein rosenroter Schimmer fliegt 
Um ihre alten Gräbermale; 
Die Kräuter blühn; der Heideduft 
Steigt in die blaue Sommerluft.             
(1966, 72) 
 
The stillness is the time all have. There is an overarching principle that, when 
changing, confers total change to everything subject to it. The “alten Gräbermale” is 
a trace of this dialectical movement. The next poem Stuckert quotes relates to how 
the presence and absence of wind that marks certain seasons so radically affects the 
particulars of reality: 
 
Am grauen Strand, am grauen Meer 
Und seitab liegt die Stadt; 
Der Nebel drückt die Dächer schwer, 
Und durch die Stille braust das Meer 
Eintönig um die Stadt. 
 
Es rauscht kein Wald, es schlägt im Mai 
Kein Vogel ohne Unterlass; 
Die Wandergans mit hartem Schrei 
Nur fliegt in Herbstesnacht vorbei, 
Am Strande weht das Gras.              
(1966, 74) 
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Stuckert shows in Storm’s vision of seasonal change the dialectical time of the 
German, the sharp contrasts of thesis and antithesis, so different from the gradual 
evolution of Austrian time. 
The Austrian does not depict sharp changes of reality in a quantum change of 
Zeitgeist; rather the entire past contributes to what becomes in the present. Franz 
Brentano, for example, speaks in his reflections on time and history of the 
importance of those who have come before, lending their gains to the present 
inquirer:  
The investigations of conic sections begun in ancient times by 
Archimedes and Apollonius were at first of purely theoretical, 
mathematical interest. Centuries later Kepler made their work applicable 
to astronomy, but again only because of a theoretical interest. Yet as a 
result the investigations became of practical use, inasmuch as the 
progress made in astronomy did a great deal to forward navigation. The 
seaman who avoids a shipwreck by observing with precision the 
geographical latitude and longitude owes the fact that he is alive to 
theories which originated solely from a yearning for knowledge twenty 
centuries earlier.9 
In an essay on his conception of genius, Brentano writes in the same vein: “In 
science, the greatest discoverer is only differentiated from the imitator and 
apprentice by (a non-specific) degree” (Grundzüge der Ästhetik, 92). In short, he 
testifies to the morphology of knowledge over time through the efforts of an 
intergenerational extended family; the development of knowledge is seen as a 
constant problem-solving through reflective appreciation of what has been as one 
goes forward. Sigmund Freud developed a therapy for the mentally ill and the 
slightly neurotic founded upon this appreciation of the duration of the past in the 
present. As an inquirer, Freud followed Brentano’s advice to the letter, albeit one 
that was sustained by the Austrian normative style of inquiry even without 
Brentano’s emphasis upon exhaustive exploration of the single phenomenon to 
unfold its complex origins. 
The root causes of the differences between the German and the Austrian 
historical logic are to be found in the separate histories of the seat of the Holy 
Roman Imperial throne for half a millenium and the German kingdoms, 
principalities, bishoprics, and free cities. There was a cleft between German and 
Austrian political history, before and after the Enlightenment, a cleft that had an 
influence on how citizens of each nation perceived the nature of their historical 
experience. The half-millenium of the Habsburg dynasty gave a paternalistic pattern 
to Austrian political life. The strength of this “family-oriented” norm was in the 
highly interpersonal tone of political life. A dynasty never dies, although one 
measures life within it by the generations that are born and die. It is a constant, yet 
changing form, whose character is fulfilled again and again. A dynasty is a protean 
form, porous in its expression as differing persons manifest it. A morphological 
historical vision includes birth, maturation, and death, yet continuance of the form 
as seeds of the old are reborn as the new. Franz Grillparzer gives evidence of his 
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awareness of the pivotal role of the life and death of the rulers as the standard for 
duration and change in political life in his drama Kaiser Ottokars Glück und Ende. 
Merenberg sends his son Seyfried to the Archbishop of Mainz, an elector of the 
Emperor-to-be, with a letter that will warn the Archbishop of the poor character of 
Ottokar. If the letter does not arrive on time, Merenberg reflects, Germans will be 
under the influence of the wrong man for a lifetime: “One day too late is thirty years 
too early!”10  
The dynastic administration of the people through bureaucracies became known 
in the Enlightenment as cameralism, a governance by chambers designed in their 
separate purviews to embrace the many aspects of the nation’s life. Austrian 
cameralism, especially in the age of Maria Theresa and her son Joseph, gave 
evidence of the goodwill of the parental authorities. As a family, each member was 
perceived as a distinct life with individual interests. The notion of the “the one in the 
many” differentiated Austrian cameralism from the Prussian or Saxon form in this 
respect. Joseph von Sonnenfels, the Austrian cameralist, speaks of the “aggregate 
will” of the diverse population of the Austrian state that is the whole. Even the ruler 
has no more rights than those equated with their stewardship of this “aggregate 
will.”11 The German cameralists, on the other hand, stressed the state as having its 
own reasons in the interest of the people, but not in the sense of being its aggregate 
will. Samuel Pufendorf’s cameralist ideas were the touchstone of this vision of the 
“many in the one.”12 
Louise Sommer points out the most significant difference between the German 
and Austrian cameralists is the former’s penchant for abstract principle governing 
the particular, while the Austrian sees the state and its political/economic life from 
the point of view of the diversity of empirical practice (1920/1967, 6, 12). Austrian 
cameralism at its best was a benign outreach by bureaucratic officials into the daily 
lives of its charges, in a face-to-face encounter that governance at a distance could 
not so equitably match. As conditions changed, Austrian cameralism treated the 
shifting values of agriculture, trade, and manufacture with proactive oversight that 
constantly engaged the populace in intersubjective dealings with government 
officials. Sonnenfels was proud of this interpersonal concern, evidenced by an 
article he wrote in 1784 discussing the proper style of conduct for the Austrian 
bureaucratic official.13 The German cameralism was more distant and directed by 
statute law, more laissez-faire, but thereby more impersonal (Sommer, 1920/67, 
12).14 The dichotomy of the Austrian interpersonal concerns and the German legal-
rights-based concerns was also reflected in criminal law. Sonnenfels used his 
influence to “soften” criminal justice and its punishments. Albion Small writes of 
this “softness” in relation to the written law:  
A favorite idea of his was that in criminal cases the penalty of ascertained 
guilt should be determined by the vote of the majority of judges; the 
question of guilt or innocence however, as well as of the mitigating or 
aggravating circumstances, should be settled only by a unanimous vote. 
In practice this proposition would in most cases simply lead to the release 
of the accused.   (Small, 1909, 484)  
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Reinhard Merkel has pointed out that this “soft” attitude toward a rigorous 
application of civil or criminal law persisted in Austrian society, differentiating it 
from the German.15 Paragraph 48 of the 1803 legal code and paragraph 54 of the 
1852 legal code, called “ausserordentliches Milderungsrecht,” were designed to 
regulate the parameters of exceptional circumstances and the accordingly softened 
penalities (Merkel, 1994, 90). Increasingly, this “mildness” became a self-evident 
norm in Austrian justice. In 1911 a German jurist referred to the “anarchical 
condition of Austrian legal practice” in this regard (Merkel, 1994, 91). 
The profound contributions in interpersonal understanding that arose in the 
forms of practice in Austrian psychiatry, law, drama, literature, and the fine arts in 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century fin-de-siècle culture can be linked to this 
stress on the intersubjective nature of human reality and its ancillary ethic of 
reaching cooperative, empathic, common practices that was the hallmark of the 
Enlightened absolutism of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. The single-minded 
individuality, indeed ruthlessness of Faust had no place in Austrian culture then or 
afterwards.  
The problem of “family-oriented,” empathic, cooperative norms in governance 
lay in the inevitable weakening of a self-directed, assertive political will among the 
members of the society who were not governors. Kant’s recognition that one cannot 
be “given” freedom perhaps stemmed from his observation of the discontent of 
many freed serfs in Joseph II’s Austria, as well as the discomfort of religious 
minorities with the new public schools of Joseph II. The Austrian will to assertive 
independence was “co-opted” one might say by the “soft law.” The self-concept of 
individual Austrians never freed itself from the presence of others for whom one 
must care or whose care one must recognize. The strengths of this interpersonal 
world were in its cultivation of an accurate recognition in the arts and the sciences 
of interdependence and its facilitating forms of empathy. From the Enlightenment 
Momus of Gottfried Prehauser through Kafka’s Momus in The Castle, the barbed 
humor penetrating private aims and a too self-absorbed project will bring the 
Austrian individual back to the gravity of an interdependent world. The weakness of 
this embeddedness among others was in a discomfort with the final responsibility 
and aloneness of selfhood that bred for the German the Faustian paradigm. The 
Austrian political horizon will never leave its past behind to start fresh, no more 
than the prodigal son could ever fully distance himself from his parents. The 
Austrian selection of a morphological logic as the dominant form of national 
historical norm contributes both to the collective (i.e., interdependent) and 
conservative quality of its historical thought. In a morphological logic, all facts 
contribute to the form, each individual action plays its role in the mutually shared 
form to which all contribute. While a morphological thinker need not be a political 
conservative, there is a “conserving” aspect to all morphological thinkers in that 
historical forms never completely disappear, and for the most part are always in a 
phase of becoming.  
The Germanies, on the other hand, had norms for historical life that for each 
individual stimulated more public assertion. The ceaseless competition that existed 
among the Princes in the hundreds of principalities, a competition that was dynastic 
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and religious, set a conflict-oriented model of public life. Moreover, the patriciate of 
the towns had been in conflict with the princes since the late Middle Ages. The 
suburban artisans and peasants represented milieus that gravitated between alliances 
or conflict with the urban patriciate and the lower aristocratic landowners of the 
surrounding country. Every social class knew that only self-assertion could protect 
its rights. Thus arose an active citizenship in the Germanies, even against the 
aristocracy’s attempts to frustrate the sharing of public power. The individual as an 
isolate will who found community only through common principle made law more 
salient than in the patrimonial state of Austria. In the years between 1200 and 1500 
when citizen rights flourished in the German cities, the constant, often conflicting 
claims of autonomy, rights, and responsibilities between the city and the aristocratic 
ruler became normative. In that same time, citizen rights ended in Austria. The 
burghers of the Austrian cities from the rule of Emperors Rudolf I through 
Maximilian gradually lost all the medieval privileges they had gained under the 
Hohenstaufens.16 Justice was increasingly a product of the Emperor’s goodwill, 
rather than as became the Germanic bourgeois norm, justice wrought by the fair 
application of an impersonal law.   
While the period between 1500 and the Enlightenment in Austria brought 
increasing control of every facet of public life by the Habsburg Emperors, in the 
Germanies Calvin’s vision of “natural law,” which bound ruler and ruled by 
contractual clarity, grew in its influence. Frederick William, the Great Elector of 
Brandenburg-Prussia, became a Calvinist, and his attention to the highly 
differentiated rights and responsibilities that already existed in the Hohenzollern 
domains was underscored by the Calvinist emphasis upon natural law.17 The 
educated commoners of Brandenburg-Prussia and the other Germanies gravitated 
toward a natural-rights-conception of membership in the state that even more 
radically conceived the distribution of political authority than had Frederick 
William’s circumspect understanding of the rights and responsibilities of ruler to 
ruled. Johannes Althusius articulated a natural rights individualism that enhanced 
the already existent norms where each social group asserted its traditional autonomy 
and rights.18 Kant’s fourth thesis in his essay on an Idea for Universal History 
restated this natural law emphasis for the bourgeois classes in its stress on 
individuality and law: “the means employed by Nature to bring about the 
development of all the capacities of men is their antagonism in society, so far as this 
is, in the end, the cause of a lawful order among man.”19 Individuals kept their own 
counsel, and acted as a rule with great self-direction. Ideas were more of a helpmate 
than other people. Ideas gave justification for going it alone, publicly and privately. 
Principles were the best company. Where Germans formed associations so that 
common, collective action could be made, these associatons were organized in their 
means and ends with clear role and scope so that an individual knew his or her place 
within them and could differentiate this engagement from the other aspects of their 
private and public commitments.20  
The weakness of the German norms lay in the very strengths of their individual 
self-direction that was justified by idea, for this self-direction led to an overweening 
individualism taken to extremes of imbalance. One might compare Kleist’s Michael 
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Kohlhaas or Goethe’s Faust to Austrian heros such as the civil servant in 
Grillparzer’s Ein treuer Diener seiner Herrn or Kafka’s counter-example to the 
Kleisteian or Faustian heroes in his Karl Rossman of Amerika or K. of Das Schloss, 
all individuals who learn difficult but necessary lessons of interdependence. A 
healthy democratic society requires cooperative models as well as individualistic 
models. Individualistic self-assertion is reinforced for the Germans by a historicism 
whose expression sharpens individual encounter, contrast, and contradiction.  
Nietzsche is unable to grasp the multiplicity of other lives in their separate 
integrities because of this German convention of integrating multiplicity into a 
common, transcendent medium. When he connotes the nature of experience with 
Austrian wisdom, as he does in his respect for Franz Grillparzer and Adalbert 
Stifter, he inevitably distorts the Austrian comprehension of multiple integrities. For 
example, in his On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life he quotes 
Grillparzer on the multiple causes in any historical experience: 
Grillparzer goes so far as to say: “what else is history, after all, than the 
way in which the spirit of man apprehends what for him are impenetrable 
events; unites elements of which God only knows whether they belong 
together; replaces the unintelligible with something intelligible; 
introduces its concepts of externally oriented purpose into a whole which 
surely admits only purposes with an inner orientation; and again assumes 
chance where a thousand little causes were at work. Every person at the 
same time has his individual necessity so that millions run in directions 
parallel to each other in crooked and straight lines, cross, support and 
restrict each other, strive forward and backward and in this assume the 
character of chance for each other, and so, leaving out of account the 
influences of natural events, make it impossible to demonstrate a 
penetrating all-inclusive necessity of events.21 
Nietzsche uses this observation to point to the lazy generalizations of most 
historians in determining propositions about events. However, his own solution also 
departs from Grillparzer’s multiplicity; Nietzsche sums up his deliberations by 
saying: “to describe with insight a known, perhaps common theme, an everyday 
melody, to elevate it, raise to a comprehensive symbol and so let a whole world of 
depth of meaning, power and beauty be guessed in it” (36). Thus, again the lifting of 
differing causes, differing integrities, into one common, transcendental medium. 
Nietzsche’s reading of Adalbert Stifter is similarly warped to a German historical-
logical viewpoint. Adalbert Schmidt asserts that, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
Nietzsche’s conception of “The Stillest Hour” is derived from Stifter. Nietzsche 
states: “Die stillsten Worte sind es, welche den Sturm bringen. Gedanken, die mit 
Taubenfüßen kommen, lenken die Welt” (“It is the stillest words that bring on the 
storm. Thoughts that come on doves’ feet guide the world”).22 Stifter, of course, 
does not see any one event, especially a dramatic one, as the most significant 
moment of human episodes. He is the last to wish to bring on a storm with a still 
word. He writes on his “soft law” in Bunte Steine: 
The force which causes the milk in the poor woman’s crock to rise up 
and overflow is like that which drives forth the lava from the volcano, 
and leaves it on the surface of the mountain to flow down. Only the latter 
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appearance is more obvious, compelling the glance of the uninformed 
and the inattentive [...] And as it is in outer nature, so it is in the inner of 
humankind. An entire life full of justice, simplicity, self-control, 
understanding, effectiveness in one’s circle, admiration of the beautiful, 
united with a calm, resigned dying, I hold as great: powerful movements 
of dispositions, frightful manifestations of anger, the desire for revenge, 
the inflamed spirit that strives for activity, and in its excitement, compels, 
disturbs, and even throws away its own life, I hold not as great, rather as 
less significant, since these things are only manifestations of the single 
and one-sided forces as the occurrence of storms, fire-spilling mountains, 
and earthquakes.23 
Stifter’s “soft law” is the unity realized by the interrelation of all small 
interconnected cause-effect moments. The “law” is that complex, interconnected 
form. Stifter does not speak of the most salient principle or the one cause, but 
always the sequence of small moments that develop the whole. Thus, he as an 
Austrian eschews any transcending (or reduction) of differing individual moments to 
a univocal and abstract leaven. The irony is that the Austrian was and, I contend, 
still is caught in the web of morphological form, thus the personalism and 
interpersonalism has an inherent univocality, nonetheless. Stifter, in his essay-report 
of the solar eclipse on July 8, 1842 surprises the twentieth century reader by 
predicting a kind of painting where color escapes from the forms of material content 
– a prediction of abstract expressionism, as well as a prediction of atonal music free 
of traditional structure. Actually this is not formulated as prediction, but rather a 
yearning to escape morphological form. The eclipse is tracked through its several 
phases until it is complete. In the heart of darkness of the two minutes when the 
solar orb is completely eclipsed, the flames of the sun’s penumbra shoot colors 
outward and a silence becomes the background of the slight sounds of animal and 
human restlessness. Stifter writes: 
Couldn’t one invent a music for the eye by the simultaneity and 
succession of light and color as well as a tonality for the ear? Until now 
light and color have not been independently applied, rather fixed in 
designs; for fireworks, transparencies, and illuminations are only the raw 
beginnings of a light music [...] Wouldn’t a whole composed only of light 
accords and melodies, and similarly (aural) tones engender power and 
shock? In any case, I can’t name one symphony, oratorio or anything in 
that vein that is so exalted as the two minutes of light and color in the 
heavens […]   (Stifters Werke, 2: 950-51) 
Stifter asks not only for a release from form, but also for the excitement of the 
monumental moment – for shock. The German way may be the Austrian antidote if 
Austria’s intersubjective strengths can be preserved and reformulated to include a 
more individualistic public practice. Franz Brentano, Sigmund Freud, Ernst Mach, 
Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl, Anton Marty, Franz Kafka, Ludwig von 
Wittgenstein, John von Neumann, and other Austrians of the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries gave their culture and ours the tools to deconstruct form and 
liberate being human for new constellations of intersubjectivity. Austria today has a 
rich heritage for liberating itself from its still morphological historical logic. 
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I. Introduction
In a recent review in The New Yorker, John Updike writes of “the scarcely scalable 
volcanic cones which time and lessening literacy have made of Joyce, Musil, Mann, 
and even Kafka.”1 It is true that Musil has been dealt with harshly during the past 
few decades. Interest in Robert Musil seems to have peaked in the nineteen-
seventies, and in this sense, the following essay arrives some decades too late. 
Musil, I will argue, is a philosopher’s novelist, and perhaps that explains his 
vast readership. In this essay, I will pay special attention to the extremely important 
role that mathematics, mathematical objects, and mathematizing have in Musil’s 
major works of prose. One of the most important writers of fiction after the 
Enlightenment, Robert Musil is almost unique in having extolled mathematics, 
precision, and the methods and conclusions of the natural sciences as a cure for the 
intellectual and especially emotional ills of the contemporary soul. Others in Musil’s 
milieu, notably Karl Kraus, advocated precision in language as a moral matter. 
Kraus, however, exemplified this perfect language without describing it, as did 
Musil. Nevertheless, in Musil’s novels and essays, philosophers get more than they 
want. Most philosophers view novels as a form of entertainment, or perhaps at best 
as exalted high art, but certainly not as a proper mode of philosophizing. But for 
Musil, novels were the ideal form of philosophizing.2 And despite the association of 
his name with scientific philosophy and the Vienna Circle, Musil’s account of 
mathematical objects is nothing like the positivistic one; in fact, one can categorize 
him as anti-empiricist in several important ways.  
Robert Musil, the legendary Austrian writer of fiction and several essays, was 
born in 1880 and died in exile in Switzerland in 1942. He is best known for the 
novelette The Confusions of the Fledgling Törless, and the very long novel The Man 
without Qualities, which, because of its length and unfinished state at the time of the 
author’s death, it is something of a German Remembrance of Things Past. Törless 
had a second life as one of the first films of Volker Schlöndorff (Der junge Törless, 
1964) and thus as a progenitor of the German New Wave Cinema. In addition to the 
writers of fiction Updike cites, Musil is also often associated with fellow Austrian 
Broch and the Germans Döblin and Hesse; nevertheless, the comparison of Musil to 
Writing the Austrian Traditions: Relations between Philosophy and Literature. 
Ed. Wolfgang Huemer and Marc-Oliver Schuster.  Edmonton, Alberta:  
Wirth-Institute for Austrian and Central European Studies, 2003.  pp. 143-159. 
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any of these writers remains a contentious issue. Unlike other novelists, such as 
Thomas Mann, Musil was not known outside the German speaking world, even to 
literary professionals, until well after his death.3 In 1990, with the publication of the 
fine and aptly titled Precision and Soul, Musil the essayist gained some recognition 
in the English-speaking world, long after general interest in Musil had peaked. His 
reputation as an essayist in the German- and English-speaking worlds has lagged far 
behind those of Karl Kraus or Walter Benjamin, to name an incongruous pair. 
Musil was born in Klagenfurt, Carinthia; the male members of his family 
pursued military, medical, and, especially, engineering professions.4 His father was 
a professor of engineering in Brno – the family was originally Czech, as the name 
suggests – and Musil himself was sent to military schools in his Gymnasium years. 
He subsequently studied engineering. Breaking with family tradition and wishes, he 
departed for Berlin, where he studied philosophy and psychology at the university 
and completed a doctoral dissertation on epistemology and Mach in 1908.5 Before 
World War I, he had already ventured into writing fiction and edited Die neue 
Rundschau in Berlin. After the war, he remained in Vienna mostly and published the 
first volume of The Man without Qualities in 1930 to some acclaim, especially in 
Germany. He maintained a serious interest in science and scientific philosophy, and 
he was a member of a salon circle associated with Richard von Mises in Berlin; he 
had some contact with the Vienna Circle, mainly Neurath, and by association, with 
Wittgenstein. Although he suffered to some extent from agoraphobia, Musil 
frequented the famous coffee houses and was especially well acquainted with the 
dramatist Hofmannsthal. The young Wittgenstein lived, for a briefly overlapping 
period in the early nineteen-twenties, in the same building as Musil, on 
Rasumofskygasse in Vienna’s Third District, but in a different section of the 
building with a different staircase.6 There is no record of any personal interaction, 
but it is likely that they passed each other on the street, and Musil must surely have 
noticed the construction in 1926-1928 of what we know as the outrageously 
conspicuous Wittgenstein Haus only a block away. In any case, Musil had by 1933, 
if not earlier, become aware of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.7 
Incongruous as it might seem, philosophers with any taste at all for fiction 
could be tempted to view Musil as the literary face of the Vienna Circle. One might 
correctly surmise that Musil was a knowledgable and sympathetic proponent of a 
largely Viennese type of “scientific philosophy.” The rubric “scientific philosophy” 
can, in my view, be extended to include Mach, early Wittgenstein, the Vienna 
Circle, and even the symbolic, mathematics-style logic of Frege and his heirs.8 
Musil’s 1908 dissertation on Mach gives weight to this suggestion. The opening 
sentences of the dissertation express the view that philosophy cannot possibly 
address crucial questions without attending to theories in science, especially basic 
notions of mathematical physics, and without considering the impact of 
methodological and epistemological issues of the sort Mach had pioneered. He also 
believed that science would have to take into account “philosophical” topics – even 
if the origins of these topics ultimately derive from the work of scientists thinking 
about science. And, at least in the early part of the century, the professional lives of 
Einstein and Bohr (and perhaps Dirac as well) are a vindication of Musil’s thesis 
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that philosophy must impact physics. What we call Anglo-American or “analytic” 
philosophy, brought to England and North America by German-speaking refugees 
and also surviving to some extent in Austria and Germany), confirms his thesis that 
the exact sciences can profitably impact philosophy. 
For a novelist and essayist to have expressed these views in 1908 strikes the 
contemporary philosophical mind as intriguing to say the least. One expects to find 
disciplined, scientifically-educated “philosophical” novels that avoid the usual 
paeans to love, feeling, and a-rational ethical and political conflict. A novel for 
Quine, so to speak. Even if fiction must ultimately be about non-existent entities (at 
least Musil did not write poetry, surely a sign of good analytic-philosophical taste), 
one still has reason to hope that Musil’s essays contain a wise, succinct exposition 
and defense of scientific philosophy, maybe even an original philosophical theory. 
One imagines a German-speaking Bertrand Russell, much more disciplined of 
course, and without such a feirce need for funds and popular influence. 
It is certainly true that Musil did not adapt his style and subject matter to appeal 
to popular taste. But this virtue led to grinding poverty and personal tragedy, 
especially during his years of exile in Switzerland. He ended in the hopeless 
professional situation of having his writings banned for ninety percent of its 
potential readers, but without the international cachet of a name such as Mann or 
Broch. Writing in German for an educated audience, but one which at the time was 
scattered and reduced in numbers, affected writers of the German-speaking diaspora 
differently, but few were hit harder than Musil and Zweig.9 
Musil has nevertheless deeply failed to accommodate the myth that has been 
erected around him, for several reasons. First, he is philosophically elusive. His 
fictional characters do not go about declaiming his or any precise philosophical 
views – they are too “real” for that,10 and his irony ubiquitous; similarly, his essays 
are extremely digressive and lack all hint of systematic philosophical exposition or 
argumentation.11 In style at least, he remains firmly a man of letters – without 
degenerating into the mere Feuilleton writer as criticized by Kraus. A craftsman-like 
art alone guides his fiction and essays, not organized truths and arguments. Second, 
he does not disparage or outcast as nonsensical the aesthetic, ethical, religious, and 
especially emotional components of human life as the Logical Positivists so 
famously proposed doing. In this respect he is closer to the Wittgenstein of the 
Tractatus. But perhaps quite unlike Wittgenstein, Musil proposed analyzing feelings 
and desires12 in a liberal way, with recourse to science and literature, even in the 
analysis of a mass murderer’s motives. Musil was more philosophical psychologist 
than mystical philosopher. Third, the methods and “mystical” objects of 
mathematics function in a very important, partly allegorical way in his writing. 
Mathematics serves for Musil a perfect model of human thought, with no suggestion 
of tautology or the lack of substance associated with positivistic, analytic, or 
formalist accounts of mathematics and its objects. Understanding mathematical 
reasoning and its objects is critical to understanding Musil, since mathematical 
issues lead us most directly to what we can regard as his philosophical theory.  
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II.   Musil as Man of Letters  
With regard to the predominantly “literary” character of Musil, it has often been said 
that Ulrich, the mathematician-hero of The Man without Qualities, is Musil’s 
mouthpiece. I am extremely wary of this assumption. Although Ulrich’s utterances 
do overlap considerably with Musil’s own views, Ulrich is to some extent 
intentionally portrayed as a naif. It is uncertain where Musil ends and Ulrich begins: 
what represents the admirable efforts of a scrupulous and detached mathematician 
and what represents bumbling or merely emotionally detached behavior. While 
Musil clearly considered a mathematical type of approach a valuable instrument in 
our understanding of the whole phenomenal world, I am sure he did not see this as 
an easy and straightforward procedure and wanted to stress the difficulties. Not all 
applications of “mathematics” – perhaps not even many – are plausible, and some 
are purely comical. The comic, the ironic, and the serious and philosophical are 
rarely seen in pure and isolated form in Musil: his is an art designed to obstruct and 
sabotage stupid critics. The teenage Törless is of course a still more unlikely and at 
best partial spokesman for Musil himself.13 
With Musil’s essays, too, we are frustrated in our search for a “philosophy,” 
although for different reasons. There is no question of who is speaking in his essays; 
there are no distinct voices and less irony. Indeed, we find titles that are more than 
faintly philosophical: “The Religious Spirit, Modernism, and Metaphysics,” “The 
Mathematical Man,” “Commentary on Metapsychics,” and “Mind and Experience” 
as translated in Precision and Soul as well as essays such as “Analysis and 
Synthesis,” “Form and Content,” and various essays suggestive of aesthetic and 
ethical themes in the collection of Essays und Reden (Gesammelte Schriften 8). In 
“The Religious Spirit, Modernism, and Metaphysics,” we encounter instead of 
philosophical theorizing a kind of perceptive philosophical joke that sounds faintly 
like Woody Allen14: 
But however one goes about it, as soon as one goes beyond the 
boundaries science has drawn for itself, not much knowledge will be 
achieved; and all metaphysical systems are bad because they apply their 
reason in the wrong way […]: proving the reality of the hereafter instead 
of (for a more demanding taste) first trying to make such a thing 
“possible.” In this fashion the various metaphysics build bridges, but to a 
tiresome place. In Kantian terms: all metaphysics are transcendental, and 
the transcendent remains pure boredom.               
(Precision and Soul, p. 24; modified translation by RRD) 
To an extent, Musil predates the Vienna Circle’s attempt to do “without” 
metaphysics, but with a wisecrack. The essay “The Mathematical Man” is somewhat 
less mocking as we will see shortly. 
III.   Scientifically Analyzing Emotions through Literature 
Musil is perhaps best seen as a neo-Enlightenment figure, who viewed rationality, 
especially as guided by mathematics and the natural sciences, as salvation from the 
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worst ills that had befallen humanity. Almost to a unique extent since Goethe, the 
literary man Musil stands alone in this praise of rationality and also in his 
knowledge and embrace of contemporary scientific thinking. Few of his 
commentators and admirers in the twentieth century, and especially in the last 
decades, have shown clear signs of sharing this vision and Musil’s own appreciation 
and knowledge of the exact sciences – especially mathematics.15 Appreciation of 
him has focused instead on his style (especially his irony and distance); on his place 
in European, Viennese, and German-speaking cultural history; and on his effort to 
give rich psychological portrayals of his characters. However, his very idea of 
psychology and how to practise it, and indeed of the makeup of what he persisted in 
calling the soul (Seele), far outstrip most conventional conceptions of psychology, 
which are still overshadowed in the contemporary literary world by the figure of 
Freud. Musil is not to be read as one would read Kafka or Schnitzler; for one thing, 
he contemptuously rejected psychoanalysis. 
Musil’s overall attitude to this investigation is nicely summarized in the 
quotation that inspired Pike’s and Luft’s volume of translations, Precision and Soul: 
We do not have too much intellect and too little soul, but too little 
precision in matters of the soul. 
This remark is strikingly out of step with the prevailing view, in both the world at 
large and in the arts and humanities, that modern life has displaced feeling, intuition, 
and depth with cold calculation and thereby impoverished life, or even that the 
exclusive cultivation of rationality naturally results in a Fascist monster. This is 
based upon a fashionable opposition of rationality on the one hand and our 
emotional and conative lives on the other. The twofold nature of humankind was 
already a theme in Romantic thought, but Freud’s dramatization of the 
“irrationality” of our deepest impulses – whatever we may ultimately think of the 
merit of his theories – has pushed these ideas still deeper into our collective 
consciousness. A Musilian vision that avoids this false – deeply and perniciously 
false – opposition is contrarian and of vital importance. 
We might first contemplate the “standard” model of human life and action in 
contemporary analytic philosophy. It holds that our actions and world-view spring 
from two sources: our beliefs on the one hand, and our desires and emotions on the 
other. Belief formation and revision, as cognitive science calls it, are held to have 
their ideal in rational mechanisms that are describable by various forms of rules in 
logic. However, our desires and emotions arise from who-knows-where, as a kind of 
arbitrary given: arising from instinct and bodily compulsion, perhaps, acculturation, 
whim, and so on.  
According to my reading of Musil’s model of human life, mental life has 
desires and emotions that are almost entirely intentional, triggered by beliefs from 
the realm of reason, and directed toward cognitive objects that are shared with our 
beliefs.16 Furthermore there is a normativity, various dimensions of what I call an 
orthotic quality (a “correctness”), that is as active in our emotional life as it is for 
beliefs. For one thing we can have, or lack, clarity in our emotional objects no less 
than in the object of our beliefs; likewise, a case can be made that some emotions 
are appropriate or well-founded in much the same way that beliefs are justified. 
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These two claims17 “rationalize” desire and emotion. Second, as contemporary 
philosophers of science since Kuhn and Feyerabend have controversially sought to 
demonstrate, what count as good, even wise, scientific beliefs and inferences may 
have a-rational components that defy strict or complete algorithms. I would add that 
beliefs, precisely like desires and emotions, invariably involve feelings that vary 
widely in both quality and intensity. Even to pursue a life in science, one needs a 
motivation – an attraction, fascination, or passion about the science’s objects. 
Together, these maneuvers have the effect of giving emotion and desire some form 
of “logic,” and of injecting feeling and a complex evaluative procedure into belief 
(and related doxastic states such as hope and myth). 
Musil believed in the kinship and intertwined complexity of beliefs, logic, 
sensations, desires, and emotions as atomic feelings; the characters in his fiction are 
a working out of these theories and a “combinatorial” portrayal of how we should 
see human beings. My primary evidence is a remarkable document, “Profile of a 
Program,” originally dating from 1912 (it exists in two versions and was heavily 
annotated, perhaps at much later dates). It begins with these remarks: 
The Soul is a complex interpenetration of feeling and intellect18 […] The 
element of growth in this pairing lies in the intellect. To talk about depth, 
[…] greatness, or charm of feeling is misleading; notice from what 
primitive relationships these metaphors are still borrowed. It is intellect 
that brings these quarter-tone gradations upwards into feeling.             
(pp. 10-11; modified translation by RRD)  
I interpret these remarks as follows. First, our conceptualizations of feelings and 
their differentiable texture are entirely derived from their relationships as understood 
through the intellect. We do not have simple names or simple thoughts for simple 
feelings. In contemporary and infinitely misleading parlance, the life of our feelings 
is “constructed.” If we admit sensations as a type of feeling in this wide sense, we 
have the beginnings of a view that is not likely to agree with the fundamental sense-
data and protocol sentences of later logical positivism. Second, I would also like to 
see this as inching toward the “Austrian” view of the intentionality of all mental life: 
even or especially our emotions and desires are directed toward complex thought-
objects.19  
For the purpose of tying together my second and third themes, the literary 
analysis of feelings together with mathematics as model, I quote a later passage 
from Musil’s “Profile of a Program”: 
Mathematical daring, dissolving souls into their elements and unlimited 
permutation of these elements; here everything is related to everything 
else and can be built up from these elements. But this construction 
demonstrates not “this is what it is made of,” but “this is how its pieces 
fit together.   (p. 13) 
Here we see a cautious “phenomenalist” atomism, and in his fiction we see the 
combinatorics of this theory in action. Musil’s case for the application of exactness 
(Exaktheit) – methodical care and precision in matters of the soul – reaches its 
climax in Part I, Chapter 61 of The Man without Qualities, namely in Ulrich’s idea 
of the “Utopia of Exactness.” But even here, the exaggerated rhetoric (“utopia”) 
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sounds a note of irony and distances Musil himself from what may be the flawed 
excesses of Ulrich’s particular application of the method.  
IV.   The Fledgling Törless and Mathematics  
The Confusions of the Fledgling Törless is a coming-of-age novel, set in a stifling 
military school. It is the story of Törless initially taking part in, then rejecting, the 
exceptionally cruel torture of a weaker fellow student, Basini. One might say it is 
part Hesse, but also part Kafka: there are dark, mysterious forces at work. It is a 
haunting story of youth, complicity, brutal physical-sexual male dominance, and 
hapless adult educators. Its dominant theme is moral-emotional confusion that 
parallels Törless’s conceptual confusion about, of all things, i: the square root of –1.  
Although a very early work (from 1906, when Musil was 26), Törless is both 
precursor and miniature of the massive Man without Qualities. Törless himself is 
variously described as both over-sensitive and over-thoughtful. He is even described 
as “without character,” as someone whose personality and views were products of 
his friends’ influence and whatever he happened to be reading. As an only child, he 
suffers greatly at the initial separation from his parents in experiencing Sehnsucht. 
Musil describes Törless’s feelings, poorly understood by his teachers, at length and 
with great precision. Törless is described as having a hole in his emotional 
personality. His “confusions” accumulate and intensify with respect to his 
relationships with his friends Beineberg and Reiting, with the victim Basini, as well 
as his own swirling sensations and feelings, and his awareness of the vaguest of 
sexual feelings. Precisely in the middle of the chronology of these confusions, and 
also intellectually mirroring them, is his confrontation with imaginary numbers. 
Törless expresses the difficulty this way: “Every number, whether positive or 
negative, when squared yields a positive number. Thus there cannot be any actual 
number that is the square root of something negative” (p. 70). Beineberg is patient 
but does not share Törless’s quandary. Lacking Törless’s “oversensitivity,” 
Beineberg is completely untroubled; for him, that is just the way it is done. 
Beineberg says that there are, of course, no such actual numbers, and that is why 
they are called “imaginary.” It is as if we set the table for a deceased person, 
knowing he will not actually arrive and eat. We just pretend – for whatever reasons 
– that there are such numbers. This has its own use and if one did not accede to this 
idealistic, virtual element, then there could not be mathematics! Törless gradually 
concedes the metaphysically unresolvable problem about imaginary numbers. But 
now a deeper mystery arises for him. How do most people come to accept this with 
so little trouble? Where does the power come from to hold on to such a figment of 
one’s imagination so that one ends up right? How can people set aside the scruples 
of reason, the usual standards of reason that applied mathematics enshrines, with 
only the consolation that it “will work out” (p. 71)? This becomes a meditation on 
the inapplicability of the dully real and the usefulness of the merely imaginary.20 
With trepidation, Törless makes an appointment with their young and 
accomplished mathematics teacher. The talented teacher is, however, far more 
impatient than Beineberg and is made nervous by Törless’s difficulties. He describes 
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the reality that these imaginary numbers have as a “necessity of reason” 
(Denknotwendigkeit), but he is unwilling to demonstrate this necessity, instead 
saying that it is beyond Törless’s present ability to understand. In order to explain 
the problem, the teacher would have to spell out, in a strict (streng) and 
intellectually-disciplined (wissenschaftlich) way all the involved assumptions 
(Voraussetzungen). And to understand these, Törless would need to understand ten 
times more than he presently understands about mathematics. Furthermore, the 
instructor does not have the time to begin this enterprise and advises Törless that, 
for the moment, he must simply have “faith” (Glauben). 
Törless sits silently and is unwilling to leave, awaiting further explanation. As a 
last resort, the instructor grabs a book of Kant’s on ethics and says that the problem 
is clearly explained in the book. When you try to reach the basis for understanding 
ethics, the teacher says, you encounter the “necessities of thinking.” Mathematics is 
likewise, and that is the proof of imaginary numbers! Törless is still not satisfied, 
grabs the book on Kant’s ethics, and starts to look through it. The instructor retreats, 
interjecting that the volume of Kant was not itself the required proof but only an 
example of the kind of proof that was needed. Törless subsequently buys this book 
and others that he has seen in the mathematician’s room. He tries to read them, but 
he cannot make sense of them and recalls the copies of Kant in his father’s office, 
which, like some relics in the Holy of Holies, were admired but only on special 
occasions actually touched. “One esteems [such books] only because one is glad 
that, thanks to their existence, one doesn’t actually have to worry any more about 
such things” (p. 75). Beineberg’s justification is pragmatic, the mathematician’s 
justification is both transcendental and, as a last resort, an appeal to authority. Musil 
scorns them all. 
A casual reading of the story of Törless might suggest that Musil is drawing a 
parallel between the metaphysical status of objects of mathematics and those of 
theology, and advocating a similar attitude of faith in both. Mathematics might then 
cast an indirectly positive light on religion – or religion a suspicious light on 
mathematics. Musil denies this affinity, however (although he tempts us with its 
presentation). It is Beineberg, not Törless, who first recognizes the parallel between 
religion and the mathematician’s account of the proper attitude toward imaginary 
numbers. Törless is earlier described as having a near total contempt for religion and 
traditional piety.21 In the academy’s inquisition concerning Basini’s torture that 
closes the book, Törless declares that the only thing similar to his confused attitude 
toward Basini and his complicity in the torture of the latter, is his attitude to the 
imaginary numbers. He is naturally asked to explain this strange connection. He 
explains by appealing to his thoughts about what is awe-inspiring and unimaginable 
(“Ungeheuerliches […] nicht Vorstellbares,” p. 130f), and the need to grapple with 
issues for which our thought is inadequate, and which require quite another, inner 
certainty than is provided by thinking (p. 131). The academy’s faculty-jury, 
prompted by the priest-theologian’s understanding of this language, provides an 
escape route for Törless, namely that he was motivated in the Basini affair by a 
misguided religiosity. Törless emphatically denies this. 
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V.   The Mathematical Man (Der mathematische Mensch, 1913) 
One widely quoted remark of Musil’s is that after reading overwrought 
contemporary German literature, one should solve some problems in integral 
calculus in order to regain one’s balance. Musil has had the misfortune, probably 
more now than in his own time, of having few readers and critics who are 
mathematically educated and share his mathematical sympathies. My survey of the 
secondary literature reveals that, remarkably, several major works do not mention 
the topic of mathematics, most at best closely paraphrase Musil’s remarks, and some 
feel the need to explain in footnotes what would have been obvious to the reader 
whom Musil had in mind.22 Musil has by and large received the attention only of 
students of German and comparative literature.23 
“The Mathematical Man” is a remarkable popular essay. Even its title is 
remarkable. Although Hermann Broch concerned himself extensively with 
philosophical topics in his last years,24 his “mathematical man,” the mathematician 
of his essay “Methodisch konstruiert” (published first in 1917 and reprinted as the 
second in his collection of stories, The Guiltless: Novel in 11 Short Stories)25 is a 
pathetic figure by comparison. While Musil’s essay is indeed penetrating, it is also 
subtle and elusive; it characteristically avoids giving the curious reader the desired 
glib portrayal of mathematics. 
Musil mainly sees mathematics as a “triumph of intellectual organization” that 
allows one to perform operations quickly and correctly that would otherwise be 
error-prone and take days (this seems to be a twist on Mach’s theme of the 
“economy of research”). Musil bristles at the suggestion that some of the branches 
of pure mathematics have as yet no application and are therefore worthless: he sees 
mathematics as an enormous savings account that we have wisely stored in the bank. 
Mathematics is “incomparable. For our entire civilization has arisen with its 
assistance; we know no other way; the needs it serves are completely satisfied by it, 
and its aimless abundance is of the uncriticizable kind of irreducible facts” (Pike and 
Luft, pp. 40-41). According to Musil, most of us, even engineers and physicists, 
know little about mathematics nor do we appreciate it. For the professional 
mathematician, however, it has many rooms and its “windows do not open to the 
outside, but into adjoining rooms.” For the professional mathematician it is a matter 
of a “total surrender and a passionate devotion.” Mathematics was brought to “the 
most beautiful state of existence,” but the mathematicians themselves discovered 
that it was without foundations, and that this foundationlessness could not be 
corrected (Musil possibly has in mind the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries 
and especially the difficulties in giving calculus a basis through analysis and 
eventually set theory, or Russell’s Paradox; his views echo Törless’s misgivings and 
anticipate the final coup de grâce in Gödel’s theorems). “But the machines work! 
[…] The mathematician endures this intellectual scandal in exemplary fashion, that 
is, with confidence and pride in the devilish riskiness of his intellect.” 
What appears to have been the rejection of Beineberg’s casual mathematical 
pragmatism in Törless has here become a modest endorsement: “the machines 
work.” Despite this later view, I do not think that Musil is suggesting that their 
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“working” alone justifies belief. Rather, as the context makes clear, their successful 
application should make us hesitate before impulsively sweeping imaginary 
numbers aside despite their foundationlessness. After the Second World War, the 
engineer in Musil realizes that this same mathematics that he admired plotted the 
trajectories of poison-gas shells. But as Phillip Payne notes about the relevant Part I 
Chapter 11 of Man without Qualities, “neither mathematician nor non-
mathematician escapes unscathed […]. There, with even handed criticism, the 
narrator leaves the matter” (p. 151). The “humanist” criticism of mathematics and 
engineering as a typically amoral or even immorally detached form of thought 
steadily rose between the world wars and then especially after mathematics’ crucial 
involvement in the development of nuclear weapons. However, one might as well 
denounce writing and journalism – or pens and loudspeakers – for their misuse, an 
argument toward which Plato points perhaps. Musil probably could not have 
grasped such a point at all nor understood the appropriateness of Payne’s remark 
about “even-handedness.” Only exceptionally weak and mathematically ill-informed 
minds could regard mathematics and mathematical thinking – clear thinking itself – 
as harmful. 
What follows is, in my view, the most important and beautiful passage in 
Musil’s essays. It is nothing less than the appropriate antidote to the twentieth 
century’s often anti-intellectual “humanism”: 
After the Enlightenment the rest of us lost our courage. A minor failure 
was enough to turn us away from reason, and we allow every barren 
enthusiast to inveigh against the intentions of a d’Alembert or a Diderot 
as mere rationalism. We screech in favor of feeling over intellect and 
forget that – apart from exceptional cases – feeling is by itself utterly 
incomprehensible. In this way we have ruined our imaginative literature 
to such an extent that, whenever one reads two German novels in a row, 
one must solve an integral equation to balance out one’s diet […] [The 
way of mathematicians] is a parable for the intellectual of the future.     
(p. 42; modified translation by RRD) 
VI.   Musil and Contemporary Philosophy 
To an extent, I believe I have tried to do what I earlier suggested was impossible: to 
extract from Musil’s fiction and non-fiction a “philosophy,” particularly a 
philosophy of mathematics that serves as a template for the rest of philosophical 
theorizing. Perhaps the best method of continuing this difficult task is the via 
negativa, discussing what Musil does not endorse, despite the rumors and false 
associations to the contrary. He is clearly neither a Machian positivist nor a full-
fledged logical positivist. His dissertation on Mach is already more critical of an 
epistemology based purely on sense-experience than one would expect. He does not 
see sense-experience as a priviliged feeling, as a type of human experience on which 
all other constructs are to be based. Likewise, he does not see the laboratories for the 
natural sciences as solely those places in which we record and organize sense 
experiences alone: the literary realm can also distinctively contribute to our 
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knowledge of humanity and the world by being a laboratory for all forms of human 
experience. This train of thought puts him at a point surprisingly distant from 
twentieth-century positivists. He leaves their sense-observation laboratories and 
roams the streets and minds of the cities. He observes souls, not the skin of bodies. 
The literary and the aesthetic, rather than being an often distracting nonsense-buzz, 
become instead necessary laboratory instruments for serious observation. Musil’s 
motivation is “scientific” but by putting art at its center, his conclusion is almost an 
inversion of the verificationist theory of meaning. 
Musil is also not a strident foundationalist. While he extols the now typical 
model of analysis of human experience into parts, he is unwilling to characterize 
these parts – as sense-data, for example. Similarly, he does not believe that such 
reductions demonstrate the importance of these “ultimate” elements. Instead, they 
show us about the relationships of the parts. In this respect he has more in common 
with the neutral monists than the later phenomenalists (who were perhaps idealists 
in some stage of denial). Also, given his “kaleidoscope” approach to the 
combinatorial analysis of the soul, there is reason to suspect that he did not believe 
that there was a single, uniquely correct analysis, but many different analyses that 
altogether cast light on explaining the phenomena of human understanding. Unlike 
the monistic analyzers such as Carnap, he is possibly suggestive of later pluralists 
such as Feyerabend.  
Although Musil was a fierce critic of traditional religions, there is a kind of 
ghost object of the activity of having faith that remains with us. He remains a 
traditionalist in refusing to endorse the Nietzschean proposal that some of us are 
now so advanced that we have risen above the need for such attitudes. In 
mathematics at least, he was pragmatist enough to agree that there are propositions 
that cannot be justified – and perhaps are even implausible or contradictory. 
Because of our need for such propositions, in order to have beliefs at all, as well as 
because of the peculiar accident that “they work,” we must in a sense accept them. 
He clearly saw this as a kind of ironic and grudging embrace of mysticism.26 This is 
antithetical to the Vienna Circle and also rare in the wider movement of scientific 
philosophy. As I have portrayed Musil’s views, they are more than a little similar to 
the views of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (although the publication dates of Törless and 
“The Mathematical Man” preclude any possible influence from Wittgenstein), but 
are also suggestive of the view of the very late Wittgenstein in On Certainty.  
Although an outspoken defender of the Enlightenment, Musil must also be seen 
as a peculiar and troubled rationalist. First, there is the unempiricist, unpositivistic 
nature of the criterion for enlightened belief – namely, not just through the senses. 
Second, there is the view that some propositions lack justification in the usual, non-
pragmatic sense. And finally, there is the more remarkable view that these 
propositions are difficult to accept or are even contradictory. They have a kind of 
necessity but are, in isolation, repugnant to reason. Musil is not a happy rationalist, 
but a frowning one. 
Musil is obviously cognizant of the same developments in mathematics and 
logic as were the logical positivists. But his interpretation of them is quite different. 
Törless’s taste for logic is precisely what eventually leads to his perplexity. Logic, 
154 RANDALL  R.  DIPERT 
 
 
 
in a very broad sense, is not the more basic of the two disciplines. Instead, logic 
presents obstacles for the acceptance of mathematical propositions, which are more 
inspiring, more curious, and also more useful than logical truths.  
Within the epistemological discussions of mathematical truths, the empiricist 
tradition had always had a difficulty with mathematics. Both the modal character 
(their neccesity) and the acquisional feel (how we think we came to accept them; 
why we accept them) appear quite distinct from those of empirical propositions. One 
just comes, usually in a flash that is little like sense observation, to recognize their 
abiding truth. The early empiricists, as well as their twentieth century kin, struggled 
to reconcile these metaphenomena. Their resolutions of this difficulty were various. 
Mathematical truths are definitionally true; these truths are built into our definitions 
of human-constructed mathematical concepts, although not self-evidently so. A 
variant of this view is that mathematical truths derive from metaphysically and 
epistemologically deeper truths of logic. Some had earlier argued that these 
formulations are the only consistent arrangements of these mathematical concepts, 
and this gives them their truth-like status. 
Empiricist theories of mathematical truths in fact have been dealt a series of 
blows in the last two centuries. Non-Euclidean geometries, spreading rapidly to 
algebra and even number theory, have taught us that there is no single consistent 
theory of such objects. The logical positivists rejected both empiricist and Kantian 
views of mathematics as synthetic a priori. This leaves only the position that 
mathematics – that is, every mathematical truth – is ultimately definitionally, 
analytically true.27 Mathematical propositions are tautologies, if they are true. 
Logicism, the promising early twentieth-century view that deeper truths of logic 
metaphysically or epistemologically anchored mathematical truths, has died a more 
agonizing death. First, the intuitive logical truths of Frege and Cantor turned out to 
be more infested with contradiction than any decent mathematical theory ever had 
been. This led to more complicated and artificial efforts, that we now know as set 
theory, in order to obtain a unifying approach to mathematical truths. While the 
result – modern foundations of mathematics – is an artful and often helpful creation, 
few have noticed that the original desideratum of a metaphysical or epistemological 
obviousness and anchoring quality seems to have become forgotten. Furthermore, 
these foundations have arbitrary components, and Gödel turned on his Viennese 
colleagues to show that logical truth would never be able to anchor mathematical 
truth in the way they had hoped. Gödel himself abandoned this project of 
analytically anchoring mathematics through tautologies of logic and became an 
outright mathematical Platonist. He believed we have a peculiarly stable insight into 
mathematical truths, but that this is neither observational nor logico-definitional in 
origin and character. 
Musil appreciated fully only the early stages of these developments, but it is 
interesting that he never was enamored of the wrong-headed view that mathematical 
truths are in some ways either definitionally true or disguised truths of logic. 
However, I do not think that Musil precisely took Gödel’s route either. While our 
attitude toward deities is in some ways like our attitudes toward (fringe) 
mathematical objects, this is not to say that these numbers do exist.28 Instead, I 
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propose that Musil’s approach is one of justifying individual – especially slightly 
repugnant – mathematical truths through the systematic workability of the whole 
mathematical edifice. For various reasons I prefer to call this a “holistic theory” of 
mathematical truth rather than a “pragmatic theory.”29 This is not to claim that these 
propositions are precisely truths, and perhaps not to say that we should precisely 
believe them. Whatever it is, Musil’s conception is very distant from the views of 
Mach or the Vienna Circle. 
V.   Conclusion 
The ideal for thinking about both ourselves and the world that Musil puts before us 
is a kind of scientific humanism. His vision is in some ways an optimistic 
Enlightenment vision that reaches back to the eighteenth century rather than being 
part of nineteenth- or twentieth-century thinking. While Musil is surely a pessimist 
about the present states of our modern souls and about our present modes of 
analyzing souls – from psychotherapy to logical positivism – he is ambitious and 
optimistic about our ability to do so and the prospects for success. His proposal is 
manifestly not eliminativist or dismissive in, for example, seeking to dismiss all of 
our experience or to suggest that it is probably reducible to physical explanation. For 
sense perception and what it confirms as true is only one mode of human 
experience, and is not privileged. Modern reductivism and eliminativism have 
succeeded in diverting us from an effort to analyze and understand our psyches. 
Rather, they promise that eventually our psyches can be ultimately explained by 
physics, somehow. In contrast, Musil’s approach is a “psychological realism,” 
taking the swirling and ill-understood myths, hopes, emotions, and desires – those 
features of inner life that novels above all other art forms explore – as the data for 
theorizing (it is axiomatic since Kant that we must first understand the perceiver, 
including the perceiver’s motives and limitations, before we can understand the 
perceived). To this realm we are then to apply the distance and discipline that 
mathematics alone provides. We analyze our souls, we analyze relationships, and we 
construct plausible combinations of feelings. Novels are then the large-scale, 
“realistic” thought-experiments of this new mathematics of the soul.  
I find it hard not to be smitten with this vision. It reconnects C.P. Snow’s “two 
cultures.” It puts back together the Humpty Dumpty of our fractured 
humanist/scientist modes of thought. It demands the precision and discipline that 
one sees (only) in the sciences, especially in mathematics. There is no place for 
political posturing, for merely fuzzy feeling,30 or glorifying our ignorance or 
accidental career choice (such as being ignorant of, having failed, or having a 
distaste for calculus). But likewise Musil’s vision does not seek to ignore the 
obvious. It does not claim that the world is just the clean Moosbrugger-less world of 
protocol sentences or quarks.31 It underscores that our feelings are “real”; they are as 
real or more real than subatomic particles or the square root of –1. But this is only a 
paraphrase of Musil himself: 
The misfortune is that people who are concerned with such questions 
today [i.e., such as mysticism and the spirit] have little understanding of 
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the virtues of clear thinking […]; while others, who would have such 
understanding, have for the most part no intimation that there is 
something here that has been grasped at a great depth but been lost again 
on the way back to the surface. […] With us, artistic and scientific 
thinking do not yet come into contact with each other. The problems of a 
middle zone between the two remain unresolved.32  
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pursue, not truth but experience” quoted in T. Quinn, “‘Dialektik der Verzauberung’: 
Mystification, Enlightenment, The Spell,” in Hermann Broch, ed. Stephen D. Dowden, p. 121 
(quoted from Broch’s “Geist und Zeitgeist,” KW 9/2, p. 183). For a discussion of works that 
compare Musil and Broch, see Robert L. Roseberry, Robert Musil: Ein Forschungsbericht 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Athenäum Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1974), p. 148. Broch’s later work in 
philosophy is portrayed in the somewhat superficial Die Philosophie Hermann Brochs by 
Ernestine Schlant (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1971). Broch’s views on mathematics and logic 
(Schlant, pp. 82-90) are of less interest than one might hope, since they appear to be an 
eclectic assortment of views expressed by various philosophers in the twentieth century. As 
summarized by Schlant, there is, for example, a formalist conception that the thoughts and 
their expressions in mathematical formulation are isomorph; one also finds the Russellian 
idea that mathematics can be defined as the theory of all possible relations between things 
without (monadic) properties. 
25 “Unterrichte [der “Gymnasialsupplenten”] Mathemathik und Physik, kraft einer kleinen 
Begabung für exakte Betätigungen […]. Denn der aus Mittelmäßigkeiten konstruierte 
Charakter macht sich über die Fiktivität der Dinge und Erkenntnisse wenig Gedanken” (p. 
33). Appearing after Törless (1906), the mention of the anti-hero’s “constructed character” 
and of the “fictional nature of things” is suggestive.  
26 Cf. B.F. Hyams, “Was ist ‘säkularisierte Mystik’ bei Musil?” in U. Baur and E. Castex, 
eds., Robert Musil: Untersuchungen, pp. 85-98. 
27 See Rudolf Carnap, “The Old and the New Logic,” esp. pp. 140-143, and Hans Hahn, 
“Logic, Mathematics and Knowledge of Nature,” in A.J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism (New 
York: Free Press, 1959). A.J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover, 1952) is 
useful, too, especially Chapter IV. Carnap and Ayer retain the more usual view that 
mathematical truths are “a priori” and “necessary” without much inspection of what that 
means. Ayer separates two notions of analyticity in Kant: meaning-inclusion and (unique) 
logical consistency. However, since inclusion (from Leibniz) was metaphorical, and might 
more properly be analyzed as saying that if the predicate P1 is included in the meaning of P2, 
this is just to say that “x is P2 but not P1” is contradictory, Kant is perhaps ultimately 
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vindicated. Ayer argues for the position that the truth of 7+5=12 is merely a consequence of 
the meanings of “7,” “5,” “12,” the operation “+” and perhaps the meaning of the relation 
“=.” This leaves him with the formidable task of explaining how the truth of some 
mathematical propositions, despite being simply expressed and consisting of what appear to 
be simple terms whose meaning we fully understand, can be so difficult to determine 
(Fermat’s Theorem, Goldbach’s Conjecture), and the process seemingly more like discovery 
than like examining a lexicon. 
28 “Ohne Zweifel war er [i.e., Ulrich] ein gläubiger Mensch, der bloß nichts glaubte” 
(p. 826). 
29 Perhaps the correct attitude to some of these objects is not precisely “faith” but rather a 
grudging resignation. This would explain Musil’s own seeming ambivalence between 
scorning faith in Törless and endorsing it in “The Mathematical Man.”  
30 The “banal zärtliche Vorstellung[en]” of the novels that Törless read (p. 11). 
31 I find it odd that Musil does not quote or refer to Terrence’s famous epigram that had 
earlier so captured Montaigne (in many ways a kindred spirit to Musil): “Nihil humani a me 
alienum puto.” 
32 Musil, “Commentary on a Metapsychics,” in Precision and Soul, ed. Burton Pike and 
David S. Luft, 1990, pp. 57-58; the “us” refers to Germans with the exception of Nietzsche, 
but the passage surely applies more widely. 
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OEDIPUS  ENDANGERED:       
ATREAN  INCEST  AND  ETHICAL  RELATIONS  IN  MUSIL’S
DER  MANN  OHNE  EIGENSCHAFTEN 
Jill Scott 
University of Toronto 
In his 1931 essay, “Der bedrohte Oedipus,” Robert Musil provokes the ire of the 
psychoanalytical establishment with this bold prediction: “Soweit ich weiß, steht 
heute der vorhin erwähnte Oedipuskomplex mehr denn je im Mittelpunkt der 
Theorie; fast alle Erscheinungen werden auf ihn zurückgeführt, und ich befürchte, 
daß es nach ein bis zwei Menschenfolgen keinen Oedipus mehr geben wird!” (504). 
Oedipus, it would seem, is the Everyman of human psychological development, an 
archetype, an icon, a bastion of our collective mythology.1 The stain of this master 
narrative appears to seep to the very core of twentieth-century cultural 
consciousness. This paper argues, however, that Musil’s narrative masterpiece, 
Mann ohne Eigenschaften, threatens the privilege of the psychological autocracy of 
the Oedipus myth.  
The myth of Electra runs through the novel like a musical leitmotif, and the 
sibling incest mimed by Ulrich and Agathe provides the framework for the first 
threads of a new relational ethics as a space of intersubjectivity. I propose that Musil 
invokes Ernst Mach’s theories of the provisional ego and sensation body in his 
interpretation of the Atrean myth to challenge the singular, masculine-gendered 
subject position of the Oedipal model. The novel’s narrative trajectory eventually 
transcends Mach’s “unrettbares Ich” and moves beyond the cliché of a Viennese 
crisis of identity. Through an investigation of Körpersemiotik and experimentation 
with gender in the form of androgyny, hermaphrodism, and the “new woman,” 
Musil engages in a larger argument with modernity and the culture of militarism and 
morality. At the end of the aforementioned Oedipus essay, the author ventures the 
question: “Werden wir statt des Oedipus einen Orestes bekommen?” (504). In Mann 
ohne Eigenschaften, Musil answers this query in the affirmative. 
Musil’s life and work from about 1924 until his death in 1943 (exiled in 
Switzerland) was solely dedicated to the production of one mammoth masterpiece of 
literary modernism, which, by the author’s own admission, had become a historical 
novel in the process of its creation (5, 1941).2 Mann ohne Eigenschaften, a precise 
silhouette of the waning Habsburg Empire, is suffused at first with biting irony,  
Writing the Austrian Traditions: Relations between Philosophy and Literature. 
Ed. Wolfgang Huemer and Marc-Oliver Schuster.  Edmonton, Alberta:  
Wirth-Institute for Austrian and Central European Studies, 2003.  pp. 160-180. 
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which is suddenly replaced by a poignant, almost sentimental lyricism that risks 
descending into the worst kind of kitsch. The seemingly endless dialog and diatribe 
on such lofty subjects as love,3 morality, freedom, mysticism and social deviance, 
contrasted with political intrigue aimed at the general glorification of a pathetically 
outdated empire, is strategically crammed into the anticipatory pre-war year of 
1913.  
Tension also mounts around Musil’s protagonist, Ulrich, whose main claim to 
fame is his Eigenschaftslosigkeit, the total absence of any defining characteristics or 
traits. At the age of thirty-two and entirely lacking in professional ambition, this son 
of a prominent Austrian aristocrat suddenly decides all at once to take a year off 
from life, during which time he hopes to make some meaningful discovery about the 
nature of humanity and the world. As time slows down and the plot all but grinds to 
a halt, bogged down in numerous pages of idle contemplation, the reader’s patience 
and the writer’s capacity are stretched to the limit.4 The novel is infuriatingly 
masterful in taking on subjects of grand scale that hold great promise and result in 
ever larger circles that lead to an inevitable vortex; Mann ohne Eigenschaften is 
about something and nothing at the same time. And yet the resulting creative 
intensity is never resolved, for the work remains a novel fragment.5 It is as if the 
characters have been cut off in mid-sentence as the anxiety of pending war is frozen 
in the air. The author never has to orchestrate the suicide, murder, or Liebestod of 
the protagonist and his sister, for they are figuratively terminated in the dangling 
threads of the novel’s refused conclusion. 
I.   Peripeteia and Pierrot 
Mann ohne Eigenschaften presents its anti-oedipal polemic in very subtle ways. The 
pervasive paradigm of Oedipus and his complex are never directly challenged, 
rather his position is usurped by his other: Electra. Halfway through the novel, when 
Ulrich’s attempt to transform himself and the world has proven entirely 
unsuccessful, the narrative is abruptly shaken by the death of Ulrich’s father. This 
precipitates a dramatic upheaval in the protagonist’s life and initiates a significant 
shift in tone. The narrator dispenses with clever, ironic ploys that poke fun at 
everything from the self-satisfied society dames with their lavish wardrobes and 
secret affairs to the petty and obsequious ways of the Austrian civil service with its 
ludicrous and antiquated bureaucracies. 
A new narrative voice emerges as the Atrean myth of Electra seeps through the 
pages of the third book and stains the characters with the painful legacy of patricide 
and sibling incest. This is no parlor joke – the patriarch’s sudden death, precipitating 
haunting reverberations of Agamemnon’s ghost, coupled with the much anticipated 
reunion between Ulrich and his long-absent sister, Agathe, constitutes the peripeteia 
in the novel. Electra’s story is unearthed in this poignant recognition scene. Never 
mentioned by name, the myth has been scraped to its bare bones, reduced to a few 
crucial clues. The first of these is the death of the father.6 The children seem almost 
pleased at the passing of their overbearing father. However, the recurring sense of 
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loss and confusion in the second half of the novel is akin to that felt by the Atrean 
children at the senseless murder of Agamemnon. 
The other major element of the myth’s structure is precisely the anagnorisis of 
Electra and Orestes. During the much-anticipated recognition scene, the earth ought 
to cease rotating on its axis for one long moment of gaping silence. Musil heightens 
the suspense of this encounter by maneuvering his subjects into place and then 
delaying their meeting in much the same way as does Sophocles in his Attic version. 
And yet, there is something almost artificial and contrived about this first meeting. 
As I will show, this is merely a trial run for the real recognition scene, which 
appears much later in the novel. 
Ulrich arrives at the family home following his father’s death, exhausted and 
dishevelled after a train journey, only to learn that Agathe, whom he labels his 
“unbekannte Schwester” (3, 674), is indisposed and cannot see him right away. He 
is confused by this inhospitable reception and does not know what to make of it 
since he barely knows his mysterious sister (they have barely seen each other since 
early childhood). Conscious of the power dynamic in play, Ulrich surmises that her 
reluctance to rush to greet him gives Agathe the upper hand in the situation. Finally, 
after an agonizing hiatus, the siblings are poised to enter the scene. Unlike the 
Electra myth of antiquity, in which Orestes disguises himself as the messenger of his 
own death, here brother and sister both know what is at stake in this reunion. Or at 
least they think they do. 
In subtle rebellion at having been abandoned upon his arrival – “Sie hätte mich 
doch wenigstens in der Wohnung gleich begrüßen sollen!” – Ulrich decides to wear 
“eine[n] große[n], weichwollige[n] Pyjama, den er anzog, beinahe eine Art 
Pierrotkleid, schwarz-grau gewürfelt” (3, 675). Little did he know that his sister has 
taken the same exaggeratedly casual attitude toward her dress and has donned 
almost identical pyjamas. When Ulrich enters the room, he is confronted with a 
Pierrot, “der auf den ersten Blick ganz ähnlich aussah wie er selbst” (3, 676). 
Equally flabbergasted, Agathe exclaims: “Ich habe nicht gewußt, daß wir Zwillinge 
sind!” (3, 676). Though certainly suspenseful and anxious, this recognition scene 
differs fundamentally from the Greek myth. While the protagonists in the Hellenic 
versions display emotions ranging from shock and dismay to disbelief and 
bittersweet tears, Ulrich and Agathe seem more awkwardly surprised and somewhat 
clumsy in their first interaction. They must wait patiently for the second anagnorisis  
to truly recognize each other. Once they get over the incredible coincidence of their 
matching outfits and the uncanny doppelgänger experience, the siblings resort 
almost immediately, as if out of adolescent shyness, to conversational banalities 
such as the sports they prefer.7 Still, the meeting is not without lasting 
consequences. Even if they are as yet blind to the true nature of their bond, Ulrich 
and Agathe begin to function as one indivisible unit. From this point forward, they 
progressively refer to their status as “Hermaphroditen” and “Siamesische 
Zwillinge,” and consider that they are inextricably linked in some kind of platonic, 
one might even say “mythical,” union. 
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II.   Oedipus Meets Mach 
And so it is that Ulrich and Agathe in turn mime this artful meeting of Pierrot with 
him/herself.8 Their extraordinary encounter constitutes an identity crisis for Musil’s 
protagonist, from which, it seems, he will never recover. The mere possibility of an 
Oedipal scenario is forever banished from the novel, since Ulrich’s consciousness is 
now unmistakably and irreversibly split, as if severed at the root into two distinct, 
platonic halves. Oedipus, Freud’s Oedipus at any rate, has as his sole purpose the 
pursuit of a unified and developmentally complete consciousness. Oedipus may, in 
his emergent state, waffle somewhat in his object choice, but this ambiguity gives 
way in the end to a secure and singularly masculine subjectivity. Freud is adamant 
on this point: “Anyone who fails [to master the Oedipus complex] falls a victim to 
neurosis” (149). According to this view, the relationship between Ulrich and Agathe 
is a sign of neurosis, for it is the successful mastery of the Oedipal stage that 
awakens and installs the incest taboo.9 Contrarily, I would argue that the siblings are 
able to negotiate an ethical pact precisely because they do not fall victim to the 
restrictive social initiation of the Oedipus complex. 
Though Musil initially followed the father of psychoanalysis in setting up 
sexual relations as a crucial cultural model, his system diverged significantly from 
that of Freud because of his insistence on the coexistence of eros and intellect as a 
move toward a revolutionary, sexual ethics.10 Moreover, he repudiated the cult-like 
status and seemingly unscientific approach of the psychoanalytic establishment. 
While Musil seems to have set out, in part, to refute the primacy of Freud’s principal 
paradigm, these theories were by no means his sole reference point. In fact, he had 
written his doctoral dissertation, Beitrag zur Beurteilung der Lehren Machs, on the 
pre-Freudian psychology of Ernst Mach (1838-1916), a physicist who had given the 
Austrian public a new formulation of the monist doctrine of positivism.11 Mach’s 
famous dictum proclaiming the unsavable self, “das unrettbare Ich,” became a 
powerful catchphrase and dominated the psychological landscape of Viennese 
modernism. Adopted by the influential cultural critic, Hermann Bahr, it became an 
axiom for the crisis in language and the crisis of identity itself. As Mach himself 
said: “[das] Ich [ist] keine von der Welt isolierte Monade, sondern ein Teil der Welt 
und mitten im Fluss derselben darin” (quoted in Frank 325). As such, and this is 
Mach’s central argument, subjectivity can exist only as a bundle of sensations and as 
a fiction of its own perceptions of the world. Or as Musil interprets it: As soon as 
one attempts to analyze the self, “löst es sich in Relationen u[nd] Funktionen auf” 
(8, 1403). This is demonstrated in Mann ohne Eigenschaften when all that appears 
tangible and malleable in its characters slips through one’s fingers like the finest silt.  
I propose that Mann ohne Eigenschaften simultaneously engages with and 
critically evaluates Mach’s theories and that the Electra myth serves as a platform 
for this dynamic dialog. The novel denies Freud’s exclusive Oedipal narrative, all 
the while leapfrogging Mach’s deconstructive metaphysics and opening up a space 
for alternative ethical relations. The encounter of the mythological siblings in the 
guise of Ulrich and Agathe, together with Musil’s experimentation surrounding their 
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negotiations of subjectivity and positionality, provide the basis for a new ethics to 
emerge. 
The author makes no attempt to outline a systematic theory of ethics. In fact, an 
ethical system is an oxymoron: “Wo eine Regelmäßigkeit sich einstellt,” laments 
Musil, “dort hat sich eine Moral gebildet” (8, 1305). In Mann ohne Eigenschaften, 
morality is shown to be static and artificial, whereas ethics functions as a 
continuous, fluid, and relational project. “Moral ist in ihrem Wesen als Vorschrift 
nach an wiederholbare Erlebnisse gebunden” (8, 1093), whereas Ulrich states in the 
novel: “Das Unmoralische gewinnt sein himmlisches Recht als eine drastische 
Kritik des Moralischen!” (3, 959). Later in the novel, such statements become 
bolder and more anarchic in tone, and as Musil himself comments in connection 
with the relationship between Ulrich and Agathe: “Nichts ist fest. Jede Ordnung 
führt ins Absurde” (5, 1834). In much of this enigmatic section, the narrator speaks 
in axiomatic phrases, spitting out philosophical vignettes and leaving the reader to 
decipher his code. Unwittingly, we become schooled in the doctrines of Mach, 
which will then be mutated through Musil’s clever manipulation of character and 
narrative development. 
III.   Recognition Scene Turned Seduction Scene 
While Musil at times forgets he has vowed never to analyze a character, he usually 
allows his protagonists the freedom to experience their own fluid shifts. One scene 
in particular demonstrates Musil’s narrative technique and relational theory. In the 
chapter “Beginn einer Reihe wundersamer Erlebnisse,” near the beginning of the 
Nachlaß,12 Ulrich and Agathe are preparing for yet another evening out with friends. 
Already late, they are dressing hastily, and Ulrich is assisting his sister in the 
absence of qualified maidservants. The narrator outlines in the minutest detail this 
scene, in which Agathe puts on a silk stocking. Her body becomes the object of an 
artist’s gaze: “am Hals rundete die Spannung des Vorgangs drei Falten, die schlank 
und lustig durch die klare Haut eilten wie drei Pfeile” (4, 1082). Her brother loses 
his cool distance and is helpless in the face of the powerful kinetic force connecting 
him to his sister; the painting “schien ihren Rahmen verloren zu haben und ging […] 
unvermittelt und unmittelbar in den Körper Ulrichs über” (4, 1082). Suddenly, 
Ulrich leans over his sister from behind and bites into one of the folds on her 
tenderly exposed neck.  
This moment, marking a turning point in the sibling relationship, is one that I 
characterize as the second recognition scene in the novel. In the antique myth of 
Atreus, anagnorisis is a single event, and there is no need for Orestes and Electra to 
reenact their first meeting.13 However, according to my reading, Musil’s rendition 
suggests that Ulrich and Agathe never really saw each other during the Pierrot 
scene. They were too absorbed in establishing the pecking order of the sibling 
hierarchy. Ulrich was still acting his spoiled playboy routine and Agathe was pre-
occupied with plotting the end of her marriage. Only at this point does the 
narrative’s veneer of irony finally fall away to reveal the quasi-mystical union of 
two souls.  
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At frequent intervals following the first recognition scene, Ulrich and Agathe 
critically evaluate themselves as the two halves of Plato’s original human (3, 903), 
as Pygmalion, as the Hermaphrodite (3, 905), and as the Siamese twins (3, 908; 3, 
936; 3, 945); they even refer to themselves as hermits (3, 801). Very early on, Ulrich 
comes to understand the nature of his dependent relationship with Agathe; she is the 
sister who will allow him to love himself. His self-analysis reveals a deficiency that 
she can apparently fulfill:  
Ich weiß jetzt, was du bist: Du bist meine Eigenliebe! […] Mir hat eine 
richtige Eigenliebe, wie sie andere Menschen so stark besitzen, in 
gewissem Sinne immer gefehlt […] Und nun ist sie offenbar, durch 
Irrtum oder Schicksal, in dir verkörpert gewesen, statt in mir selbst!      
(3, 899)  
After a great deal of debate and reflection, Ulrich refines this hypothesis: 
Aber auch ich muß doch etwas lieben können, und da ist eine 
Siamesische Schwester, die nicht ich noch sie ist, und geradesogut ich 
wie sie ist, offenbar der einzige Schnittpunkt von allem!   (3, 945) 
This kind of analysis abounds in the chapters leading up to the second recognition 
scene, and the tone is cerebral and sterile. Ulrich may have softened around the 
edges since the arrival of his sister, but his thinking is still mired in an intellectual, 
even clinical, quagmire. What this second anagnorisis reveals is clearly on a 
different plane. 
Following the initial description of Ulrich lunging in a vampiric maneuver 
toward Agathe, the whole scene is repeated in extreme slow motion, this time 
emphasizing the somatic distortions of this single gesture. In a cinematic frame-by-
frame analysis, we learn that Agathe has been liberated into weightlessness and has 
lost her balance. The event has called all muscles into play, but simultaneously 
paralyzes their limbs (4, 1082). The siblings abandon ordinary language for a kind 
of corporeal code, such that “der geschwisterliche Wuchs der Körper teilte sich 
ihnen mit, als stiegen sie aus einer Wurzel auf” (4, 1083). Indeed, they suddenly 
recognize their collective blindness as if a cloudy film has been peeled back from 
their eyes:  
Sie sahen einander so neugierig in die Augen, als sähen sie dergleichen 
zum erstenmal. Und obwohl sie das, was eigentlich vorgegangen sei, 
nicht hätten erzählen können, weil ihre Beteiligung daran zu inständig 
war, glaubten sie doch zu wissen, daß sie sich soeben unversehens einen 
Augenblick inmitten dieses gemeinsamen Zustands befunden hätten, an 
dessen Grenze sie schon so lange gezögert, den sie einander schon so oft 
beschrieben und den sie doch immer nur von außen geschaut hatten.      
(4, 1083; my emphasis) 
Ulrich and Agathe are granted the gift of a special vision, which gives them insight 
into the nature of their relationship as they stand on the crest between their past and 
their future. They see that they have been hovering at this precipice since the night 
of their first meeting. They had been trying all along to articulate in ordinary 
language what they have now experienced physically as a “shared condition” or 
“anderer Zustand.”14 What had been an accident of bodily gesture has become a 
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catalyst for something more. Even when Ulrich picked up the phone and canceled 
their engagements for the evening he showed no signs of sobering up (4, 1083). Far 
from being an isolated incident, this moment has set the scene for the next phase of 
Ulrich’s and Agathe’s collective being. 
IV.   Romanticism Revisited 
For what seems like an eternity after Ulrich’s daring overture, the siblings remain 
silent. Only their glances meet as they navigate through unknown territory using a 
new somatic language. They sense that their movements are censored by some 
warning, a higher force that has nothing to do with moral codes (4, 1083). When 
they finally regain the use of their voices, they speak in a forgotten tongue, 
borrowing vocabulary and imagery from early Romantic poets such as Tieck, 
Schlegel, and Novalis. As if from nowhere, Ulrich blurts out to Agathe: “Du bist der 
Mond […] Du bist zum Mond geflogen und mir von ihm wiedergeschenkt worden” 
(4, 1084). With these prophetic words, he places his sister in the role of female 
redeemer in the Romantic tradition.15 She is his mirror image, thereby strengthening 
their hermaphroditic bond. Agathe been given back to Ulrich, and he implicitly has 
been given back to himself, and has found love for himself through his love for his 
other half.  
Breaking the spell in the most annoying manner, the narrator interrupts our 
romantic scene – “Verläßt man hier das Gespräch der Geschwister […]” (4, 1084) – 
to inform us that we are in the midst of an artificially altered reality and must not 
fully integrate into this magical world. Soon, however, the narrator forgets his task 
of waking the reader and carries on with such clichéed romantic epithets as the all-
encompassing corporeality of the night far from the harsh light of day, which 
facilitates a state of “grenzenlose Selbstlosigkeit” (4, 1085). If this scene were 
removed from its context, it might seem to be extracted from Novalis’s Hymnen an 
die Nacht, with its lovers “in dunkle Nacht gehüllet,” or from Wagner’s Tristan und 
Isolde,16 where the magical couple feels their love threatened by the jealous and 
deceitful day.17 
Musil’s sexual imagery has clearly been borrowed from his Romantic 
predecessors. The sensual moon, icon of intoxicating desire, beckons irresistibly and 
invites the siblings into a magical union of the flesh. And yet, like a magnet that 
attracts and repels with equal intensity, the moon seems to draw them together and 
keep them apart (4, 1085). Still, they are aware of love’s fever in their bodies (4, 
1086), and gaze longingly toward the celestial sphere, as if transplanted from Caspar 
David Friedrich’s Romantic painting about two lovers mesmerized in lunar 
observation. Just when their metaphysical union threatens to dissolve into a sexual 
consummation, Ulrich adds a puzzling corollary by comparing Agathe to “Pierrot 
Lunaire.” The narrator again severs the bond with any romantic paradigm with a 
clinical analysis of this archetype: “In der bleichen Maske des mondlich-einsamen 
Pierrots […]; es drückte also die Vorliebe für Mondnächte beträchtlich ins 
Lächerliche hinab” (4, 1086). For a number of reasons, the siblings are kept from 
expressing their love in a sexual union of the flesh: one reason is Ulrich’s admission 
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that their scene has slipped into a sentimental debauch, trivialized to the point of 
kitsch (4, 1086). Then the Pierrot allegory returns from the first recognition scene 
bringing with it the overtones of androgyny, hermaphroditism and general confusion 
around sexual identification. But a more significant deterrent is the unknown force 
that has marked the siblings for some “höhere Ahnung” (4, 1083).18  
With the return of a rather pathetic image of Pierrot, the siblings realize they are 
nothing but characters in their own plot. Nevertheless, brother and sister both 
understand that they have experienced, even for a fleeting moment, a hint of what 
Ulrich names: “Seligkeit des Gefühls” (4, 1086). In a posthumous note, Musil 
writes: “U[lrich] weiß sich u[nd] Ag[athe] [als] eine Art letzte Romantiker der 
Liebe” (5, 1844), thereby making their allegiance explicit.19 In many ways, the 
siblings’ journey to another reality comes across as clichéed and sentimental, but it 
is rescued from descending into kitsch at the last minute by common sense that 
breaks through the veneer. Having recognized that they are characters in their own 
play or figures in a painting, they take the necessary steps to close the scene. Agathe 
unexpectedly calls “Gute Nacht!” to her brother and then, as though waking 
suddenly from a slumber, she closes the curtains so quickly that the tableau of the 
two of them standing in the moonlight vanishes suddenly and completely (4, 1087). 
The Romantic dream is eclipsed as quickly as it emerged. 
In a larger sense, Ulrich’s and Agathe’s romantic encounter illustrates Musil’s 
attempt to compensate for a loss of authenticity in the world around them. Their 
collective mourning for what was and their yearning for what might be colors the 
narrative as they linger on the cusp between genuine meaning and irony, between 
sincere love and debauched vulgarism. But like the mythological characters whose 
roles they restage, they too must make a decision and move forward. Typically, a 
traditional recognition scene is followed by stunned silence at having seen for the 
first time, and yet Electra and Orestes both know they cannot gaze forever into each 
other’s eyes. They have a task before them; their love alone will not redeem the 
kingdom of Argos, and they take up their swords and go to battle. So, too, Ulrich 
and Agathe must confront their future together. 
V.   Sensation Body and Provisional Fictions of the Ego 
In the middle of the prolonged romantic scene, Ulrich feels the need to theorize their 
relations, and he explains: “Wir hatten unsere Körper vertauscht, ohne uns zu 
berühren” (4, 1084). The body emerges as a central metaphor for their relationship, 
be it a physical body or a “sensation body,” as postulated by Mach. It is no 
coincidence that the catalyst that finally allows Ulrich and Agathe to understand the 
depth of their connection is a single physical gesture. What cannot be understood on 
a cognitive level must be approached on the corporeal level.  
In a very early work, Die Analyse der Empfindungen (The Analysis of 
Sensations), Mach relates that in his youth he had come across Kant’s Prolegomena 
to All Future Metaphysics in his father’s library, and this precipitated his later 
inquiry into the “superfluity of things in themselves.” He explains that one day “the 
world, including my own selfhood, suddenly appeared to me as a coherent mass of 
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sensations, in which my sense of self was only and simply a stronger cohesion” (24). 
In his later work, Erkenntnis und Irrtum (Knowledge and Error), Mach further 
outlines his theory of the ego’s construction through its fundamental 
interdependence with the body’s spatial surroundings and its experience of 
sensations: “There is something all but unexplored standing behind the ego, namely 
our body” (8). Inasmuch as the body is the only vehicle for knowledge of the self, it 
is equally vulnerable to errors of perception: “the imagination rounds off incomplete 
findings […] thus occasionally falsifying them” (7). In other words, the dependence 
upon outside forces and the processing of these forces as internal circumstances of 
sensation can lead to delusion. This propensity to confuse knowledge and error 
based upon a misunderstanding in the interpretation of incoming data renders the 
self a fundamentally unknowable entity; in consequence, “an isolated ego exists no 
more than an isolated object: both are provisional fictions of the same kind” (9). As 
a “provisional fiction,” the self is nothing more than a sensation cluster, connected 
to plants, animals, and objects through its sensory perceptions. Essentially, humans 
are not too different from machines, argues Mach: “some kind of weird and 
wonderful automata” (18). Far from despairing at this seemingly fatalistic view of 
the ego, the psychologist insists that this model of human development is actually 
liberating because it frees us, first, from the mind/body dichotomy and then from a 
static, fossilized notion of self.  
Mach’s phenomenological and pragmatic approach to the perception of the self 
is important for Musil’s project in a number of ways. For one thing, as we have 
observed, the characters in Mann ohne Eigenschaften are shown to be fluid entities, 
without ground. Initially, it seems that remedying this would be a reasonable task, 
and Ulrich tells his sister optimistically: “Wir suchen einen Grund für dich” (3, 
959). Eventually, however, the narrator recognizes the impossibility of such a 
project, and describes another version of being, “welches wir im Grunde nicht 
begründen können” (5, 1752).  
Another important factor for Musil’s characters is Mach’s theory that emotions 
are part of the overall experiential phenomena of the body. He explains: 
At first glance, feelings, affects and moods of love, hate, anger, fear, 
depression, sadness, mirth and so on, seem to be new elements. On closer 
scrutiny, however, they are less analyzed sensations linked with less 
definite, diffuse and vaguely circumscribed elements of internal space: 
they mark certain directed modes of bodily reactions known from 
experience.   (1976, 17) 
Ulrich echoes Mach’s theory when he elaborates his own thoughts on the emotion of 
love to Agathe: “Da ist erstens ein körperliches Erlebnis, das zur Klasse der 
Hautreize gehört” (3, 941). Love is, for Ulrich, first and foremost a physical-
mechanical experience rather than one of the soul; this is illustrated by the fact that 
their mutual experience of love entails sharing and even exchanging bodies. Ulrich 
describes a sensation that affects his body when he is close to a woman, “als sei ihm 
da selbst ein zweiter, weit schönerer Körper zu eigen gegeben worden” (3, 898). 
Being twins is not enough; they must be Siamese twins and physically connected so 
that all sensations are shared. The narrator begins to utter Mach-like phrases on the 
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coexistence of emotion and physical sensation, such as Ulrich’s dream “zwei 
Menschen zu sein und einer” (4, 1060).  
Clearly, Musil is engaging with Mach’s theories in order to understand the 
nature of his characters’ subjectivity. But he eventually goes beyond Mach’s 
corporeal aesthetics and challenges his mentor. Musil supports the notion of the ego 
as an unstable cluster of physical sensations, essentially a nothingness, which is at 
every moment being redefined according to new spatial and sensational 
circumstances. He parts company with Mach when he develops from this model a 
complex set of social relations. Not only is the ego a fluid entity, but it intermingles 
and interferes with other sensory beings. Ulrich and Agathe are determined by their 
respective somatic perceptions; however, they also codetermine each other’s beings 
through their interactions.  
Further exceeding the limits of Mach’s theories, Musil seems dissatisfied with a 
notion of the “unrettbares Ich” and the pessimistic view that the ego is really nothing 
but an accident of error and false perception. Instead, he proposes and demonstrates 
an alternative, some would say utopian, perspective. Ulrich and Agathe embark 
upon a path of discovery, recognizing the inherently unsettled nature of their 
collective being as a cluster of sensations, and they do so through the catalyst of 
love. Without love, their status as Siamese twins or shared hermaphrodite would be 
at best ridiculous and at worst pathetic. Love itself compels them to seek a better 
alternative to the status quo. “Aber das Reich der Liebe,” affirms the narrator, “ist ja 
in allem die große Anti-Realität” (4, 1319), and this is the inspiration for the 
siblings’ quest to imagine a reality beyond the limits of morality. Indeed, they risk 
everything and enter into their ethical pact, an experiment of gargantuan 
proportions. 
Ulrich is more articulate than Agathe about their desire to meld fully with each 
other. Throughout the novel, he repeatedly voices the wish to abandon his masculine 
identity and become his female other. He recalls how, even as a child, when he saw 
his sister dressed up for a birthday party, he longed desperately, “ein Mädchen zu 
sein” (3, 690). Later in the novel, his love for Agathe awakens in him “Sehnsucht, 
sie zu sein” (4, 1311); he yearns to be his sister at any cost. But to be his sister is far 
more than simply wishing to unite completely like Siamese twins. It becomes a code 
word for a particular way of being that Ulrich and Agathe begin to cultivate 
consciously after their mystical recognition; they step deliberately beyond the 
confines of moral codes and strict social structures and withdraw into what they call 
“ein zweigeschlechtiges Mönchtum.” Ulrich asserts this alternative definition of 
sorority: “die ‘Schwester’ [ist] ein Gebilde, das aus dem ‘anderen’ Teil des Gefühls 
ersteht, der Aufruhr dieses Gefühls und das Verlangen, anders zu leben” (4, 1314). 
Together, Ulrich and Agathe acknowledge their existence as that of the “third 
sister,” the intermingling of “I” and “you.”20  
VI.   The New Woman 
Ulrich’s desire to embody womanhood itself in the form of his/a sister is 
foregrounded by the rise of a new ideal of femininity in the novel. Very early on, we 
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find evidence of a dichotomy between two categories of women, characterized by 
body type: the round, soft, maternal woman and the hard, tight, boyish girl. The 
female characters in the novel are equally divided among these two categories: 
Diotima, Bonadea, and Leona all fall into the maternal group, while Clarisse, 
Gertha, and Agathe are more androgynous and boyish. Diotima, Ulrich’s confidante 
and cohort in the Parallelaktion, is described as embodying “ein Schönheitsideal 
[…], das hellenisch war […] mit ein bißchen mehr Fleisch” (1, 109). She has a 
large, warm body with feminine curves and several rolls of voluptuous fat on her 
neck. On the other hand, Clarisse’s “kleiner, nervöser Leib” (1, 53) is hardly 
maternal, but rather “hart und knabenhaft” (1, 354). Over time, this tendency 
accelerates until she becomes an emaciated rack of bones, devoid of feminine flesh.  
In his slow eradication of the maternally connoted female body from the novel, 
Musil refers tacitly to the legacy of Johann Jacob Bachofen or even Otto Weininger. 
In Bachofen’s anthropological study of mythology, Mutterrecht, the primitive, 
maternal principle finally gives way to the laws of paternity precisely when Electra 
decides to avenge Agamemnon’s death. And the misogynist Weininger, who 
abhorred all things maternal, saw in women the roots of social disease. He was 
disgusted by the so-called bisexuality of culture and the feminization of the ego, and 
considered this phenomenon a symptom of decadence and social decay. Musil can 
hardly be said to uphold either of these theories. He observes and comments upon 
the same phenomenon of gender ambiguity and experimentation; however, he 
introduces this new construction of femininity in order to celebrate women’s 
liberation from their maternal responsibilities and their newfound ability to interact 
with a free-floating set of gender signifiers. 
Musil theorizes this concept in his essay, Die Frau gestern und morgen (1929), 
where he begins by describing an outdated version of femininity. Women’s bodies 
become caricatures in his descriptions: “Der ideale Mund hatte die Größe und 
Rundung eines Stecknadelkopfes und die Händchen und Füßlein saßen mit der 
Ohnmacht kleiner Falter am üppigen Kelch des Leibes” (642). Female bodies were 
prudishly buried beneath wads of fabric, which had the opposite of the desired 
effect, creating “eine ungeheuer künstliche Vergrößerung der erotischen 
Oberfläche” (641). In an early chapter of Mann ohne Eigenschaften, the narrator 
expounds upon these same points almost word for word, postulating that the 
extensive clothing of the traditional woman was something of a civilized 
aphrodisiac. Maternal and corpulent, these women were sexual beings.  
The ideal of woman changed, proposes Musil, with the Great War. The new 
woman shed her camouflaging layers and her maternal role all at the same time: 
“[Sie] wendet sich vorläufig an die Knabeninstinkte des Mannes, ist knabenhaft 
mager, kameradschaftlich, sportlich spröd und kindisch” (645). She remains 
physically immature and is principally concerned with matters of how to prevent 
reproduction. This fact is made evident in the novel when Ulrich’s friend and 
confidante, Clarisse, maintains a self-imposed chastity in spite of her husband’s 
tireless pleading for conjugal relations. Another of the protagonist’s female 
companions, Gertha, also denies herself and Ulrich the pleasures of the flesh when, 
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at the height of passion, a twisted scream hurtles from her body in a violent purging 
of all sexual impulse. 
Agathe, too, falls squarely within the bounds of the new woman,21 such that 
when Ulrich sees her for the first time in feminine attire, he mistakes this costume – 
“vor die schlanken, hohen, den seinen ähnlichen Beine […] hatten sich Röcke 
gesenkt” – for a disguise (3, 694). Women’s clothing is a foil more jarring than the 
Pierrot pyjamas of their first meeting. Her body is “groß und schlank,” and her 
shoulders are “von einer gesunden Breite” (3, 896), all of which contributes to 
Ulrich’s confusion surrounding her gender status. In fact, his very first remark about 
her appearance notes the sexually ambivalent and immature nature of her body: 
“Ihre Brust ging nicht in Brüsten verloren” (2, 676). He is so shocked that he is 
incapable of determining whether his initial fascination with her arises out of 
curiosity or sexual desire. 
This pre-pubescent, androgynous and perhaps asexual image of Agathe acts as a 
mirror for Ulrich’s construction of his own masculinity. Musil never writes an essay 
on “Man Today” or the nature of the new man. But Ulrich’s own self-conscious 
analysis of his character and his relationship to Agathe speak to a larger shift in the 
development and manifestation of masculinity, a shift that I would posit as a threat 
to the Oedipal scenario. This is not a man whose sexual development is either 
predictable or complete. He refuses to identify with or emulate the kind of man his 
father was and purposefully casts off the shadow of the domineering man. The 
absence of his biological mother precludes any Oedipal mother-son conflict. And, 
while he appears to go through a period of infatuation with maternally connoted 
women, Ulrich does not take part in the ritual of usurping the power of the maternal 
in order to assert his masculine, sexual supremacy. Mother figures simply fade away 
when the new woman takes center stage as the dominant cultural and corporeal 
aesthetic.22 
My point here is that the demise of the Oedipal scenario is inversely 
proportionate to the rise of the Electra myth. When Ulrich is finally ready to turn his 
back upon his father’s world for good, the myth of Atreus is introduced. The son 
leaves behind the security of paternal inheritance and the solid Oedipal subjectivity 
it connotes. Following the father’s death and the recognition scene, Agathe and 
Ulrich slowly begin their retreat from the world; they abandon the life of Viennese 
high society and begin their self-imposed exile as recluses. The two of them lose 
any clear sense of identity they might have had and enter a zone of liminal 
subjectivity. By the end of the Nachlaß, the two have practically fused into one 
being, so complete is their union. Agathe describes a dream she has, in which she 
entered her body lying on the bed, only to discover that it was her brother’s body. 
She is startled by this uncanny sensation, which takes the doppelgänger motif of 
Siamese twins one step further. The dream continues with her taking her brother’s 
body into her arms, lifting it up high in exaltation. Their bodies melt into each other 
such that they are indistinguishable. The dream represents a state of utopian bliss, a 
simultaneous stasis and complete fusion of subjectivities that Ulrich first mentioned 
in the moonlit scene. There is a religious sense of awe to this scene, as though 
Agathe were Mary Magdalene lifting Christ’s dead body to become one with it.  
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Agathe’s dream also signals a shift in her overall role in the novel. She becomes 
the driving force behind their collective actions, exemplified by Ulrich’s repeated 
desire to become her, to meld with her. As Ulrich casts off his allegiance to 
Oedipus, Agathe accepts the role of Electra, courageous and defiant.23 She asserts 
her independence and sets her own agenda, and Ulrich, like Orestes, seems happy to 
follow. Though her task is not that of orchestrating a literal matricide, her 
characterization as the new woman acts as a figurative matricide. She extinguishes 
the maternal element in herself, just as Musil postulates its erasure from the cultural 
imagination.24 
Agathe’s new role is foreshadowed by Ulrich’s own suggestion, shortly after 
their first meeting, that the siblings might also take on the roles of Isis and Osiris as 
they perform the alchemy of becoming symbolically one. Musil explores this theme 
elsewhere in poetic form: “Isis und Osiris” (1923) reveals the grizzly story of Isis 
stealing her husband’s male member: “Und die Schwester löste von dem Schläfer / 
Leise das Geschlecht und aß es auf” (597). In exchange, she gives him her heart, 
which he in turn consumes. The poem parallels the siblings’ quasi-incestuous 
relations in Mann ohne Eigenschaften in that Osiris, like Ulrich, is figuratively 
emasculated. Unlike his mythological counterpoint, however, Ulrich is a willing 
victim. In both cases, the brother/lover’s sacrifice is rewarded when he gains access 
to the coveted trophy: his sister’s heart. Such a metaphor of cannibalistic ritual is 
perhaps a more profound symbol of the depth of their union than sexual 
consummation itself. 
The novel starts off with Ulrich as a solitary and singular protagonist in a quasi-
Bildungsroman quest for a purpose and meaning in life. By the end of the unfinished 
work, we are on much less solid ground. Agathe and Ulrich have melted into each 
other to the extent that they function as one character, with Agathe or the 
androgynous new woman as the dominant force. Oedipus has been abandoned, and 
Electra and Orestes have become one. Musil is not alone in his explorations of this 
scenario. In his 1977 play, Hamletmaschine, Heiner Müller presents us with a 
similarly subtle critique of Oedipus. In fact, the author suggests elsewhere that 
Oedipus has long outlived his usefulness: “Im Jahrhundert des Orest und der 
Elektra, das heraufkommt, wird Ödipus eine Komödie sein” (Projektion 1975, 16). 
Müller replaces Oedipus with a failed Hamlet in disguise, who wavers on the edge 
of an abyss, a crisis in consciousness of such proportions that he, too, declares his 
desire to abandon his masculinity: “Ich will eine Frau sein” (15). He does not want 
to be just any woman; he wants to be Electra. Like Ulrich, Müller’s Hamlet 
figuratively fuses with and is transformed into an Electra-character,25 albeit a 
disabled one. Müller’s disfigured and wheelchair-bound Electra also enacts a 
symbolic matricide in her denial of her own fertility, threatening to annihilate all her 
unborn children. 
Unlike Müller’s Electra, whose anarchic view privileges destruction as the only 
ethical stance, Musil’s characters embrace the possibility of creating and nurturing 
an alternative reality through their own ethical relations. As I have already argued, 
Musil refutes Freud’s Oedipal subject in part by looking to Mach, whose 
metaphysical scepticism constructs the subject as a provisional fiction of physical 
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sensations. Mach’s pessimistic pragmatism, however useful as a provisionary 
model, does not provide all the building blocks for Musil’s project. He does not 
want his version of Electra and Orestes to end up in a void or in a relational cul-de-
sac.  
VII.   Nietzsche and the Abyss 
It is to Nietzsche that Musil looks to complete his vision of an alternative relational 
ethics. The philosopher is present as a backdrop throughout Mann ohne 
Eigenschaften, first introduced through Ulrich’s close friend, Clarisse. He had given 
her the complete works of Nietzsche as a wedding present, and indeed she begins to 
embody the spirit of Dionysus. The narrator remarks upon the unspoken force that 
threatens her stability: “Etwas Unbestimmbares riß sich dann los in ihr und drohte 
mit ihrem Geist davonzufliegen” (1, 62). Clarisse even proposes a “Nietzsche Year” 
as a parallel to the ridiculous jubilee year planned for Emperor Franz Joseph. Her 
obsession reflects the extent to which this philosophy dominates the landscape of 
cultural consciousness in Musil’s Vienna. However, Clarisse’s rather shallow 
reception of Nietzsche – she cherishes the weighty tomes but seems not to have read 
them – and her worship of him as a statuesque icon act as a counterpoint to Musil’s 
larger conversation with the philosopher toward the end of the novel. The author’s 
allegiance to Nietzsche is more implicit than explicit, but it permeates his prose, 
especially in the third book and Nachlaß.  
“All ordered society puts the passions to sleep,” asserts Nietzsche in The Gay 
Science, a message paralleled by Musil’s conviction that morality is a narcotic that 
lulls even sharp minds into a dull, sleepy trance. The author sees in Nietzsche the 
potential for a different kind of drug, perhaps one that stimulates productive 
insomnia to “reawaken the sense of comparison, of contradiction, of joy in the new, 
the daring, and the untried” (Kaufmann, 1963, 93). The characters in Mann ohne 
Eigenschaften are engaged in a Nietzschean experiment of audacious joy, through 
which they escape ordered society to imagine something new. Agathe and Ulrich 
risk everything to break free from social mores, and their actions echo Ulrich’s 
aphoristic bluntness: “alles ist moralisch, aber die Moral selbst ist nicht moralisch” 
(3, 1024).  
While Musil does not expressly mention Nietzsche in the novel’s treatise on 
morality, the creative tension of the characters’ unfinished and permeable 
subjectivities recalls the philosopher’s invitation to move beyond one’s own self in 
an explosion of Dionysian excess. Musil demonstrates his theory of ethical relations 
through the perpetual metamorphosis of his characters and their courageous 
endeavors to harness their love and sketch a new vision of intersubjective being. In 
so doing, he provides a model for modern individuals to recreate themselves 
constantly and to embrace the chaos of the changing world around them.26 
Agathe and Ulrich may engage in a Nietzschean experiment of joy, which leads 
to a hermaphroditic fusion of Electra and Orestes; however, their coexistence does 
not culminate in the kind of Dionysian frenzy that consumes Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal’s Electra as she performs her famous Totentanz. Instead, their 
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challenge is to walk an ever-narrowing precipice between two extremes: utopia and 
anarchy.27 Like Nietzsche’s tightrope dancer in Also Sprach Zarathustra, they are 
confronted on either side by a cliff and a bottomless abyss. Perhaps the impossibility 
of succeeding at such a feat is what prohibits Musil from completing his 
masterpiece. The novel refuses to end with Electra and Orestes walking hand in 
hand into the sunset. On the contrary, it simply peters out as Ulrich and Agathe 
teeter ever closer to the edge of the abyss. In order to stay alive, they must reject the 
slumber of moral stagnation and stay awake to imagine new ways of being in the 
world. 
 
 
 
1 Freud states that the legend of King Oedipus from classical antiquity has universal 
validity and that “every new arrival on this planet is faced by the task of mastering the 
Oedipus complex” (149). Indeed, by the time Musil began serious work on his novel, the 
theory of the Oedipus complex had gained such notoriety in the field of psychiatry and 
among the general public that this might have seemed to be true. 
2 The first volume, published in 1930, received so much praise that Musil began to dream 
of a Nobel Prize. Under pressure from his publisher and his readers, the second volume was 
divulged in 1933 and was less of a success, due in part to the political climate as well as 
Musil’s own view that it was a less polished piece. Mann ohne Eigenschaften was banned in 
Germany and Austria in 1938, and censorship would eventually extend to all his works. In 
dire financial straits throughout the remaining years of his life, Musil labored increasingly 
over the manuscript, though with little progress. 
3 After meditating and hypothesizing upon the nature of love in conversations mostly with 
Agathe, but also with anyone who will listen (Clarisse, Bonadea, Diotima), Ulrich boils the 
problem down to its essential questions: “wie man seinen Nächsten liebe, den man nicht 
kenne, und wie sich selbst, den man noch weniger kennt […], wie man überhaupt liebe,” and 
“was Liebe ‘eigentlich’ sei” (4, 1223-24). These are not only important questions with regard 
to his relationship with Agathe, but Ulrich feels compelled to include “millions of loving 
couples” in his equation. This is just one example of how our protagonist ensures his own 
failure by setting himself impossible tasks. His musings on other subjects are of equally 
preposterous proportions. 
4 Indeed, the praise for Mann ohne Eigenschaften has not been unanimous. Peter Handke 
called the work “ein bis in die einzelnen Sätze größenwahnsinniges und unerträglich 
meinungsverliebtes Werk” (quoted in Luserke 96). 
5 Critics use the word “fragment” when referring to Mann ohne Eigenschaften (Luserke 
103, Rogowski 75), and rightly so, though I prefer the label “incomplete.” In the strict sense 
of the word, of course, the work is a “fragment,” but I simply cannot bring myself to use this 
term to describe a novel that runs to almost two thousand pages including all the extensive 
unpublished posthumous papers, depending on the edition. Fragmented it is, and increasingly 
so toward the end, though it is debatable whether this is a result of the unfinished nature of 
the project or rather a factor of an intentional aesthetic transformation within the text. I tend 
to support the latter interpretation: Musil struggles to provide narrative closure, in part due to 
the lack of plot towards the end. His characters have abandoned their social roles, but they 
have not replaced their former lives with any clear plan of action. Though many critics and 
scholars have insisted upon a clear distinction between the published segments of Mann ohne 
Eigenschaften and the Nachlaß, I have chosen to treat Musil’s latter drafts and notes as part 
of the whole. These chapters may be rough and unpolished, but they nevertheless provide 
important clues to the direction of the author’s considerations on a number of key points. 
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6 And here, we can include Ulrich’s and Agathe’s biological father, the patriarchal figure 
of the aged Emperor Franz Joseph, as well as the terminally ill Habsburg Empire itself. The 
seventieth jubilee celebration of Franz Joseph’s accession to the throne, planned for 
December 2, 1918, is the subject of the great Parallelaktion, an elaborate planning committee 
with which Ulrich becomes involved. The whole scheme revolves around the attempt to 
overshadow the German celebration of Wilhelm II’s jubilee in June of that year. Ulrich’s 
father explains: “Da der 2. XII. natürlich durch nichts vor den 15. VI. gerückt werden könnte, 
ist man auf den glücklichen Gedanken verfallen, das ganze Jahr 1918 zu einem Jubiläumsjahr 
unseres Friedenskaisers auszugestalten” (1, 79). This scheme reveals the full extent of the 
ludicrous activities within the government (especially as the whole Parallelaktion dissolves 
into a social club) and the lengths to which the Austrians will go to uphold their historical 
supremacy over the Germans. The campaign is a ridiculous and desperate attempt to 
resuscitate a dying tradition and the prestige it once evoked, and a symptom of a larger 
philosophical problem of the “nonempty gap” (Ryan 216) that invades much of the rest of the 
novel in different forms. 
7 Surely it is no coincidence that the identical disguise is that of Pierrot, the notoriously 
ambiguous circus figure, descended from early European commedia dell’arte theatre. He has 
been known as Pulcinella, Punch, Pedrolino, or Petrushka, the simpleton and fool who 
exposes and ridicules his masters. This melancholy clown suffers slightly from 
schizophrenia, appearing at once mischievous and playful, then sinister like the jealous and 
cynical operatic figures of Rigoletto and Pagliacci. But the aspect of Pierrot’s personality of 
most interest to us is the ambiguity surrounding gender identification in Ulrich’s and 
Agathe’s chance meeting. Traditionally gendered male, in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries Pierrot was increasingly played by women, the most famous of which is 
undoubtedly Frank Wedekind’s Lulu character. This double articulation of Pierrot as 
feminine man and masculine woman irreparably alters the nature of the siblings’ reunion. 
They can no longer be identified as man and woman, with all the erotic overtones implicit in 
the Attic recognition scenes. Instead, they meet as brother and sister, as twins, perhaps even 
as each other’s alter ego. 
8 Perhaps Musil knew of Mallarmé’s fascination with the self-identical play of murder, 
incest, and suicide orchestrated by Pierrot, the mime. In a brutal and bizarre drama, Pierrot 
illustrates his murder of the unfaithful Colombine. He ties her to the bed while she is sleeping 
and tickles her feet, so that her “ghastly death bursts upon her among those atrocious bursts 
of laughter” (quoted in Derrida 199). Pierrot simultaneously plays the murderer and his 
female victim, thus initiating the simultaneous collapse of both gender and subject/object 
boundaries. A single character takes on a form of oscillating androgyny, in an illustration of 
what Derrida calls a “masturbatory suicide.” While it is certain that Musil’s invocation of 
Pierrot has a different aim, the analogy is a useful one. 
9 It is important to establish the metaphorical nature of sibling incest between Agathe and 
Ulrich. Their bond is not really of a sexual nature. Rather, they use the fuel of eros to 
orchestrate their quasi-transcendent union. 
10 Musil parts company with Freud on the fundamental issue of biology. Freud insists upon 
the “biological foundation of the Oedipus complex,” thereby rendering it an essential part of 
human sexual development. For Musil, this is a simplistic view, which fails to take into 
account the significance of social, psychological, and indeed ethical factors. 
11 A genius of many talents, Mach was, among other things, a physicist, an engineer, a 
psychologist, and a philosopher. He is known for his theories on epistemology and 
positivism, and for his experiments in optics, acoustics, electronic induction, physiology, and 
photography. He held posts alternately as Professor of Mathematics, Physics, and 
Philosophy, and was inducted into the Fluid Mechanics Hall of Fame as one of the leading 
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pioneers of supersonic aerodynamics. He is perhaps most famous for his discovery of the unit 
of the speed of sound, appropriately labeled the “Mach.” 
12 The Nachlaß is divided into two sections: the first is a group of twenty chapters which 
appear relatively intact and have undergone the first stages of the intense polishing to which 
Musil subjected all his work. The second section consists of notes, sketches, and drafts for 
future chapters or versions of other chapters. There is much repetition and the writing is 
disjointed and almost fantastic in nature. We witness an unraveling of character and plot such 
that all of the first three books of Musil’s masterpiece almost appear to come apart at the 
seams before our eyes. Upon reading this section, everything that has come before these 
pages seems like fiction, and the dream-like, visionary quality of these final musings 
becomes the real novel. Here Musil experiments with various alternative scenarios, including 
the possibility of Ulrich having sexual relations with a number of the women in the text: 
Agathe, Diotima, Clarisse. This testifies to Musil’s own complaints that publishing the work 
piecemeal limited him severely; he considered the novel a continual work-in-progress, 
experimental in nature, and felt that the release of early chapters distorted the entire work 
(Pike xii). Perhaps one of the most important contributions of the Nachlaß is the light they 
shed on Musil’s concept of mysticism and what he called “anderer Zustand.” 
13 Classical and neo-classical drama often include a recognition scene as a means of 
driving the plot forward. Aristotle accorded it great importance and developed criteria for 
anagnorisis, which included some kind of false inference. Whether deliberately contrived or 
not, there is necessarily a misunderstanding concerning the true identity of a character 
(Dupriez 433-34). While Ulrich and Agathe do not appear to fall prey to such Aristotelian 
false inference, there is indeed, I would argue, a misunderstanding. For they never get 
beyond the Pierrot costume to see the true nature of their relationship. Thus, this chapter 
constitutes a second recognition, one that seems to run almost the entire course of the novel 
without full resolution. Ulrich and Agathe are in a constant state of seeing each other for the 
first time. 
14 Musil introduces the term “anderer Zustand” in the third book to refer to Ulrich’s and 
Agathe’s experiment in creating an alternative, imaginary social reality. The author never 
clarifies this ambiguous epithet, perhaps because defining it might ruin the magic of the 
quasi-utopian twosome the siblings attempt to nurture and sustain. 
15 We need only think of examples such as the “beloved” in Novalis’s Hymnen an die 
Nacht, Lucinde in Schlegel’s novel of the same name, or the many Wagnerian redeemers: 
Senta, Elisabeth, Brünnhilde, and Isolde. These women all sacrifice themselves to facilitate 
the transcendence of the male hero, often an artist struggling to realize his creative potential. 
While Agathe’s role in Mann ohne Eigenschaften does not fit easily into this paradigm, there 
are elements of this tradition at play in the novel, especially in this critical chapter. Ulrich 
does most of the talking, and Agathe acts more as facilitator to his experience of discovering 
self and subjectivity. As we shall see, this model breaks down when it becomes clear that 
Ulrich cannot simply overcome his existential angst even when he finds his Platonic mate. 
From Ulrich’s mature perspective, Wagner’s predictable plots will seem foolishly simple. In 
the final sections of the narrative, Agathe emerges as the dominant force in the guise of the 
new woman. 
16 Novalis is no stranger to the world of Mann ohne Eigenschaften. Agathe is in the habit 
of quoting Novalis – “Was kann ich also für meine Seele tun, die wie ein unaufgelöstes 
Rätsel in mir wohnt?” (3, 857) – even though she denies belief in the soul. She leaves it to 
her brother to answer such questions. Wagner, too, figures prominently in the novel; his 
music is the source of tension between Clarisse and Walter, Ulrich’s childhood friends. They 
play duets of his music on the piano and are enchanted by its romantic fervor; Walter even 
compares their suffering to that of Tristan and Isolde. Wagner also functions as a backdrop in 
 OEDIPUS  ENDANGERED 177 
 
 
 
the novel (Clarisse’s brother is conspicuously named Siegfried), representing a now defunct 
world where authenticity was still sought and sentimentality was not regarded as kitsch. 
17 Along with the ubiquitous romantic characterization of night as a refuge from the harsh 
realities of the light, both Novalis and Wagner speak of a new kind of sight: for Tristan and 
Isolde, to be “nachtsichtig” (80) means being able to see the lies of the strict moral and social 
codes imposed by day. And Novalis’s lovers have access to the night’s loving sun, “liebliche 
Sonne der Nacht” (151), a secret inner piercing light fueled by passion. Ulrich’s and 
Agathe’s new extended vision features some of these same characteristics, allowing them 
access to a higher plane, but also freeing them from a static and repressive moral system. 
18 That Ulrich and Agathe do not consummate their love is in some ways a strange reversal 
of Wagner’s erotic philosophy in Tristan und Isolde. While Wagner was an unabashed fan of 
Arthur Schopenhauer and his philosophy of will-negation, he allowed himself certain 
liberties in its application. The Liebestod makes for a perfect Schopenhauerian climax, with 
Isolde as otherwordly redemptress, and yet their physical union of the flesh contradicts the 
philosopher’s doctrine of asceticism. While Musil’s motives are clearly not the same as 
Wagner’s, his decision to deny Ulrich’s and Agathe’s sexual desires contradicts the romantic 
imperative of erotic love and paves the way for them to transcend their earthly existence (and 
here this might be translated as the strict moral codes of Viennese society) and move toward 
the construction of a relational ethics, with Schopenhauer’s will-negation acting as the 
driving force. 
19 Manfred Frank interprets Mann ohne Eigenschaften as part Romantic allegory and part 
Romantic critique. He points to the appropriation of key concepts regarding the construction 
of the self and argues that Musil adopts Novalis’ critique of Fichte’s self-determining self in 
favor of a self that is determined by a non-self. He demonstrates that Ulrich’s and Agathe’s 
foray into Romanticism represents a quasi-religious aspiration, which abolishes totalizing 
systems and unfolds as an anarchic project. 
20 Near the end of the Nachlaß, three sisters are mentioned, referring to the trio of Ulrich, 
Agathe, and the fictional world they have created, which itself is granted object status. 
Musil’s notes are by this point chaotic and convoluted. The author contemplates Ulrich’s and 
Agathe’s respective thoughts of suicide, albeit not without a glimmer of hope. Ulrich vows 
that they will not kill themselves until all other avenues have been exhausted. 
21 In fact, Ulrich is annoyed that she is not more assertive in her role as a new woman: 
“Diese männliche Machtvorstellung von der weiblichen Schwäche ist heute noch recht 
gewöhnlich, obwohl mir den einander folgenden Wellen der Jugend daneben neuere 
Auffassungen entstanden sind, und die Natürlichkeit, mit der Agathe ihre Abhängigkeit von 
Hagauer behandelt, verletzte ihren Bruder” (3, 684). As the novel progresses, Agathe 
becomes increasingly independent, even straying from Ulrich’s sphere of influence and the 
situation is reversed altogether when, one day, he has no knowledge of her whereabouts. 
When he finds himself unneeded, Ulrich no longer wants her to embody the new woman. 
Instead, he behaves like a selfish and jealous husband. 
22 Walter Sokel suggests that Musil veers away from his essayist persona in his fictional 
treatment of women: “Als Essayist und Philosoph neigte Musil dazu, den Mann und Bruder 
siegen zu lassen. Als Romanschreiber und Erzähler erlaubt er der weiblichen Hauptfigur 
einen ästhetischen Triumph davonzutragen. Das zeigt, dass Musil seine eigene stereotype 
Idee von der Frau imstande war zu transzendieren” (1983, 127). Sokel seems here to confuse 
the issue somewhat. The triumph of the feminine aesthetic may be a victory on the level of 
cultural values, but it has little to do with the portrayal of Musil’s character, Agathe. 
23 Ever since the Attic tragedies of antiquity, Electra has been synonymous with a non-
traditional version of womanhood. She is not described in any of the extant versions of 
Aeschylus, Euripides, or Sophocles as either particularly feminine or beautiful. An outcast in 
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the Kingdom of Argos, she is often described as a haggard figure dressed in rags. Similarly, 
her actions do not fit the traditional status of a single woman, be it in antiquity or more recent 
times. She is fierce, vengeful, courageous, and defiant, full of rage and determination – 
attributes for which she is condemned and ridiculed. In Musil’s immediate literary memory is 
Hofmannsthal’s influential adaptation of Sophocles’ Elektra, in which he takes these 
elements to the extreme and portrays his Elektra as a hysterical maniac. 
24 Such figurative matricide need not be seen in a negative light. Musil uses Agathe to 
question and redefine the nature and role of femininity. But, ultimately, he sees her 
emergence as the “new woman” as one of strength and rejuvenation. In building a bridge of 
re-gendered ethical relations, Agathe’s expression is allowed to extend beyond the confining 
limits of maternity. 
25 Müller, too, borrows from the legend of Isis and Osiris when he has Elektra offer 
Hamlet her heart as a tasty morsel. The ultimate symbol of a true union of souls has always 
involved consumption of the flesh. 
26 Though Nietzsche’s thought offers utopian possibilities for Musil’s characters, if left on 
this course the siblings risk falling victim to a vacuous and apolitical sentimentality. Mach’s 
theories constitute the pragmatic anchor for this ideal couple on the margins of society and 
lend much-needed leverage to the symbolic silence of their self-imposed exile. 
27 Critics (e.g., Schärer, Luserke) have accused Musil of indulging in utopian fantasies, 
which provide no real political alternative for the corrupt and decrepit society he seeks to 
undo. Musil counters this criticism with this diary entry: “Das Kontemplative des Anderen 
Zustandes ist aber etwas anderes als der Trance… Es ist ein europäischer Versuch, ohne 
Bewußtseinsverlust usw.” (Tagebücher 786; see Kochs 187). The author prevents his 
characters from succumbing to the utopian trance by having them tread a thin line between 
their ideal vision in a self-exiled alternative reality and the threat of their dream imploding in 
destructive anarchy. In the end, it is the continual encounter with the/one’s other that keeps 
Ulrich and Agathe alive to the challenge of resisting the status quo and attempting to embrace 
a different version of reality. 
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A  SYMPOSIUM  AS  ORNAMENT? 
HERMANN  BROCH’S  SCHLAFWANDLER  TRILOGIE  AND  THE
DISCOURSE  OF  ART  AND  PHILOSOPHY  IN  THE  MODERN  NOVEL 
Mark Grzeskowiak 
University of Toronto 
Es hat seit dem Expressionismus, ja vielleicht überhaupt in der ersten 
Hälfte dieses Jahrhunderts wohl kaum einen deutschen Dichter ge-geben, 
der die Probleme der Moderne und insbesondere der modernen Dichtung, 
genauer: des modernen Romans, in so vielfältiger und um-fassender 
Weise durchdachte wie Hermann Broch.   (Brinkmann 347)  
It would be fair to say that Richard Brinkmann’s 1957 evaluation of the Austrian 
author Hermann Broch maintains a degree of verity in German literary scholarship. 
Along with Thomas Mann, Alfred Döblin, and Robert Musil, Broch’s oeuvre is still 
considered to be exemplary of late-modernist prose in the German language. His 
novel, Die Schlafwandler: Eine Romantrilogie, in particular, has become a standard 
for those interested in delineating the “Deutsche Roman der Moderne”; both in 
terms of its topic and in terms of its narrative form (Durzak 287; Petersen 38). Broch 
claimed that in writing Die Schlafwandler, he had attempted to create a new type of 
novel, one similar to experiments by contemporaries such as James Joyce, John Dos 
Passos, and André Gide. Central to Broch’s conception of this new novel is the unity 
of reflection, plot, and style, and in fact it is on the basis of what he termed this 
“einheitliche Geschlossenheit” that he felt the form of the novel could be renewed. I 
would like to look at how this unity is achieved in Die Schlafwandler by considering 
the philosophical and architectonic status of “Das Symposion oder Gespräch über 
die Erlösung,” a dialog passage that appears in “Huguenau oder die Sachlichkeit.” 
Die Schlafwandler was written by Broch between 1928 and 1931, and it 
comprises three books. Each book is set in a different historical period – 1888, 1903, 
and 1918, respectively – and each presents a different story. Characters from the 
first two run over into the third, however, and there is a unity, as I mentioned above, 
to the trilogy’s theme. Before I enter into a discussion of the symposium dialog and 
its relation to this theme, it might be best to provide a cursory review of the main 
points of the novel’s plot. 
Writing the Austrian Traditions: Relations between Philosophy and Literature. 
Ed. Wolfgang Huemer and Marc-Oliver Schuster.  Edmonton, Alberta:  
Wirth-Institute for Austrian and Central European Studies, 2003.  pp. 181-188. 
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The first book, “Pasenow oder die Romantik,” is set in and around Berlin at the end 
of the nineteenth century. Lieutenant Joachim von Pasenow is the son of a Prussian 
landowner. The military and social traditions that have come to define his life are 
beginning to unravel around him. It is a gradual dissolution depicted in the book 
through his relationships with his father, his friend Eduard von Bertrand, and 
Ruzena, a girl from a local theatre with whom he has fallen in love. Joachim has a 
brief affair with Ruzena, but eventually ends their relationship and marries the 
daughter of a neighbouring landowner. His decision to marry Elisabeth Baddensen 
is a culmination of the romanticism to which the title refers; like the antiquated 
customs and habits that structure his life, Joachim’s marriage is an empty formality 
and an attempt to escape from the changing realities of the world around him. 
The second book is set in the industrial milieu of Cologne and Mannheim at the 
turn of the century. “Esch oder die Anarchie” centers on August Esch, a bookkeeper 
who develops an idiosyncrasy following his dismissal from a shipping company; he 
feels that the world is full of tiny, bookkeeping errors. Esch’s attempt to trace these 
errors to what he perceives to be their origin fails, and he retreats into a world of 
utopian plans and dreams. He develops an idealized image of America and decides 
to go there to escape the pressures of his lower-class life, and he even invests his 
savings in a variety show, hoping that the profits will help him to leave Germany. 
Esch’s restlessness and his constant desire to bring about some sort of social 
revolution constitute the “anarchy” to which the title of the second book refers. 
These impulses lead Esch to a confrontation with Bertrand, now an industrialist, and 
into an almost mystical relationship with Mutter Hentjen, the owner of a small 
tavern. Eventually Esch loses everything invested in the variety show and marries 
Mutter Hentjen. 
Events in the third book take place toward the end of the First World War, in a 
little town on the Mosel. Both Esch and Pasenow reappear in “Huguenau oder die 
Sachlichkeit” (the former as the owner of the town’s newspaper, the latter as its 
military governor), and so too do Bertrand and Mutter Hentjen. A deserter, Wilhelm 
Huguenau, arrives in the town and immediately proceeds to manipulate Esch out of 
his ownership of the newspaper and subsequently attains a certain prominence 
among the townspeople. But Huguenau lives in fear that his desertion from the army 
will be discovered, and the story that unfolds in the third book centers for the most 
part on his attempt to win the favor of Major Pasenow and to prevent any friendship 
from developing between the latter and Esch. “Huguenau oder die Sachlichkeit” 
includes various other story lines running parallel to, and at times crossing, the 
principal story of Huguenau, Esch, and Pasenow. Each of these secondary story 
lines concerns a different character in the town. Lieutenant Jaretzki, for example, 
has lost an arm in battle and tries to come to terms with his situation through 
alcohol. Hannah Wendling is a young woman who slowly loses her sense of 
connectedness to her husband, to her marriage, and finally to the world around her. 
Gödicke is a soldier who had been buried alive in the trenches and whose 
“resurrection” is in effect a gradual reconstruction of his identity. Also embedded in 
this third book are a narrative and an essay. The narrative, “Geschichte des 
Heilsarmeemädchens in Berlin,” is recounted by a convalescent in the Berlin home 
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of a group of Jewish refugees. As the third book unfolds, we discover that this 
convalescent is actually Bertrand, and that he is also the author of the essay, “Zerfall 
der Werte.” Broch later wrote that in putting together the complex narrative of 
“Huguenau oder die Sachlichkeit” he intended to weave all of the separate stories 
together like a carpet:  
im Huguenau ist eine neue Technik versucht [...] Das Buch besteht aus 
einer Reihe von Geschichten, die alle das gleiche Thema abwandeln, 
nämlich die Rückverweisung des Menschen auf die Einsamkeit – eine 
Rückverweisung, die durch den Zerfall der Werte bedingt ist – und die 
Aufzeigung der neuen produktiven Kräfte, die aus der Einsamkeit 
entspringen, wenn sie tatsächlich manifest geworden ist. Diese einzelnen 
Geschichten, untereinander teppichartig verwoben, geben jede für sich 
eine andere Bewußtseinslage wieder: sie steigen aus dem völlig 
Irrationalen (“Geschichte des Heilsarmeemädchens in Berlin”) bis zur 
vollständigen Rationalität des Theoretischen (“Zerfall der Werte”). 
Zwischen diesen beiden Polen spielen die übrigen Geschichten auf 
gestaffelten Zwischenebenen der Rationalität. Auf diese Art wird die 
Sinngebung der Gesamttrilogie erzielt, und ebenso wird der meta-
physisch-ethische Gehalt […] mit aller Deutlichkeit zum Ausdruck 
gebracht.   (quoted in Durzak, 1966, 76) 
The “Zerfall der Werte” that Broch describes is presaged by both Pasenow’s 
romanticism and Esch’s anarchism, and it culminates in Huguenau’s “Sachlichkeit”; 
at the end of the third book, after coldbloodedly murdering Esch by stabbing him in 
the back, Huguenau later cheats Esch’s widow, Mutter Hentjen, out of all her 
savings.  
“Sachlichkeit” is in itself a difficult term to translate into English; it can be 
thought of as “objectivity,” as “matter-of-factness,” or perhaps even as 
“functionalism.” All of the principal characters in Die Schlafwandler suffer from 
what might be called a disconnected perception of reality – with the exception of 
Huguenau. Unlike Pasenow and Esch, Huguenau is rooted in the objective here and 
now of the world. His relations with the other characters depend upon their 
usefulness to his plans, and he spends little time reflecting upon his actions. The 
problem, or idea, with which Broch was trying to come to terms in the character of 
Huguenau, was general to the period in which he wrote Die Schlafwandler. 
Huguenau not only confronts reality, but also creates it for himself by removing any 
secondary or ethical reflection from his actions. Broch is ambivalent when it comes 
to providing a final judgment of Huguenau and his Machiavellian attitude. At the 
end of the novel, Huguenau returns home and becomes a successful businessman. It 
is not that the novel is devoid of alternatives; in fact Die Schlafwandler is a perfect 
example of the interpretive possibilities that arise from what contemporary literary 
theorists have termed “the turn to narrative.” My present concern, however, is with 
the actual structure or “Architektonik” of the novel.  
Broch conceived his novel as a tangible structure and often used terms such as 
“Architektur” and “Architektonik” when describing the composition of Die 
Schlafwandler. As some of his readers have noted, it is not insignificant that a 
discussion of modernist architecture is included in the embedded essay in the third 
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book, “Zerfall der Werte.” Its author, Bertrand, begins the second part of his essay 
by commenting, “vielleicht ist das Entsetzen dieser Zeit in den architektonischen 
Erlebnissen am sinnfälligsten [...] hinter all meinem Ekel und meiner Müdigkeit 
steckt eine alte sehr fundierte Erkenntnis, die Erkenntnis, daß es für eine Epoche 
nichts Wichtigeres gibt als ihren Stil” (436). Paul Michael Lützeler has termed 
Broch the “kulturphilosophische Romanschriftsteller par excellence,” and has 
provided the most detailed interpretation to date of the novel in relation to Broch’s 
writings on the philosophy of culture. Like a number of authors of his generation, 
Broch was influenced by epochal theories of culture. Lützeler has shown how 
Broch’s earlier thoughts on modernist architecture are repeated in “Zerfall der 
Werte,” and he has also pointed to aspects of the “Architektur” of the novel that can 
be thought of as realizations of this theory. I would like to review some of Lützeler’s 
arguments before I turn to the question of the “Symposion-Gespräch” (see Lützeler, 
1996, 289-297). 
At the turn of the century, the Viennese architect Adolf Loos helped to set the 
tone for the later development of modernist architecture when he advocated the 
removal of decorative ornaments and greater emphasis on functional considerations 
in the construction of buildings. Loos’s criticism was directed at the type of 
aestheticism that had produced the various “neo” architectural styles (Gothic, 
Classic, Romantic) over the course of the nineteenth century. It is a criticism that 
was shared in certain respects by Broch himself. He used similar arguments to 
distinguish between art and kitsch, which he saw as “Mache” or 
“Dekorationsbombast” – an attempt to hide the lack of a central value through 
aesthetic decoration. But Broch also pointed to what he saw as the wider 
consequences of a total reduction of style to function. Loos was not simply 
describing architecture; he was writing from within that disintegration of a system of 
values he set out to criticize, and the problem, according to Broch, lay in Loos’s 
evaluation of the ornament.  
An ornament could be decorative and merely fulfill an aesthetic function, but 
for Broch it was also indicative of the style of a period in art history, and in this 
sense an ornament was not merely decoration; it completed a work of art by 
summarizing it and expressing its essence on a smaller scale. Accordingly, an 
approach to architecture that removed the ornament from its theoretical 
considerations, such as that proposed by Loos, could also reveal something about 
the epoch in which it appeared. In spite of his stated intentions, Loos’s proposition 
was similar to a concept of art reduced to the aesthetic (l’art pour l’art) and to a 
system of values that had fractured into various independent systems of values with 
their own absolute logic. The author of “Zerfall der Werte” points out that the one 
quality which distinguishes modernist architecture from all previous architectural 
styles is the removal of the ornament, and that proponents of modernism have failed 
to recognize that the ornament is not merely an accessory; in its medial position, it 
provides the basis for any representation of a broader, or perhaps it would be better 
to say “deeper,” unity between the two: 
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“Baustil” ist Logik, ist eine Logik, die das Gesamtbauwerk durchdringt 
[...] und innerhalb dieser Logik ist das Ornament bloß das letzte, der 
differentiale Ausdruck im kleinen für den einheitlichen und 
einheitssetzenden Grundgedanken des Ganzen.   (437)  
The ornament is the only art form that cannot exist autonomously; as such, it 
provides the starting point for Bertrand’s thoughts on the broader collapse of a 
universal system of values. 
Lützeler has suggested that Broch incorporated his thoughts on the ornament by 
including “textual” markers in the novel that can be thought of as realizations of 
Bertrand’s thoughts in the essay (299-303). In the first book, the military uniform 
assumes the role of ornament, and in the second book the variety show fulfills this 
function. Both motifs, according to Lützeler, are decorations; they hide the loss of a 
central value rather than help to bring expression to it. And both are restricted to the 
level of the diegesis. In the third book, it is the essay itself that takes on this role, but 
Lützeler believes that in this case, it represents an authentic ornament as it is 
conceived by Bertrand (and, ultimately, Broch):  
Das Gebäude findet seine ästhetische Vollendung im Ornament, und der 
Roman Die Schlafwandler findet seine Abrundung im “Zerfall der 
Werte”. So sinnlos ein Ornament ohne Gebäude, so sinnlos “Der Zerfall 
der Werte” ohne die Romanhandlung.   (Lützeler 298) 
The essay grows out of the novel by integrating and discussing on a theoretical level 
all of the problems associated with the disintegration of values in the story. There 
are two other major compositional moments in the third book: “Geschichte des 
Heilsarmeemädchens in Berlin” and “Das Symposion oder Gespräch über die 
Erlösung.” I would like to discuss now whether the latter can be considered as an 
ornament or decoration on the basis of what I have just described. 
“Das Symposion oder Gespräch über die Erlösung” takes place in the home of 
Esch and Mutter Hentjen. The editor, his wife, Major Pasenow, and Huguenau are 
seated at a table. The narrator introduces the dialog, which ensues as a 
“Theaterszene” (551), and the form of the “Symposion-Gespräch” is the same as we 
would expect to find in a dramatic script or perhaps even the libretto of an opera. 
Dialog is rendered directly, although there are italicised passages that might pass for 
stage directions or prompts. The narrator also lets us know that this “Theaterszene” 
is a symbol. In fact, in the atomized and mediated world of Die Schlafwandler, it is 
the symbol of a symbol, a symbol “zweiter, dritter, n-ter Ableitung” (551). 
In the opening dialog, Esch asks the Major if he would like another glass of 
wine. He declines, and Huguenau remarks, pretentiously, that it is a harmless wine 
and that the most the Major would have to fear from it is “einen einfachen 
natürlichen Rausch..., man schläft ein, wenn man genug hat, das ist alles” (552). 
Esch interjects that to be drunk is never natural: “ein Rausch,” he says, “ist eine 
Vergiftung” (552). Huguenau, interpreting this as a taunt, replies in kind that he can 
recall times when Esch himself had drunk more than his share of wine in the local 
tavern. And looking over at Esch, he adds “übrigens […], gar so unvergiftet 
kommen Sir mir nicht vor” (552). The Major, sensing perhaps that this denigration 
of Esch is being staged for his ears, tells Huguenau that his comments are 
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deplorable. Huguenau persists, and goes so far as to call Esch a wolf in sheep’s 
clothing, “ja, dabei bleibe ich... und, mit Verlaub zu sagen, seine Räusche tut er im 
geheimen ab” (552). What follows in the “Symposion-Gespräch” corresponds to the 
dramatic pattern set out in these opening lines. Huguenau, self-centered, sarcastic, 
and trying to draw the Major away from Esch, is himself excluded from the 
increasingly esoteric discussion between the other two men. Esch, following his 
own train of thought, breaks from it only occasionally to respond to Huguenau. The 
Major complements what Esch has to say, although it is clear from their exchange 
that he is also trying to draw Esch in a particular direction with his thoughts.  
Numerous biblical references, and also allusions to other parts of the trilogy, are 
integrated into the “Symposion-Gespräch.” The Major quotes the Lutheran Bible, 
and some of Esch’s comments are reminiscent of his earlier conversation with 
Bertrand in the second book, when he visits the industrialist. Symbols are always 
difficult to interpret definitively, and I would like to suggest three possible ways in 
which the “Symposion-Gespräch” might be approached in relation to the theme of 
Die Schlafwandler. 
First, in terms of the story, the dialog marks the point at which Huguenau 
becomes aware of both Pasenow’s animosity toward him and the favorable opinion 
Pasenow has of Esch. The dynamic between Huguenau and Pasenow is one of the 
more interesting aspects of the third book, and it is never really clear if the former’s 
mollification is self-serving or sincere. This fine line between rational and irrational 
action is, as Broch often pointed out, a principal element of Die Schlafwandler, and 
it finds its quintessence in Huguenau’s attitude towards Pasenow. 
Second, in respect of the essay, the dialog can be considered in relation to 
Bertrand’s thoughts on religion. “Auf dem Tische,” the narrator tells us in 
describing the scene, “das Brot und der Wein.” Bread and wine are central to the 
Christian Holy Communion and are, at least since Hölderlin’s famous poem, motifs 
associated in the German culture with a general unifying impulse. In the course of 
the dialog, Esch and Pasenow try to draw each other in a particular direction with 
their comments, and at the end they do reach a synthesis, but it is in the form of the 
song of the “Heilsarmee,” something I will return to later. 
Third, with regard to the novel’s philosophy, and by that I mean Broch’s 
comments on weaving the different story lines in the third book together like a 
carpet – what he would elsewhere call its polyhistoricism – the dialog is a 
“Symposium”-dialog. The Platonic original was rooted in the ancient Greek custom 
in which a group of men, after a meal and over wine, would discuss a topic chosen 
by a Symposiarch. Plato created an original philosophical genre based on this ritual, 
and it is this “Symposium” form, which the Romantics later imitated in their 
“Symphilosophieren” and to which the title of the dialog refers.  
But is it an ornament or decoration? Most probably, it is a decoration. In spite 
of the fact that the “Symposion-Gespräch” condenses many of the principal themes 
of the novel, it ends in the song of “Heilsarmee.” The “Zerfall der Werte” discusses 
architecture, philosophy, and also religion. Bertrand is extremely critical of 
Protestantism, and describes it as just another symptom of the disintegration of 
values. He does not consider it a religion (and therefore capable of instituting a new 
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hierarchy of values), but rather as a sect, and he regards the Salvation Army itself as 
the quintessential Protestant sect: 
Religionen entstehen aus Sekten und zerfallen wieder in Sekten, keh-ren 
zu ihrem Ursprung zurück, ehe sie sich gänzlich auflösen. Am Anfang 
des Christentums standen die einzelnen Christus- und Mithraskulte, an 
seinem Ende stehen die grotesken amerikanischen Sekten, steht die 
Heilsarmee.   (578) 
Given the option of joining Marie, the Salvation Army girl, Bertrand chooses to stay 
with the Jewish refugees because he believes it is the most honorable choice 
available to him. If the “Symposion-Gespräch” is considered a decoration, however, 
then it might also give an indication of two directions in which the author of Die 
Schlafwandler did not see a possibility of renewal (at least at the time that the novel 
was written): in the Christian church and in Platonism. The ethical trajectory is 
similarly directed away from the past, but what distinguishes Die Schlafwandler is 
precisely this mixture of narrative and essay. Broch does not argue only from a 
position “beyond good and evil,” he also depicts what he perceives to be its effects 
on the various characters in his novel. This “what he perceives to be” is perhaps the 
strongest argument that can be made against the ethical component of Die 
Schlafwandler.  
In conclusion, I would like to touch upon a ubiquitous problem in recent 
literature on Broch, namely whether or not he should be considered a modernist or a 
post-modernist. At a recent conference, a novel by Thomas Mann was described as 
pre-postmodern. An elderly gentleman, somewhat perplexed, asked whether or not 
pre-postmodern simply meant modern; it is a question that might be asked of several 
German and Austrian authors whose novels are considered representative of late 
modernist prose. Lützeler has answered this question in favor of modernism for 
Broch, but in order to do this he focuses on Broch’s Platonism. In Broch’s insistence 
upon the need for a universal system of values, or at the very least his nostalgic 
recollection of it, Lützeler believes that Broch is on the other side of the 
philosophical divide when it comes to the central debate on the “grand narratives” 
(Lützeler 302). But I think that we could also take into consideration Broch’s 
concept of a textual “Architektur” in this regard. The early theory of postmodernism 
was also informed by discussions about the larger role of architecture in society, and 
Charles Jencks’s study What is Post-modernism? is a good example of this. Jencks 
hinted that one of the many revivals of postmodern architecture was the ornament, 
an ornament which not only grew out of the building to which it was attached but 
also helped to situate it in the broader community in which it was built. In this 
respect, Broch is not quite as modernist as he might seem at first glance, and I 
mention this only in order to suggest that the answer to a question that continues to 
perplex North American literary scholars – “What is a Postmodernist Text?” – might 
be found in the work of seemingly modernist authors such as Broch. The conclusion 
of Die Schlafwandler carries what would appear to be Broch’s inscription: “Schluß 
der Schlafwandler / Wien 1928-31” (716). And this leads to a final question: Is the 
contemporary “return of the author,” or what some critics refer to as “narcissistic 
narrative,” an ornament or a decoration? 
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SONNETS 
by 
Franz  Josef  Czernin 
wasser, sonett 
das meer, es wird durchkreuzt im eignen namen laut, 
da im glas wasser stürmt, als öffnung vor zu schweben, 
wie all die schäume sich mit lippen selbst beleben,  
dass wasser unsre farben spielt, zusammen braut 
sein bild als aug: aus blauem sich das durch uns staut, 
blick bis zum rand zu füllen, da auf die see wir heben, 
von grund auf schwall ausschöpfend, wir auch fliessend geben, 
dem meer, den wellen wort, das unsern lauf rein schaut: 
gestrichen wird, auch an wie aus, das ganze segel  
an jedem punkt, dass tränen, tropfen sich durchdringen, 
aus einem guss, in einem boot auf uns zu bringen, 
ja lösend ruder, blatt mit dieser zunge: pegel 
auf es und angibt mit der quelle, die in dingen 
und zwischen zügen, zeilen fasst: stillt dies die regel? 
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wasser, sonett 
 
 
was unter strömt und über schäumt, ich übersetze 
durch dich, der wasser uns so hoch, so tief lässt reichen, 
da es sich, fliessend, über trägt, noch im entweichen, 
als das, was unter jeder hand gemein, knüpft plätze, 
 
die ich uns, unter gründig, über mässig, durch die netze 
da regnen lasse; was, uns schwall, in all den schläuchen 
läuft unter, über neu durch dich, seh ich aus teichen 
mit nassen augen, dass uns zwischen zeilen schätze 
 
flüstern sich ein, die winken? wasser, das ins wasser geht, 
uns über, unter, rauscht so wahr vom wein, der schenkt 
sich ein bald, rein, da unter schwellig, es gelenkt 
 
stets auf dich selbst, mir über fällig, wort an steht 
da bis zum hals: wie es sich murmelnd schön her drängt, 
uns mund schon wässrig macht, bis dir der trank gerät. 
 SONNETS 193 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
erde, sonett 
 
 
aus grauem, masse wälzt es sich, uns rührt, wild dreht, 
ja schleudert ding aus sich, hier mich heraus fest greifend, 
dass heiss der brei hervor gebracht hat uns, gesät 
als korn längst, wahr dran, doch jetzt auf den teig versteifend 
 
sich dergestalt; so macht ich uns aus staub, der sich gerät  
feucht ausser sich, in all den namen gliedernd, reifend, 
dass es, in solcher fassung, sich bewahrt, da steht,  
geformt, bezeugt durch uns, selbst schale so einstreifend 
 
als kern wie sachlich: was das heisst, da wir durchdringen 
uns leibhaft, dass es sauer, süss aufgeht, das maß   
gebend, so ein wie aus, gleich voll: was uns schon stets besaß, 
 
schürft lebhaft, tief hier? steine, brote, die verschlingen  
einander uns, am wort, das hält, sich isst gelingen  
auf ganz: ob jeder deut davon jetzt in sich las? 
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erde, sonett 
 
 
aus nichts als punkten, tot, aus all dem staub, dem grauen, 
da aufgewirbelt massenhaft, zeug dies so greift 
heraus, rührt heiss sich bald, zu brei, an sich zu bauen, 
aufgehend, ein- in solcher sache, ob es auch läuft,  
 
ja über, ach, auf uns heraus; wie nackt, versteift 
darauf, abtastend dergestalt wir dadurch schauen, 
an ganz gehörig; so gefasst hält eins sich, reift, 
dies gliedernd leibhaft, fest, jetzt endlich zu verdauen   
 
am wort: das teilt mit unsrem korn, wahr dran, verkehrt, 
(auch mit sich selbst), schalen, ja, kerne lässt zerspringen, 
wie wir uns stets mit haut danach, mit haar verzehrt. 
 
kein krümel bleibt auf einmal, nichts von all den dingen 
als das, was sich aus unsren, freien stücken nährt, 
da wir im eignen namen selbst durch uns ganz dringen. 
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waizen, spreu 
 
 
da boden doppelt, so aufwühlend, zu mir fällt, 
es stampft aus spreu und staub sich, lärm und all dem kot; 
zusammen stoppelnd, stotternd sich, heraus dies stellt, 
dass das, was wüst gesät, sich aufgeht, all dies schrot 
 
in körnern, wahr an uns; dran sich es, wörtlich, hält, 
da ich es mahle aus, so fruchtbar aus der not 
beleibt, wie es uns schmerzlich fasst, bis wir gepellt 
aus jeder schale frisch sind, neu, einander brot, 
 
dies da mit teilend: kern gepflanzt, auch fort, gemessen 
uns dergestalt wird zu, in jedem zeug bedingt 
mit haar und haut, auskostend bitter, süss, wir fressen 
 
uns auf, ganz sachlich: wie da an sich erde bringt, 
hier jeden fussbreit mich, wir sind, von uns besessen, 
im letzten krümel noch, was durch sich selber dringt? 
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aus all dem dunklen, böden, staub gestampft, errichtet 
einladend sich dies haus, anheim euch, fest gestellt, 
dass prunkvoll türmend, doch bedacht gefügt, geschichtet, 
die leeren plätze greifend, raum in räumen sich gesellt, 
 
weit dafür eingenommen uns; was da höfe hält, 
auch worte, weiss einleuchtend, ist so reich gewichtet, 
trägt bis zum letzten stein, leicht über auch, sei zelt, 
das uns anhimmelnd fernen ausmalt, fenster dichtet. 
 
wie hell wir uns durch hallen wieder holen, spiegelnd    
glanzvoll erschliessen; stufe über stufe schwingt 
sich auf, uns hebt aus all den angeln, lauf beflügelnd,   
 
vervielfacht tür ist, tor, gleich ein- sind, ausgeklinkt, 
gekreuzt wird jeder gang mit sich: ob auf es springt,  
das ganze schloss, eröffnend uns, sich selbst besiegelnd? 
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erde, sonett 
 
 
voll pracht, hochherzig malend aus uns ganz, errichtet 
leibhaft der bau sich, weitläufig an wie ausgelegt,  
abstufend  reich mir zu gestalten viel geschichtet,  
auch heimlich räume greift es, haupt stumm, steinern prägt,  
 
anhimmelnd so bedacht; euch eingefleischt ihr mich verdichtet,     
dass wir uns bilden ein gesicht, da glanzvoll trägt 
mich festlich, körper, über euch, wie schwer gewichtet 
aus tiefen wieder hallen holt, zu ruhn bewegt   
 
auf  welchen säulen, bögen! ach, im grossen, zügen 
zugänglich mir, doch uns auch übersteigt dies zelt, 
hebt lauf auf  keis um kreis, erschliesst, nicht nur verschwiegen, 
 
den punkt, so hoch: ringsum ihr schallt, mich gleich euch stellt, 
schön dar, dass wir von grund auf  zu einander fügen, 
da leuchtend ein dies haus erbaulich uns erhält? 
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erde, sonett 
 
 
schwankend der ganze bau, von grund fest uns erschütternd, 
da wir, so lückenhaft, falsch, schief, sind uns gelegt, 
ja aus auch, unbedacht ent-deckt; ich, doppelt, zitternd 
zieh böden weg euch, überstürzend  kaum dies trägt, 
 
wird stets entworfen. wie bin haltlos uns, zersplitternd, 
stellt bloss sich dies, durch euch entrüstet, auf  sich schlägt, 
an selbst gemasst. in trümmer gehn, verlustig und verwitternd 
malt mir dies dunkel an die wand , wie sehr bewegt 
 
rührt blindlings uns. so wird auf  dies stets gehoben, 
aus all den angeln wir, da fehlend, doch in stücken, 
an allen ecken, enden tür sind, tor, verschoben, 
 
verschaukelt! wie ist frei der himmel, sich erblicken 
leer lässt, ein loch zuletzt: getürmt prunkt staub, wir oben 
wie unten sind da mit geteilt, haus zu entrücken? 
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dies eingefleischte kleid, darin ich tief versenkt, 
dass es sich, stoffe blühend, glanzvoll uns entfaltet, 
prächtig erscheint, schön färbend; schleierhaft beengt 
es mich, doch damit uns erwirkt, hier leibhaft waltet, 
 
ja, schaltet: schalen sind um schichten mir verhängt, 
da jede silbe auf sich drängt, sinnreich uns spaltet, 
dass es die blüten streut, dies so besternt, umfängt, 
schmerzlich bemäntelnd uns verblümt, doch wohl gestaltet! 
 
ach, dunkel zu gefallen, uns dies überträgt 
einander musterhaft, da sich, davon durchdrungen, 
das blatt so teilt, selbst mit, bloss sich gewand jetzt legt, 
 
staub aus, in unsren namen: wie wir sind verschlungen 
im kern so herz-, ja sachlich, bis, doch neu geprägt, 
dies platzt heraus, mit jeder faser nackt, entsprungen. 
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da so ich angetanzt, wie ihr mir leibhaft gleicht, 
in all dem zeug, einander wieder uns zu geben, 
ich, stofflich eure pracht entfaltend, wechsle leicht 
die seiten, als ihr, kleidsam mich so anzustreben,  
 
mich dreht, mir schleierhaft, zum ding: behende reicht 
mir das, ergreifend, euch, da wir uns selbst aufheben 
in der verschlingung, bis ihr wendig euch entweicht,    
auffächernd mich allein, doch so, wie ich vorschweben 
 
in meinen namen lass mir uns: ja, dies gewand, 
verkörpernd dergestalt, schön auslegt und beschreitet, 
wie wir uns übertragen, zeigend rand um rand 
 
so ungesäumt: stets jede masche sich ausweitet, 
geht durch sich selbst, entsprechend, weit gespannt, 
bis alle fasern nackt sind, wir ganz ausgedeutet. 
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luft, sonett 
 
 
da es mich schrillt, verpfeift, bin aufgeschreckt, -gespürt, 
heraustrompetet selbst verschreiend durch mich drehe;  
umbraust, durchzuckt weh im verdonnern bin gerührt, 
verschleudernd alles sausen lasse, flöten gehe, 
 
bis es, zusammentrommelnd, packt mich, schlägt, abschwirrt, 
mitreissend mich verzupft, verduften lässt, dass stehe, 
nein, längst verweht bin, stets auf andrem blatt, verirrt, 
entgeisternd mir, vergeigt, verschollen, ja, die böe, 
 
weit fegt, hinweg...in schwebe bleibe, luft so liegen,    
wie kreis, sich selbst beschreibend, mich lässt an sich deuten,  
dass fern anklingend hohe bögen mich aufwiegen:    
 
am höchsten punkt es lässt uns all dies hören, läuten, 
bis wind, sich legt, auch aus-, wird still. so frisch erschwiegen, 
sich wort hält atem an uns, neu mich zu besaiten? 
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luft, sonett 
 
 
süss wird es eingeblasen, doch uns gleich geht flöten, 
da wir gehörig sind erschüttert, stürmisch, lückenhaft, 
sodass es auf mich, durch uns pfeift, all dies trompeten, 
einpauken stopft die löcher nicht, sie schmerzlich klafft:  
 
so sind gepackt, gerüttelt maß, wir wind gedrehten,   
ja davon aufgewirbelt, es uns trommelt, rafft 
zusammen, hochreisst laut, die so aus uns gewehten!, 
bis selbst uns fern dies läuten hören lässt, geschafft 
 
wer weiss wie sehr, wohin: was ist da aufgegangen,  
dass wir entgeistert sind, vergeigt, doch auch erwogen 
in atem haltend an uns, immerfort anlangen, 
 
am höchsten punkt, so sehr verspielt, ja aufgeflogen, 
doch rings voll anklang: ob wir uns so selbst einfangen, 
in schwebe bleibt, ob aus, ob ein uns schliesst der bogen. 
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engel, zungen  
 
 
wie lücken-,  schleierhaft es antanzt, doch auch lichtend, 
so leicht uns fächert auf: hauch zart besaitend luft 
sich greift aus mir, dass stofflich, doch auch fein, gewichtend,        
wir flöten gehn einander, sehr verlustig, kluft 
 
uns anweht! reich, doch nebelhaft auch, sich andichtend, 
hier süss aus jedem loch verpfiffen, aus dem blauen 
es gibt uns wieder ein, dich zuträgt, bis, uns sichtend, 
selbst wendig kreis drehn, wort, ja, atem halten, stauen: 
 
allseits sind so posaunt heraus, hinein gewandt, 
wie wir anhimmeln selbst aus heiterm uns vielkehlig, 
da, insgeheim gelüftet, noch das fernste band 
 
dich auslöst, ein: jetzt bin mir voll-, ach, überzählig, 
antönend wohl dir zu gefallen, weit bis zum rand, 
dem letzten deut uns froh entlocken, so saumselig?. 
 
 
 
 
Diese Gedichte stammen aus elemente, sonette, aus einem Vorhaben, an dem ich 
seit einigen Jahren arbeite. 
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